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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report presents the results of a Seed System Security Assessment in Zimbabwe, 
implemented during July 2009.   
 
A seed system security assessment (SSSA) reviews the functioning of seed systems which 
farmers use, both formal and informal.  It assesses whether seed of adequate quality is 
available and whether farmers can access it.  The approach also promotes strategic thinking 
about the relief, recovery or development vision needed.   For instance, during the stress 
period, should aid aim to restore the system as it was, ex ante, or aim to strengthen it?    A 
SSSA goes well beyond a conventional seed needs assessment as it hones in on specific seed 
security problems communities face, and then steers response to actions which alleviate 
specific constraints, and often improve systems. (For full description of method, see 
http://www.ciat.cgiar.org/africa/pdf/sssa_manual_ciat.pdf).     
 
Four sites were chosen for the assessment :  Murehwa , ward 14 (natural  region IIB); Bikita, 
ward 15,( natural  region III); Tsholotsho, ward 12 (natural  region IV); and Beitbridge, ward 
10 (natural region V). The sites include zones where participating non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) were prepared to address seed security-related constraints and 
opportunities.    The four selected sites also represent well the cross-section of the regions in 
which Zimbabwean agriculture and seed aid continue to unfold.   Murehwa is a prime maize 
zone in a higher potential region, Tsholotsho and Bikita are largely small grain zones, in which 
maize is also grown. Beitbridge is at the edge of where agriculture is viable.  
    
The full report presents the seed security findings and recommendations specific to each site,  
as well as findings and recommendations which emerged across sites.  In this summary, we 
focus on the across-site results as these may have broader relevance to areas in Zimbabwe 
where seed security responses are currently being planned. 
 
Note that this assessment coincided with a period when preparations by donors and NGOs 
were well advanced for distributing substantial seed (mainly hybrid maize) and fertilizer aid 
to at least 600,000 farming families, or about half of the Zimbabwe farming population.  At 
the same time, rural businesses, including agro-dealers that had closed shop during the price 
control enforcement, were beginning to revive. The synopsis of the findings are that (i) 
farmers are generally seed secure and have developed resilient community seed sourcing 
mechanisms during stress periods when seed was not available or affordable and that (ii) 
massive direct seed aid to farmers will hurt agro-dealers and ‘short circuit’ a natural business 
progression relationship between seed houses, agro-dealers, rural traders and the farmers. 
The team recognizes the need for assistance, particularly in terms of increasing farmer and 
community buying power and injecting currency into local economies.  However, we propose 
delivery mechanisms that give farmers the opportunity to choose (and strategize) and which 
that do not hurt rural business or agro-dealers and eventually hurt farmers – e.g. aid 
interventions such as vouchers and  subsidies for transport. These interventions require 
logistical prudence but are geared towards assisting the recovery process that has already 
begun.  Farming families depend on rural traders not only for seed and fertilizer purchases, 
but also as buyers for their farm produce.  
Select SSSA findings are summarized in the section directly below.  Recommendations then 
follow. 
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SEED SYSTEM SECURITY ASSESSMENT HIGHLIGHTS 
Smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe use both formal and informal seed channels for procuring 
their seed, and both merit explicit attention in any seed security assessment.   
Formal seed sector 
• Zimbabwe has been long known for having an unusually well developed national seed 
industry: when functioning well, over 15 companies produced and marketed seed of over 
20 different crops. (Key companies include SeedCo, Pannar, Pioneer, Agri Seeds, National 
tested Seeds.)    
• Maize is, by far, the most important focus of breeding and seed sector efforts and the 
only important food crop for which small farmers are dependent on the formal seed 
industry. Some 101 maize hybrid varieties were released in the period 1970-2007, and 8 
open pollinated varieties (OPVs) during the years 2003-2008.   Despite, increasing 
breeding efforts on OPVs, the Zimbabwe seed industry still focuses heavily on hybrids.  At 
the time of the SSSA, a single company, Agri Seeds, had OPVs (ZM521) on offer. 
• In the past, commercial seed companies have also sold seed of other crops, but these 
have been a minor focus relative to maize.  Some of the commercial crops for which seed 
has been previously sold include: wheat, barley, sunflower, soybeans and cotton.  Staple 
food crops for which seed of improved varieties was also previously sold include 
sorghum, peal millet, cowpeas and groundnuts.   
Trends pre-liberalization  
• Between 2006/07 and the beginning of 2009, the formal seed sector nearly shut down 
due to price controls, inflation  currency constraints, and an unfavorable policy/ 
regulatory environment.    Seed production within country was extremely limited, and 
essentially all retail seed outlets closed.  More specifically:  
o Seed companies had concerns about price.  Prices (especially for maize and 
wheat) were fixed by the government, which made it un-profitable for the out-
growers to produce seed and sell it to the companies.  There are also concerns 
that any seed produced could be requisitioned by government, at any time, to 
support large scale inputs distribution programs. 
 
o With land reform and the loss of the large-scale commercial farmers, seed 
companies have had to establish new networks of out-growers.  These new seed 
producers have required time to gain the necessary experience and expertise.  
They also farm much smaller amounts of land, which means seed companies 
have had to contract more growers, and this has significantly increased their 
transaction costs. 
 
o Before the introduction of the use of the US dollar, the inflationary environment 
made doing business in general extremely challenging. For example, the price of 
25 kgs of maize was 4313 Zimbabwe dollars  in  July 2003 and  250000000 
Zimbabwe dollars in  July 2008. 
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Current trends- with liberalization 
• With liberalization of the regulatory/policy environment and introduction of US$/ZAR 
(Rand) in the first quarter of 2009, most seed houses have been expanding grower 
networks and are re-opening retail outlets.   
o Seed houses have been significantly scaling up production in-country,  For 
instance, in the 2008/09 season, Pioneer produced at least 4000 mt of hybrids  
in-country , and  Agri Seeds between  5000 -6000 mt  (up from 1200 mt in 
2007/08).  It is not possible to get precise figures on total supplies available for 
the upcoming season, as:  a) seed companies prefer not to divulge figures on 
stocks now in country; and b) certified supplies for sale to Zimbabwe farmers can 
come from seed house branches in neighboring countries, particularly South 
Africa and to a lesser extent Zambia. Discussions with seed houses suggest that 
they can import very significant quantities with only 4-weeks’ notice.   
o Agro-dealers were open in every city, town and growth center visited during the 
assessment.  New outlets even opened during the course of the field assessment, 
indicating that the next few months could be a dynamic period of transition: e.g.  
a SeedCo outlet opened its doors in Murewha on July 10, 2009.  Anticipating 
expanded business, not only were agro-dealers selling seed and fertilizer, but so 
were general delivery stores, and many non-specialty shops, such as grocers and 
clothes stores, which would put 5-10 bags of inputs on offer.   
o The amount of stocks available for sale in July 2009 was impressive  for the time 
of year,  many months before sowing and well before  farmers’ main period seed 
purchases in September and October .  At that time, established agro-dealers had 
generally upwards of 15T maize for immediate sale, with the majority indicating 
that these were just initial stocks, which could be replenished when, or if, 
depleted.     
o Dealers generally assessed farmer buying patterns as quite positive.   In 
Masvingo, for example, Masvingo Farm Supplies (MFS) had sold 8T maize 
immediately upon opening in March 2009, while N. Richards, had sold 15T in one 
week mid-July and had ordered another 15T to arrive the following week.   
Anticipating farmers’ limited access to US$ currency, dealers are making available 
smaller packets on inputs: two, and particularly five and 10kg packs of maize and 
fertilizer, along with the normal 20 and 25 kg packs.  
o Innovative efforts have been catalyzed to extend the reach of agro-dealers.  
Starting from 1995, CARE International in Zimbabwe has supported an 
‘Agribusiness Entrepreneur Network (AGENT) program, a network of community-
based agents which sell agri-inputs and allied products to smallholder farmers.   
The program has trained over 800 agents and at its height covered five provinces 
and 33 districts.  Basically, the work brings a network of retail shops much closer 
to its rural buyers.   Currently the program is active in Masvingo and the Midlands 
and has 106 trader agents.  CARE not only provides services to farmers through 
supporting such trader agents, but equally enhances agents’ own business skills, 
loan prospects and entrepreneurial opportunities.   
o Agro-dealers were optimistic but expressed concerns over staying open during 
this critical period. Masvingo Farm Supplies (MFS), the largest agro-dealer in the 
province (Masvingo), provides a compelling example.  At its peak, MFS had 14 
branches and moved over 210T of maize seed  each season, serving over 100,000 
commercial and communal   farmers   with agricultural inputs.  August 2008, MFS 
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closed its doors and let all 150 employees go.  They re-opened March 2009, with 
15 staff only, but now have hopes for renewal. 
o Many dealers expressed dismay over the upcoming free direct seed distributions 
(DSD). Even if free seed  is provided only in November 2009,  hearing about the 
prospect of  such aid can change farmers’ buying patterns immediately---even 
five months earlier, in July 2009.   Evidence for such anticipatory behavior came 
from the Murehwa site, where in 2008/09, 50% of farmers in the district planted 
maize late, as they delayed sowing until the free fertilizer came, in mid December  
o In terms of  bolstering  agro-dealers,  two immediate  challenges became  
apparent during the SSSA; 
• To get inputs for  sale  into the regions, to agro-dealers  (versus only  
to centralized relief agencies procurers); 
• To encourage farmers to buy inputs now ,   knowing that free seed 
and fertilizer will be distributed in massive quantities later in the 
year.  
 
In brief, the formal seed sector in Zimbabwe has been very badly affected by the massive 
inflation that existed over the last 10 years, and by a very difficult economic and policy 
environment that prevailed during the same time period, and which has been particularly un-
favorable in the last three years.  However, in the first half of 2009 things have greatly 
improved (legalization of use of the US dollar for trade in-country and removal of restrictions 
on input and output markets).  Most of the major seed companies are also still functioning in 
Zimbabwe, albeit at much reduced levels compared with 10 years ago.  So there is now an 
important opportunity to re-establish the formal seed sector and related retail market 
networks in the country.  This potential recovery is still fragile, and needs to be encouraged 
with appropriate support.  The right kind of relief programs at this time – ones that promote 
rather than compete with the formal seed sector and retail networks – could be extremely 
valuable in jump-starting the recovery. 
 
Informal sector 
Sorghum, pearl millet, groundnuts, cowpeas, Bambara nuts, sugar beans and sweet potato 
constitute the bulk of crops that are important in the informal seed sector in Zimbabwe.  
Others include open pollinated maize varieties, soybeans, sunflower, white beans and finger 
millet.    Except for maize, the informal sector supplies over 95% of the seed Zimbabwe 
farmers sow.    Informal sector crops are also are key for production stability and nutrition, 
and many are loosely identified as ‘women’s crops’.  Due to the collapse of the economy and 
the resultant shortage of maize seed in formal markets, hybrid maize has also made inroads 
into the informal markets. Hybrid maize bought in 10kg, 20kg, 25kg or 50kg packs is 
repackaged into smaller packets of 2kg and 5 kg and sold in the informal venue – from trucks 
or open market stalls, or from others who have obtained it, e.g. employees of some seed 
companies who were paid in seed bags, rather than currency.   
 
Overall, the assessment team found the informal sector function well: being both resilient 
and dynamic. There was an impressive amount of processing within communities, to add 
value to basic agricultural products and especially to generate income.  All major crops could 
potentially undergo transformation into saleable products. Also a number of processes have 
served to keep the informal sector dynamic and supplied with an injection of new varieties:  
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processes such as participatory variety selection, on-farm trials, cross-border trade, seed 
fairs.   
 
 
The 2008/09 season: overview  
• Informal sector supplies are abundant after the 2008/09 season.  
o The 2008-09 harvest was a good one, as assessed by all four farming 
communities, and supported by the Ministry of Agriculture Crop and Livestock 
Assessment Mission.  Following on a  ‘bad’ year,  maize production 2008-09 was 
160% more than that of 2007-08; and the 2008-09  combined  small grains was  
190% more than the previous year (and 110% more that the recent five-year 
national production average) (Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and 
Irrigation Development, 2009). 
o Social networks of exchange remain strong and continued to function during the 
2008-09 season, providing 10 to 38%   of the seed sown of maize, groundnut, 
finger millet, cowpea, sorghum, pearl millet and Bambara nut.   It is impressive 
that such extensive gift-giving took place, just after the ‘bad season of 2007-08.  
o Open markets in all sites visited had good supplies of a large variety of crops, 
many of which constitute ‘potential seed’.  Part of the abundance was   attributed 
to a good harvest and part due to improved access to fuel and transport facilities 
which helped agricultural produce move.  Overall, the quality of potential seed on 
offer generally looked good to excellent: the legumes in particular were full 
grained, generally sorted to a single variety (except cowpea), free from inert 
material and with little evidence of damage in storage.    
• The big surprise in the informal sector was an abundance, not a lack. This abundance 
was most apparent where local level seed production has been given special 
technical and organizational support, particularly in the Tsholotsho region.  In 
Tsholotsho, Farmer Field Schools (FFS) produced 155 mt pearl millet, groundnut, 
sorghum and cowpea during the 2008/09 season   These FFS groups ask that outside 
agencies purchase their FFS-produced seed- rather than give outside seed aid.  While  
FFS groups have mastered the seed production techniques, they need help in 
identifying markets and to build their agro-business expertise more generally. 
The 2008/09 season: specific seed sources  
• Individual farmer assessments of the 2008/09season, showed the majority in the 
SSSA sample appreciated the varieties they sowed—and the seed condition.     
• In terms of seed sources for the 2008/09 season,  seed obtained  from farmers  own 
stocks or through social networks was key across crops; agro-dealers and local shops 
were  particularly important sources for maize seed, and local markets for the 
legumes, especially  groundnut and Bambara nut.  Development interventions were a 
significant seed source only for maize (13.6% of total seed supply) and much of this 
was obtained through the government program of Operation Maguta.   Within the 
SSSA sample, food aid and seed aid together provided just over  1/10 of the maize 
seed (and some of this was probably also Operation Maguta) .  Figures are 2.4% and 
8.1% for food aid and seed aid respectively.   
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In sum, farmers used a diversity of channels and multiple strategies to access their seed for 
the 2008/09 season: most involved use of their own local channels and even during this 
economically volatile period, farmers found ways to barter and buy at significant levels.  
Development and emergency aid together provided only a quarter of the total maize seed 
sown in 2008/09. 
 
Community Assessment of seed security  
and prospects for the 2009/10 season 
 
Community groups assessed their own seed security for their three most important crops (as 
prioritized by the community).  Seed security was defined as either having the seed already in 
hand, or being able to access the seed with some certainty (though purchase, barter, gift, or 
other).  
 
• Communities themselves were quite positive in their overall seed security 
assessment.  For small grain seed, all could meet 100% of their seed needs.   In two 
the four sites, communities signaled groundnuts as a potential problem for about a 
quarter of families, depending on the supplies to on  offer in open markets  at sowing 
time (and groundnut was the only crop for which communities signaled ongoing 
availability problems—due to challenges associated with its seed multiplication.)  The 
community assessment for maize seed security was very good: 90-100% of 
households have in stock or indicate they can access the seed they need, mainly 
through direct purchase.   
• Such community assessments correlated to a high degree with the quantitative 
findings from the 165 individual interviews.  In quantitative assessments , farmers 
indicated they had clear possibilities for obtaining 100% of their seed requirements 
for all crops, except for groundnut (in which they quantified they could reach 93% of 
their requirements)   
•  For the 2009/10 season farmers indicate they will use the following sources to obtain 
seed  
o For the small grains, farmers are counting mainly on their own stocks, 
supplemented by purchase at local markets.  For the legumes, again, home-
saved stocks and open markets will be used, with local markets being a main 
source particularly for Bambara nut. Cowpea, in Murehwa is an exception as 
the crop is relatively new and farmers still expect outside assistance from the 
NGO, World Vision especially for new varieties. 
o For maize, farmers have retained some stocks (recycled and carryover), but 
aim to purchase the bulk of the seed from agro-dealers: they sense such a 
strategy possible.  Farmers are optimistic they can obtain cash needed for 
maize purchase.   At the time of the assessment, it was not possible to 
confirm that all cash needed for maize purchase  by farming families was 
available as the sale of the 2008/09 crops was ongoing:  it is mainly from 
harvest sales that farmers expect to generate seed money.   
o Relatively few farmers are counting on emergency aid for seed for 2009/10.  
This could likely change as during the course of the assessment in July, 
newspapers were already starting to advertise the upcoming free 
distributions.  
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• Reviewing the overall evidence (qualitative and quantitative data), the SSSA team 
would be slightly more conservative than the community in assessing seed security.  
Particularly for maize, we would put figures of ‘maize needy’, at around 10% or a high 
of 15% , with the bulk of the  needy coinciding with those who are chronically poor. 
(So the issue would be purchasing power, not lack of seed per se.)     
This 10-15% figure for maize-related aid is based on a assumption that other farmers 
will have the opportunity to themselves acquire needed inputs.  This implies that 
input supplies of seed and fertilizer will continue to reach rural shops in important 
quantities. 
 
Fertilizer and costs of inputs 
Fertilizer assessments were not done extensively.  Communities themselves raised access to 
fertilizer rather than to maize seed per se, as the major constraint, mainly due to its unusually 
high cost 
• During the July 2009 assessment, fertilizer supplies were starting to be put in both 
agro-dealer and general delivery stores.  Neither agro-dealers nor farmers cited 
availability as a central issue with fertilizer.  Rather price was the compelling 
constraint and particularly the terms of trade.  Using barter economy rates, the price 
has gone up five-fold in but two to three years.  For instance, in Murehwa a 50kg bag 
used to cost 3 buckets of sweet potatoes; in July 2009, it cost the equivalent of 15 
buckets. 
• Quick calculations of costs of inputs give a sense of the current, exorbitantly high, 
costs of inputs—in relation to funds received for harvest sale.  Direct inputs to plant 
an acre of maize—only the seed and fertilizer—will cost the farmer at least $112 US.   
On the open local market, farmers will receive but $166 US, he/she harvests at least 
1500 kgs. 
 
Money/Purchasing power 
The overwhelming issues in terms of seed security—did not directly relate to seed at all.  The 
critical issues across sites revolved around money and purchasing power.  Prices for inputs 
were high, and farmers felt they were not getting adequate costs for their produce (which at 
the time of the assessment was just at the point of sale—to generate needed liquidity  
• The change to the new was welcomed by many as it has relatively stable value and 
help to stimulate the return of goods onto shelves.   
• However the move to the US$ has also brought a number of distinct disadvantages.  
As there is basically no change available (nothing under US$1), prices are being 
inflated up to the higher units.  Also, getting currency notes,  the FOREX, either to 
farmers individually, or into local commerce, has taken more time than will be 
expected.  Farmers also do not have an intrinsic sense of the currency and 
particularly how their produce should be valued in the new FOREX.   Even open 
market traders were quite unsure on how the currency change itself will affect prices  
for inputs as sowing season arrives. 
 
 
 
xiii 
 
In brief: the issues related to money are multiple, and distinct. They include: 
 
• lack of actual currency notes  in rural areas (individually, and in commerce) 
• lack of change (small money) associated with the currency- which in itself 
leads to higher unit costs (as merchants round up) 
• lack of farmer purchasing power, especially in relation to low prices received 
for produce 
• Unfamiliarity with value of currency, including uncertainty of how the new 
notes in themselves will affect open market prices  
Seed security summary 
In terms of seed per se, the only critical issue found during the SSSA is related to formal seed 
and input sector functioning. Given the last few years of policy challenges (especially price 
control, and currency value breakdown), this sector will take time to recover.  However, even 
during the short period of the field SSSA, agro-dealers were starting to open their doors, 
general delivery dealers were starting to stock packets and even non-specialty stores (food 
stores, clothes shops) were starting to stack 5 and 10 bags here and there.  Evidence clearly 
shows that this sector is starting to put supplies on offer--and farmers already buying. One 
immediate challenge related to the formal sector supply, and specifically to agro-dealers, is to 
make sure they remain open and do not fold again. 
 
Fertilizer assessments were not done extensively.  Communities themselves raised access to 
fertilizer rather than to maize seed per se, as the major constraint, mainly due to its unusually 
high cost. SSSA team calculations reinforce the community assessment of the relatively high 
costs of production, and especially of fertilizer, in relation to remuneration received for maize 
sale.  
 
The SSSA found that the overriding problem around the issue of seed security, and the 
functioning of seed systems more broadly, had little to do directly with seed at all.  
Immediate and key constraints revolve around money and purchasing power: the terms of 
trade for farmers have escalated enormously; farmers  were just starting to market produce 
and were concerned about low remunerations ;  there is little actual cash (and particularly 
$US currency notes) in rural economies. 
 
As the next section moves toward making recommendations, we underline here the prime 
challenges for addressing seed security concerns at this highly fluctuating time in Zimbabwe: 
 
 To restart and reinforce  the formal sector supply—supporting not undermining 
fledging efforts; and   
 To inject cash into local economies 
 
These two big challenges should help shape immediate seed  security interventions across 
and within  the sites of assessment. 
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SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
A full set of recommendations appears in section VIII of this report.   Recommendations are 
divided into those for the very short term (now), versus recommendations for the short to 
medium term (i.e., within the next few seasons).   In this summary, we focus on 
recommendations specific to formal and informal seed sector functioning, and to methods of 
seed security assessment. 
 
Formal Seed Sector Strengthening During Emergency and Early 
Recovery 
 
Agro-dealers are critical conducts through which farmers obtain maize seed, fertilizer and 
other specialized agricultural inputs.  They can only serve small farmers if: a) they continue to 
exist, b) have supplies,  c) are situated in some proximity to farming communities, and d) 
offer products at prices which farmers can afford.   The Relief Seed Business is threatening to 
compromise attributes a  and b, and incentives or subsidies have to be put in place to address 
issues c and d.  
 
Very short term 
 
6. Recommendation:  In the immediate months, all efforts must be made to sustain,  
 not undermine, agro-dealer business during this tenuous financial period.  A good 
 number are just starting to re-open their doors, and it is a ‘make or break’ period for 
 them. 
   
Specific recommendations linked to 6 
  
 6.1  If emergency maize and/or fertilizer are to be given as part of relief programs 
  such distributions should be done via a  voucher system linking farmers to 
  agro-dealers stores or to agro-dealers selling at seed fairs.    
  
  Such a move will help support business recovery, get farmers access to  
  preferred varieties and inputs, and help to inject cash into the local economy. 
  
 6.2 Agro-dealers need to be encouraged to sell closer to farming communities, 
  and growth center areas.  Transport costs mean that rural farmers may pay 
  30-50% more for the same bag of seed sold in the bigger towns.  In the short-
  term, aid organizations might consider adding a transport cost into any  
  voucher program. 
 
 6.3 Agro-dealers linked to seed aid programs should be encouraged to package 
  seed and fertilizer products in sizes farmers have potential to access.  While 
  the assessment team saw 1 kg packages of both (re-packed) we suggest 
  seed sizes of  5 and 10 kg (with 2 kg on offer in small quantity) and fertilizer 
  in 5 and 10 kg packs and upwards. 
 
 6.4  Efforts should be made (by donors? government? UN agencies?) to ensure 
  that regional and local agro-dealers can receive adequate stocks to sell.  This 
  might be an issue of reorienting the overall supply away from bulk relief  
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  aid purchase.  Mechanisms should also be explored for helping local dealers 
  to receive stocks on consignment or through some credit guarantee  
  arrangement. 
 
Short to medium term 
 
7. Recommendation: The ‘normal’ network of those selling certified maize seed, 
fertilizer, and other specified inputs needs to be expanded and brought closer to 
farming communities on a continued basis.  Formal agro-dealers may not find it 
lucrative to set up shop in less populated and removed areas. Programs such as 
CARE’s ‘trader agents’ in Masvingo have served in the past to broaden agro-supplier 
coverage. (Note: similar programs have unfolded in neighboring Zambia, The Profit 
Program)   Recommendation: The traders agent networks, such as those supported 
by CARE,  should re-vitalized and replicated so as to serve even those in more remote 
areas.  
 
8. As a general recommendation, across the board:, Incentives need to be put in place 
to encourage agro dealers and trader agent suppliers to become more  small farmer 
client oriented.  Client-oriented means putting seed on offer early (July/August rather 
than October/November), offering farmers preferred crops varieties and fertilizers, 
packing in affordable sizes, and selling at points accessible to local farming 
populations.  
  
INFORMAL SEED SECTOR STRENGTHENING DURING 
EMERGENCY AND EARLY RECOVERY 
 The informal seed sector provides the majority of Zimbabwe farmers’ seed:  small 
grains, pulses and tubers. (Important exceptions are seed of maize, wheat and 
horticultural crops).  The informal sector needs to be strengthened so as to provide 
farmers easy access to improved varieties, deliver a good quality seed, and to 
professionalize the processes of seed production, marketing and rural agro-
enterprise more generally.   A healthier informal seed sector will translate into a 
much healthier rural economy. 
 
 
Very short term 
 
9. Recommendation: emergency support programs linking with the informal as well as 
formal sector should concentrate on alleviating seed access problems. Seed fairs with 
vouchers, vouchers linking farmers to agro-dealers  (cited in point 7) and direct cash 
transfers are all examples of possible aid options which might give farmers increased 
access to crops and varieties of their choice. 
 
Specific recommendations linked to 9 
 
9.1 In terms of seed-related issues, seed voucher and fair operations might best  
 be designed to respond to specific needs of farmers at this moment in time.   
 Access to groundnut seed, and seed of new, especially early maturing 
 varieties, have been cited at various sites as key farmer-sought inputs.   Seed 
 fairs might make extra efforts to engage local and regional agro-dealer 
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 suppliers to put on offer modern varieties.  Formal sector suppliers might 
 require a transport premium to take part in these rural  events. 
 
9.2.  Non-seed agricultural inputs also were cited at the forefront of farmer needs 
 in the assessment:  fertilizer, labor, draught power.   Seed fairs might insure 
 that both basal and top dressing fertilizer bags appear on offer in any fair 
 event, and in farmer-friendly sizes.  Use of vouchers to gain access to labor 
 and draught power might also be explored. 
 
9.3   Graduated vouchers might be usefully employed in the upcoming emergency 
 programs.  Basically, graduated vouchers give varied levels of aid and help to 
 distinguish between the very poor, and  those who need a bit of extra help in 
 this time of financial and currency fluctuation. Graduated vouchers can  help 
 lessen  dependencies, as only  those near the bottom of the spectrum 
 should  receive substantial free  support. Average income farmers (again, 
 somewhat cash insecure) might receive vouchers to cover but parts of their 
 agricultural needs. 
 
9.4.  Giving cash aid as direct assistance might seem unwise at this point in 
 Zimbabwe, where the whole economy is severely cash-strapped.  However, 
 small cash trials could help farmers access their own priority needs, which 
 may include agricultural inputs. 
  
Short to medium term 
 
There is a strong need and opportunity to professionalize and strengthen informal sector 
seed production. 
 
10. Farmer groups (and individual entrepreneurs)  require support to ensure good quality 
seed supplies of what are referred to as the non-commercial or orphan crops  
(basically everything but maize, wheat and horticultural crops). This support implies 
efforts on multiple thrusts, and needs to be done professionally.  Seed production 
will not succeed unless it is tied to real demand and sustainable market development.  
Recommendation:  Significant effort and funds should be allotted to increase 
informal seed production capacity and marketing channels.    
   
 Specific recommendations linked to 10 
 
10.1 Local community groups need enhanced capacity in the techniques of seed 
 production.  Farmer Field School experience shows that better isolation 
 distances, variety sorting, improved agronomic practices, improved storing 
 and storage techniques can lead to greater availability of good quality seed at 
 the local level. Groundnut seed, in particular, requires  enhanced local level 
 capacities. 
 
10.2 Farmer groups, whether for seed or food sale, should only be encouraged to 
 produce crops if  clear markets have been identified, and general agro-
 enterprise/ marketing skills enhanced.  Market skill enhancement and 
 market identification has to be the driving force shaping local production 
 initiatives.   
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10.3 New, modern, farmer-acceptable, and market preferred crops and varieties 
 have to feed on a continuing basis into local production systems, both to 
 boost yields and enhance marketing possibilities.  Across sites, only new 
 maize  varieties enter  farming system with regularity—except when special 
 aid of development programs bring  in new cowpea or sweet potato or pearl 
 millet types.   Recommendation: Links have to be professionalized and 
 sustained to promote variety innovation at the local level.   Farmer Field 
 Schools (FFS),  Participatory Variety selection, new variety small packet sales 
 might all help to raise awareness of and access to new needed varietal 
 materials.  
 
 10.4 Production of foundation seed has to be intensified across of range of non-
  commercial crops, to form the base of an extensive, decentralized, seed  
  production system.  The production of such foundation seed should squarely 
  rest with the national research institution `DR&SS.  (This is not an appropriate 
  or sustainable international agricultural center function).   
 
In brief, we are recommending the development of a market driven local seed 
production model, which scales up foundation seed and then decentralizes seed 
production in scores of zones country- wide.  Supply has to respond to demand, 
meaning that hard to produce crops (e.g. groundnut) and new desired varieties have 
to drive the production process. 
 
11. Local markets are important for farmers’ seed supply, particularly for the pulses. 
More attention should be given to encouraging that these open seed/grain markets 
supply the kinds of potential seed farmers need.  As a point of departure, seed/grain 
traders could be powerful partners in helping to move new modern varieties widely, 
within and among farming communities.  Recommendation:  Strategies should be 
tested for directly linking formal sector seed supply with informal trader seed/grain 
sellers.  Among the approaches that might be tested and evaluated are a) the 
distribution of variety samples (to stimulate demand); and b)  the sale of small 
packets of modern varieties and improved seed at open market venues. 
 
PROMOTING ACCURATE SEED SYSTEM SECURITY 
ASSESSMENTS 
  
 Classic seed need assessments inevitably conclude that ‘seed is needed’ and that the 
response should take the form of direct seed distribution. While innovative at their inception 
(as they distinguished seed aid need from food aid need), such assessments are now 
outdated, inadequate and should be significantly modified, and urgently. Understanding of 
what happens to seed systems during disaster has become markedly more refined in the last 
five years and   we have learned that distinguishing among seed security constraints is key for 
recovery.  Further, analyses have shown that systems need to be analyzed to gear 
appropriate seed-related responses: seed systems, farming systems, markets and livelihood 
systems more generally. 
 
Short to medium term 
 
12. Recommendation:  Seed security assessment methods have to be significantly revamped. 
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Specific recommendations linked to 12. 
 
 12.1  ` National and regional formats for assessing seed security status should shift  
 from those which calculate simplistic ‘seed needs’ to frameworks which 
 recognize different types of seed security problems, and which tailor 
 responses accordingly.  These problems might include diverse constraints of 
 seed availability, seed access and seed quality, which are distinguished by 
 their presence in the short and in the long term.   The Crop and Food 
 Assessments missions might be among the priority tools to be revised to 
 contain a specific seed security component. 
 
 12.2 Seed security assessment capacity needs to be built at regional and local 
 levels.   Technical tools already exist to help NGO and government 
 agricultural officials move forward on seed security assessments.   An explicit 
 technical process needs to be put in place to: 
• raise awareness of seed security versus food security issues 
• set up local level seed security indicators 
• train local level staff (NGO and government)  in seed security field 
assessments  
 
 12.3  Given the complexity of the stresses in Zimbabwe, “emergency’ seed aid 
  related work has to think strategically and longer-term. Assessments  
  related to seed security, can and should incorporate more developmental 
   elements, including  Issues related  to system stability, opening and   
  strengthening of markets, and  equity concerns. 
   
 This expanded focus suggests that the ‘skill set of those assessing seed 
 security’ has  to be considerably broadened.  Minimally SSSA requires 
 inputs from formal and  informal seed sector specialists, farming system 
 specialists, marketing professionals, and gender/ livelihood analysts.  
 Nutritional expertise might be considered as an  added bonus.   
  
  Specific recommendation: Multidisciplinary teams should be mobilized for 
  seed system security assessments.    
 
 12.4 More generally, a political environment for ‘real seed security assessment’ 
 has to be established.  This is no easy task.  Technical advances in methods 
 alone will not lead to more accurate assessments. 
 
Strong seed security frameworks at a national level and strong leadership, ensuring that seed 
security assessment is given focus (as distinct from food security and other non-food item 
assessment),  can enable seed aid assistance in Zimbabwe to become more demand and 
problem driven.  More accurate assessments will bolster the ability of seed-related assistance 
to address farmers’ compelling seed security problems and to seize on important, emerging 
opportunities. 
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I: INTRODUCTION 
Rationale for Report 
This report presents the results of a Seed System Security Assessment (SSSA) in four sites in 
Zimbabwe.  The assessment took place in July 2009 and was implemented for four reasons. 
 
These are quickly changing times in Zimbabwe.  Formal seed suppliers are starting to open 
shop again, after years of closure or forced sale only to government programs.  The adoption 
of the US dollar as the currency standard, along with relaxing of economic controls, means 
that   farmers and producers at all levels are re-assessing market opportunities.  The issue is 
how to support and strengthen seed systems in this period of flux.  
 
The 2008/09 season had an exceptionally good harvest, 130% over the 2007/08 maize 
harvest, and was a complete surprise. Vulnerability assessment specialists expected seed 
shortages and, instead, found unexpectedly large areas planted and giving good production.   
So the fundamental question was ‘from where did farmers get their seed?’ 
 
Massive aid actions are already scheduled for the upcoming 2009/10 season.  International 
donors are providing $140 million to distribute maize seed and fertilizer to some 600,000 
households, or 50% of the smallholder farming populations.  Is this the correct response?  Is a 
response of this scale needed?   In-depth assessments were undertaken in four distinct 
farming regions-to assess the diverse seed security scenarios and then to recommend 
tailored actions to respond to specific constraints.   
 
Finally, the work took place to build assessment capacity.  Seed security assessment tools are 
linked to food security assessments, but are also quiet distinct. For example, an assessment 
of a production shortfall, which often leads to food gaps, in most cases does not lead to a 
seed shortfall.   The Seed System Security Assessment (SSSA) in Zimbabwe was designed to 
give honed technical insight and to train professionals in fast-evolving seed security 
assessment and intervention design   methods.  The training lasted three weeks, and involved 
nine organizations. 
 
Aims and Structure of Report 
The report presents the results of the SSSA in Zimbabwe,  July 2009.  It  includes In-depth 
findings for  four specific wards  in Murehwa, Tsholotsho, Beitbridge and Bikita as well as 
overview findings,  applicable across sites. 
Section II gives background information on the concept of seed security and options for seed 
aid response.  Section III introduces the SSSA methodology and reviews the actual methods 
used in Zimbabwe, including the rationale for the choice of sites.  Given the complexity of the 
events, a separate section, IV, outlines the various political, economic and social stress factors 
which potentially shape current agricultural production and marketing.  Section V then 
provides the background for situating the specific field findings.   It describes how input 
supply systems have been functioning, including: the formal seed sector, the informal seed 
sector, and fertilizer supply chain. Notes are also presented on the “Relief Seed System’.  
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Current coping strategies are then highlighted, along with special issues related to Gender 
and Seed Security. 
 
Sections VI  presents the field findings as drawn across sites, while Section VII contains the 
four detailed cases studies, along with the site-specific recommendations. Section VIII 
presents the Overall Recommendations.   
 
The report ends with a set of references, along with annexes addressing some of the 
assessment-related logistical issues.  
 
Throughout the report, boxes are inserted to highlight important experiences and to raise 
issues for further discussion.    
 
We start the assessment report by emphasizing that the Zimbabwe case is not so much a 
complex emergency as an ongoing complex chronic stress situation---which is largely 
manmade.   Also, events are moving quickly.  Some of the assessment findings of July 2009 
might not have been remarked even in February 2009, four months earlier (for instance, the 
opening of agro-dealers).   Recognizing this dynamism, this report aims to provide a seed 
security assessment for a given period (post harvest 2008/09) as well as to highlight emerging 
trends.   We are able to do this as the assessment has focused on the functioning of seed 
systems. This is distinctly different from a standard needs assessment which may calculate 
potential seed needs at any one point in time. 
 
This is not an academic report:  the fieldwork has been effected in a relatively short time to 
allow for planning of the upcoming agricultural season, starting with sowing in October and 
November 2009.  Having said this, the assessment has  aimed for consider rigor: including use 
of multiple methods, triangulation of results (with quantitative and qualitative data), and  
work with important sample sizes.   
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II. BACKGROUND TO SEED SECURITY + AID RESPONSE 
This section presents background basics necessary for interpreting the SSSA analysis.  The 
concept of seed security is introduced   and the types of seed aid approaches used to support 
such security features  are then presented.1   
The Concept of Seed Security 
Farm families are seed secure when they have access to seed (and planting material) of 
adequate quantity, acceptable quality and in time for planting. Seed security is best framed 
within the broader context of food and livelihood security. Helping farmers to obtain the 
planting materials they need will enable them to produce both for their own consumption 
and sale. 
 
Achieving seed security is quite different from attaining food security, despite their obvious 
links. One can have enough seed to sow a plot but lack sufficient food to eat, for example 
during the ‘hungry season’ prior to harvest. Conversely, a household can have adequate food 
but lack access to appropriate seed for planting. Despite these important differences 
between food security and seed security, determinations of seed security are normally based, 
implicitly or explicitly, on food security assessments. This results from a lack of appreciation 
and understanding of seed security issues. 
 
The Dimensions of Seed Security: a Framework  
The concept of seed security embodies several fundamental aspects.  Differentiating among 
these is crucial to promote those features that foster seed security as well as to anticipate the 
ways in which such security might be threatened.  
 
The Seed Security Framework (Table 1) outlines the fundamental elements of seed security: 
seed has to be available, farmers need to be able to access it, and the seed quality must be 
sufficient to promote healthy seed system functioning.  
 
 Table 1:  Seed Security Framework: Basic Elements 
Parameter Seed Security 
Availability Sufficient quantity of seed of adapted crops are within reasonable 
proximity (spatial availability), and in time for critical sowing periods 
(temporal availability). 
Access People have adequate income or other resources to purchase or barter 
for appropriate seeds  
Quality Seed is of acceptable quality and of desired varieties (seed health, 
physiological quality, and variety integrity) 
source: Remington et al,(2002. 
 
                                               
1
 This section draws  from L. Sperling, H.D. Cooper and T. Remington,  2008 
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Availability is defined narrowly as whether sufficient quantity of seed of target crops is 
present within reasonable proximity (spatial availability) and in time for critical sowing 
periods (temporal availability). It is essentially a geographically-based parameter, and so is 
independent of the socio-economic status of farmers. 
 
Seed access is a parameter specific to farmers or communities. It largely depends upon the 
assets of the farmer or household in question: whether they have the cash (financial capital) 
or social networks (social capital) to purchase or barter for seed.  
 
Seed quality includes two broad aspects: seed quality per se, and variety quality. Seed quality 
consists of physical, physiological and sanitary attributes (such as the germination rate, and 
the absence or presence of disease, stones, sand, broken seed or weeds). Variety quality 
consists of genetic attributes, such as plant type, duration of growth cycle, seed color and 
shape, palatability and so on. 
 
In a stress situation it is  very rare to have constraints in all three seed security features at the 
same time.  So the challenge is to hone in on the real problem- and then to target alleviating 
action. 
Acute and chronic seed insecurity 
Analysis of seed security requires also consideration of the duration of the stress: whether it 
is ‘acute’ or ‘chronic’   (recognizing that the divisions are not absolute).  
Acute seed insecurity is brought on by distinct, short duration events that often affect a 
broad range of the population. It may be spurred by failure to plant, loss of a harvest, or high 
pest infestation of seed in storage. While in normal times households may have various 
degrees of seed security, all may be affected by an acute event such as a flood or short civil 
disturbance. 
Chronic seed insecurity is independent of an acute stress or disaster, although it may be 
exacerbated by it. Chronic seed insecurity may be found among populations who have been 
marginalized in different ways: economically (for example, poor, inadequate land, insufficient 
labor); ecologically (for example, in areas of repeated drought and degraded land); or 
politically (in insecure areas, or on land with uncertain tenure arrangements). Chronically 
seed insecure populations may have continual shortages of seed to plant; difficulties in 
acquiring off-farm seed due to lack of funds; or use low quality seed and unwanted varieties 
on a routine basis. The result is households with built-in vulnerabilities.  
Acute and chronic seed insecurity will very often exist together in emergency contexts. 
Indeed, in cases where emergencies are recurrent events, in drought-prone areas, for 
example, acute situations are nearly always superimposed on chronic problems rooted in 
poverty.  For example, Zimbabwe in 2007/08 had a severe drought (an acute stress), but this 
was embedded in a context of chronic (and complex) problems of ongoing political and 
economic instability.  
More Refined Analyses Leading to More Targeted Responses  
Using the definition of seed security outlined above, Table 2 gives examples of  how 
identification of a specific  seed security constraint should lead to a quite targeted response.    
So, for example, if ’seed availability’ is assessed as the problem, seed-based interventions, 
such as seed importation (for acute shocks) or development of community-based  or formal  
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sector suppliers (for chronic stress), may be appropriate.  In contrast, a diagnosis of a 
problem of ‘seed access’ might wisely trigger a  holistic analysis of livelihood strategies.  In 
the acute phase, providing farmers with cash or vouchers to get their desired seed might be 
effective . However, an identification of access problems on a chronic basis should lead 
practitioners to look well beyond seed and seed security constraints. The inability to access a 
certain necessary good on a repeated basis is usually equated with problems of basic poverty. 
Initiatives to help farmers generate income and strengthen their livelihoods would be 
essential here.   
 
Table  2:   Types  of seed problems and broadly appropriate responses 
Problem 
 
Short-term Long-term 
Unavailability of 
seed 
 
 
Where farmers source seed 
predominately through informal seed 
channels: 
 
Enhance immediate operation of local 
and regional markets (response 
dependent on context: for example, 
offer inventory credit to traders, and 
facilitate improved access to market 
information, including advance notice 
of demand subsidies or of purchase) 
Where farmers source seed 
predominately through informal seed 
channels: 
Support development of local and 
regional markets (encourage more access 
to credit, better established market 
information channels, more effective 
transport and seed storage support.) 
 Where farmers source seed 
predominately through formal seed 
channels: 
Direct distribution of seed 
Where farmers source seed 
predominately through formal seed 
channels: 
Support development of quality assured 
seed production or supply chains, incl. 
commercial enterprises where viable 
Poor and 
vulnerable farmers 
do not have access 
to seed 
Cash disbursement 
Voucher disbursement (with seed 
fairs) 
 
Poverty reduction programs 
 
Seed of poor quality 
and/or lack of 
appropriate 
varieties 
Seed fairs with quality controls  
Limited direct distribution or sale of 
samples of quality seed (for 
subsequent multiplication) 
Distribution of foundation (pure and 
healthy) seed to a limited number of 
farmers, making use of informal seed 
channels to diffuse the seed to others. 
Programs to improve seed quality (on 
farm and/or in seed and grain markets) 
 
Participatory varietal selection 
 
Participatory plant breeding 
 
It bears emphasis that relief seed aid can have negative as well as positive consequences.  
Repeated direct seed distributions distort farmers own seed procurement strategies 
(Sperling, 2002; Phiri et al., 2004), undermine local seed/grain market functioning, 
particularly in terms of retail sales (Rohrbach et al., 2004 ; Walsh et al. 2004) and compromise 
the development of longer-term more commercial seed supply systems (Tripp and Rohrbach, 
2001; Bramel and Remington, 2004; Rohrbach et al., 2005). The possible negative effects of 
seed aid should be increasingly factored into decisions about what type of aid might be given, 
and how often.  Also, as much of emergency aid unfolds in chronic stress and complex 
contexts, there is increasing urgency to link short-term relief with more developmental 
perspectives (Rohrbach et al., 2004).  Some relief-development initiatives may be seed-
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related, such as introduction of new varieties and local seed/grain market strengthening .  
Others go well beyond a seed system focus and towards a set of approaches that support and 
strengthen basic livelihood strategies.     
 
Current Major Response Options Being Used in Emergency 
Different types of seed-related interventions are currently being implemented in emergency 
and chronic stress contexts.  These are distinguished between those which deliver direct 
forms of aid (and generally assume ‘a lack of available seed’) and those which are market-
based and give recipients cash or vouchers to procure seed themselves (and hence assume 
‘lack of access’ as the driving need). Responses might also focus on seed quality issues, both 
varietal quality and seed quality per se (health, germination rates, and purity), although these 
tend to be medium or longer-term interventions (Table 3).  
 
Important within the emergency seed assistance field is that for many years, Direct Seed 
Distribution (DSD – also known as “Seeds and Tools”) has dominated seed aid response.  Use 
of a DSD approach implies a problem of  lack of seed (non-availability) on the ground.  DSD in 
Zimbabwe has been used on a routine basis since about 1991, every two to three years (see 
Section IV, Stress context) . DSD approaches also often involve promotion of Modern 
Varieties as their central  ‘emergency’ element,   Emergency DSD in Zimbabwe, in fact, has 
been more important than normal research and development (R&D) channels, for getting 
new varieties to farmers (see Section VII), although this extension function might  better be 
served by development agencies which can give technical advice and field follow-up. 
 
Voucher and cash approaches, linked to seed-related assistance, have been promoted mostly 
within the last five years, with the seed voucher approach having been first used in Kenya in 
2000, and moving to Zimbabwe shortly thereafter, in 2002 (Bramel and Remington, 2004; 
Mazvimavi et al., 2008).   Both these forms of assistance are based on the assumption that 
seed is available in a given context, and that farmers simply need enhanced means to buy it.   
Use of these latter approaches would imply that the aid implementers have diagnosed the 
seed security problem as being one of access.  
 
One can continue down the Table 3 item by item and shortly realize that, in theory,  each 
approach currently in use carries with it set of distinct assumptions of what  specific seed 
security problem is being addressed (availability, access, seed/varietal quality) and whether 
this problem is  a short (acute) or long-term one.  In practice, these approaches are almost 
always used in absence of any real diagnosis of the seed security problem and are chosen for 
reasons delinked from on-the ground analysis.  For example, one implementer might always 
favor DSD, and know only how to conduct this; and another implementer might always prefer 
cash,as this coincides with his/her institutional philosophy).  This indiscriminate use of seed-
related responses is making the seed aid field much less effective than it can be:  problems 
are not being solved, and unintended effects, such as dependencies, are being promoted. 
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Table 3:   Typology of current seed system interventions 
 Description / Rationale Constraints to which they  
should be targeted 
Direct aid 
1. Direct Seed 
Distribution 
Emergency Seed 
Provision 
‘Seeds and tools’ 
Procurement of quality seed from 
outside the agro-ecological region, for 
delivery to farmers. The most widely 
used approach to seed relief.  
Short term response to address 
problems of seed availability especially 
in situations of total crop failure and/or 
long-term displacement of farmers.  
Response sometimes also used as ‘on-
off action’ to introduce new crops + 
varieties that are usually supplied by the 
formal sector 
2. Local procurement and 
distribution of seed 
Procurement of quality seed from within 
the agro-ecological region, for delivery to 
farmers. A variant of 1. 
Short term response to address 
problems of seed access or highly 
localized problems of seed availability 
3. Food aid 
‘Seed aid protection 
ration’ 
Food aid is often supplied in emergency 
situations alongside seed aid so that the 
farming family does not need to 
consume the seed provided. Where local 
seed systems are functioning, but the 
previous harvest was poor, food aid can 
similarly protect farmers’ own seed 
stocks. 
Short term response accompanying 
direct seed distribution to address 
problems of seed availability  
 
Market-based aid approaches 
4. Vouchers / Cash to 
farmers 
Vouchers or cash can provide poorer 
farmers with the means to access seed 
where it is available, from local markets, 
or the commercial sector. Vouchers or 
cash enables farmers to access crops and 
varieties of their choice.  
Short term response to address 
problems of seed access especially in 
situations of local seed shortages and 
local markets or farmer-farmer barter 
normally used. Can also be used to link 
farmers with agro-dealers. 
5. Seed Fairs Seed fairs provide an ad hoc market 
place to facilitate access to seeds, or 
specific crops and varieties, from other 
farmers, traders, and the formal sector. 
Usually used in conjunction with 
vouchers to provide poorer farmers with 
purchasing power. 
Short or medium term response to 
address problems of seed access 
especially for subsistence crops, and 
where local markets normally used.  
Increasingly also used to give farmers 
access to new varieties 
Seed production and varietal development 
6. Seed Production 
Community-based, local 
seed production  
Farmers are trained and/or contracted to 
produce seed, distinct from their regular 
production activities, often based on 
formal seed standards. Some approaches 
focus on improving quality attributes, 
others are designed specifically to 
facilitate the movement of new 
‘improved varieties into local systems; 
still others are conceived as basically 
income-generating or profit-making 
enterprises.  
Medium or long term response to 
address problems of seed quality (of 
local materials) or, access or availability 
of new varieties. 
 
 
7. Provision or 
development of better 
varieties through small 
packets, participatory 
varietal selection, or 
participatory plant 
breeding 
Important where farmers need access to 
new genetic material. 
Medium or long term response to 
address problems of seed quality 
(genetic/ varietal attributes).  
 
source:, modified from Sperling et al., 2008
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III. METHODS 
Seed System Security Assessment 
A seed system security assessment (SSSA) reviews the functioning of seed systems which farmers use, both 
formal and informal.   It assesses whether seed of adequate quality is available and whether farmers can 
access it.  The approach also promotes strategic thinking about the relief, recovery or development vision 
needed.   For instance, during a   period of stress, should  efforts aim to restore the system as it was, ex ante, 
or aim to strengthen it?  Should seed system-related support focus on crops for food, income or both?  Should 
interventions hone in on crops linked with the most vulnerable (e.g. women)?  A full description of the  SSSA 
method  can be found at   http://www.ciat.cgiar.org/africa/pdf/sssa_manual_ciat.pdf.  Box 1 summarizes the 
steps.   
 
 
BOX 1. SEVEN BASIC STEPS IN ASSESSING SEED SYSTEM SECURITY 
 
1. Identify zones for assessment and possible intervention. 
 
2. Describe the normal status of crop and seed systems. 
 
3. Describe the broad effects of the disaster on these farming systems.  
 
4. Set goals for relief and recovery operations based on farmers’ need.  
 
5. Assess the post-crisis functioning of seed channels to determine whether short-term 
assistance is needed.  
 
6. Identify any chronic stresses requiring longer-term solutions and identify emerging 
development opportunities.  
 
7. Determine appropriate short- and longer-term responses based on analysis of priority 
constraints, opportunities, and farmers’ needs. 
 
 
The task of conducting an SSSA in Zimbabwe was particularly challenging. There are multiple baselines that 
had to be used to describe the ‘normal’ situation or the normal desired situation : before the land reform,  
before the currency decline… .  Also stresses are ongoing and somewhat unpredictable in Zimbabwe, for 
example, when will the money flow regularly again)--- just as opportunities are quickly evolving. 
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Methods used 
The range of methods used and themes explored in the SSSA are sketched below. Basically, the team 
investigated the functioning of seed systems using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods, focused on 
multiple stakeholder insights and cross-checked information from the supply and use side.  Current findings 
were also situated within a larger historical context. 
 
Table 4:   Investigative thrusts used in the SSSA work in Zimbabwe, July 2009   
Type of Investigation Commentary 
 
Background information collection  
 
Commissioning of specific documents on:  
• formal sector seed supply trends 
• fertilizer supply trends 
• coping strategies   
• gender-related livelihood trends 
Database utilization 
 
 
Use of MoA and FAO databases on: 
• crop production trends 
• seed aid history 
Key informant interviews Seed Houses 
MoA personnel (DA. DAEO) 
Grain Marketing Board 
Crop-specific specialists (maize, sorghum, legumes) 
Civil society key initiatives (e.g. trader agent) 
Community-based focus group 
discussions (N=8) 
Separate community  and women- only  FGD  
Topics of; 
• agricultural and variety  use and trends 
• seed source strategies, by crop 
• determinants of ‘bad’ and ‘good season 
• effects of currency instability 
• community seed security assessment 
• women’s crop and seed –related constraints and 
opportunities 
Individual farmer interview (N=165) Topics of: 
• priority 
• seed source patterns, 2008-09, 2009-10 
• fertilizer use 2008-09, 2009-10 
• seed aid history 
Agro-dealers site visits and interview 
(N=35) 
 
Topics  of: 
• input supplies 
• buyer patterns 
• enterprise history and prospects 
Seed/grain market analysis (5 sites) 
 
 
Assessment of: 
• crops and varieties supplies on market 
• pricing patterns 
• sourcing areas 
• seed quality management procedures 
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Site Choice  
Sites were chosen so as to link assessment to action,  and  also to  allow for some  extrapolation of findings.   
Districts and wards were chosen along the following criteria: 
 
o Zones of NGO interventions where organizations were prepared to address seed security-  related 
constraints and opportunities; 
o Zones  sufficiently contrasting so as to potentially uncover different types of  seed security scenarios 
and lessons; 
o Classic ‘maize’ zones and ‘small grain’ zones; 
o Areas at or near country  borders,  to assess possible effects of cross-border trade on seed security. 
 
Four sites were chosen for assessment:  
Murehwa  ward 14 natural region IIB   
Bikita  ward 15 natural region III 
Tsholotsho  ward 12 natural region IV 
Beitbridge ward 10 natural region V 
 
Murewha represents a prime maize zone in a higher potential region,  Tsholotsho and Bikita are largely small 
grain zones, in which maize is also grown. Beitbridge is at the edge of where agriculture is viable, and also lies 
at the South Africa border.   Figure 1 shows the location of the sites of investigation.   The next section 
characterizes the four sites in more detail. 
 
 
Figure 1: Selected district study sites for the seed systems security assessment 
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Characterization of sites 
Here we provide a brief background characterization of farming systems in the selected study sites of 
Beitbridge, Bikita, Murehwa and Tsholotsho.  The selected study sites  present a good indication of  the breath 
of agricultural systems in the smallholder sector of Zimbabwe. 
Major features of the farming systems 
Soil types and productivity 
The selected study sites (Figure 1) are traditional Communal Areas that are linked to the colonial history of the 
country, where local communities have practiced smallholder agriculture for over 50 years. The Communal 
Areas are dominated by some of the more agronomically challenging coarse sandy soils. The soil types range 
from the Kalahari sands (Ferralic/Luvic Arenosols, under the World Reference Base; also classified as Regosols 
in Zimbabwe) in parts of Beitbridge and Tsholotsho, to the granitic sands (Haplic lixisols/Arenosols) that 
predominate in most parts of Murehwa and  Bikita.   
 
Agro-ecologies and major crops in the study sites 
Land holdings for households in all study sites average 3 ha per household.  Murehwa is in Zimbabwe’s Natural 
Region  NR II which receives between 750-1000 mm of rainfall per year, and considered the bread basket 
region of the country where most of the staple maize and grain legumes such as soybean are produced 2. 
Bikita is largely in NR III receiving 650-800 mm yr-1 of rainfall (figure 2b) although parts of the districts are in NR 
IV which receives lower amounts of rainfall. Maize, groundnut and Bambara nut are principal crops in Bikita. 
The semi-arid zones of Tsholotsho and Beitbridge in NR IV and V receive about 450 mm yr-1  , (Figure 2a&d) 
with sorghum and millets among the widely grown crops, although maize still remains a very common crop 
despite its frequent failure under rain fed conditions.  Communities in all the study areas are generally 
dependent on rain-fed agriculture, apart from areas such as Bikita where smallholder irrigation schemes have 
partly supported crop production.  Table five gives an overview of key site characteristics.  
 
Crop-livestock interactions 
Livestock, particularly cattle play a central role in the farming systems across all study sites, not only by 
providing services such as draught power, transport, food (meat and milk) and manure, but also by providing 
various socio-cultural services in marriages, conflict resolution, capital investment (also form of insurance), 
and traditional and ritual ceremonies.  Small ruminants such as goats and sheep are also used to provide meat 
and other social services, and larger populations are in the semiarid districts where there is less competition 
with cropping.  Timely implementation of cropping activities is often associated with ready access to cattle. In 
turn, most of the residues from the crop lands are primarily targeted for cattle feed.  
                                                
2
 Agro-ecological regions in Zimbabwe are classified mainly according to rainfall (Vincent and Thomas, 1960). 
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Table 5:  Basic characterization of farming systems in selected district sites for the seed systems assessment study 
Site/District Agroecological zonation   Major soils and vegetation Crops grown 
Murehwa 
(Mashonaland 
East) 
• Lies in NR II (> 800 mm rainfall per 
annum) and is in the middleveld 
[750 meters above sea level (masl)]. 
• Mean of maximum and minimum air 
temperatures range from 15
o
C in 
June to 22
o
C in October 
• Well drained, shallow to deep reddish 
brown sandy loams, sandy clay loams, 
sandy clays and clay loams. 
• The natural vegetation is miombo 
woodland dominated by Brachystegia 
speciformis, Julbernardia globiflora with 
Brachystegia boehmii becoming locally 
dominant with decrease in effective 
rainfall. 
• Households have approximately 3 ha of arable 
land. 
• Maize is the dominant crop grown during the 
rainy season, and is also planted as an early crop 
in vleis.  
• Groundnut, Bambara groundnut, sweet potatoes 
and cowpea are grown as minor crops in 
summer. 
• Marketing gardening is done through out the 
year and peak period is in the dry season. 
Bikita 
(Masvingo) 
• Lies in NR III (650- 800 mm rainfall 
per annum) and is in the middleveld 
(560 masl). 
• Some parts of the district are in NR 
IV, receiving 450-650 mm rainfall 
per annum 
• Mean of maximum and minimum air 
temperatures range from 15
o
C in 
June to 22
o
C in October 
• Shallow medium –grained sands or 
loamy sands over yellowish brown loamy 
sands or sandy loams. 
• Disturbed remnants of miombo 
woodland dominated by Julbernadia 
globiflora and Brachystegia glaucescens 
tree species.  
• At low elevation, Acacia spp. may 
become dominant.  
• Households have approximately 3 ha of arable 
land. 
• Maize, sorghum and millets are the major crops. 
• Groundnut, Bambara groundnut, sweet potatoes 
and cowpea are grown as minor crops in 
summer. 
• Small scale irrigation schemes are also used to 
support crop production. 
• Marketing gardening is done through out the 
year and peak period is in the dry season 
Tsholotsho 
(Matebeleland 
North) 
• Lies in NR IV (450-650 mm rainfall 
per annum) and is in the lowveld 
(500 masl). 
• Mean of maximum and minimum air 
temperatures range from 15
o
C in 
June to 22
o
C in October 
• Well drained, deep Kalahari sands with 
low water holding capacity. 
• The natural vegetation is typical dryland 
dominated by Baikiaea plurijuga, 
Colophospermum mopane and Acacia 
tree species.                                    
• Households have more than 3 ha of arable land. 
• Generally considered marginal for dryland crop 
production due to inherently infertile soils and 
low rainfall. 
• Sorghum and millets are usually grown in 
summer but yields are often low. 
Beitbridge 
(Matebeland 
South) 
• Lies in NR V (< 450 mm rainfall per 
annum) and is in the lowveld (550 
masl) 
• Mean of maximum and minimum air 
temperatures range from 14
o
C in 
June to 23
o
C in October  
• The soils are well-drained, deep, 
medium grained sands. 
• The vegetation is characterized by open, 
disturbed woodland dominated by 
Baikiaea plurijuga, Colophospermum 
mopane and Acacia tree species.                                 
• Households have more than 3 ha of arable land. 
• Generally considered marginal for dryland crop 
production due to inherently infertile soils and 
low rainfall. 
• Sorghum and millets are usually grown in 
summer but yields are often low. 
• Micro-scale vegetable gardening is done in the 
dry season. 
Sources: Vincent and Thomas, 1960; Anderson et al 1993
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Figure 2: Total annual rainfall received from1999 to 2008 in selected districts falling under different 
agro-ecological regions of Zimbabwe (Source: Zimbabwe Meteorological   Office) 
 
Cereals predominate over other crops in terms of cropped area in any one season. Maize often accounts for 
over 80% of the total area under cropping NRII and NR III, but decreases to less than 50% in  the drier regions. 
For instance, of the selected districts Murehwa has about 90% of the land allocated to maize while the driest 
district, Beitbridge, has 22% of cropped land to maize and 44% to sorghum (Table 6). In general, the yield 
patterns across the selected study sites are consistent with agro-ecological potential. Beitbridge which 
experiences much more erratic rainfall patterns than Tsholotsho often has the least production (MAMID, 
2009).  Of the selected districts, Bikita is the only one producing all major small grains in substantial quantities 
(sorghum, finger millet and pearl millet). Tsholotsho and Beitbridge district exhibit a similar pattern that there 
is almost a complete absence of finger millets, while all the small grains are almost absent in the designated 
high rainfall zones such as Murehwa. 
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Table 6: Estimated yields and areas allocated to major cereal crops grown by smallholder 
(communal) farmers in selected districts of Zimbabwe during the 2008/09 cropping season * 
Site (District) Maize Sorghum Finger millet Pearl millet 
Area  
(ha) 
Yield  
(t ha-1) 
Area  
(ha) 
Yield  
(t ha-1) 
Area  
(ha) 
Yield  
(t ha-1) 
Area  
(ha) 
Yield  
(t ha-1) 
Beitbridge   3,982 0.19  9,787 0.37        0 0.00   4,437 0.23 
Bikita 21,175 0.57  7,832 0.63 8,724 0.52   4,609 0.33 
Murehwa 27,491 0.46     676 0.28 2,197 0.32      188 0.22 
Tsholotsho   6,366 0.67  6,016 0.64        1 0.20 10,710 0.38 
Source: MAMID Crop and Livestock Assessment Report, 2009 
• Note that the yield seem low for a season such as that of 2008/09, especially for the higher potential areas.  Crop 
performance may have been affected by leaching and lack of fertilizers. 
 
 
Alternative sources of livelihoods for different population groups 
 
While agriculture remains a major source of livelihoods for communities across the selected districts (Table 7), 
frequent crop failures due to a combination of climatic constraints and market failures over the past decade 
have led to development of new coping mechanisms. These include cross-border trading, mainly by (but not 
exclusive) households living in districts close to national boarders such as Beitbridge (South Africa) and 
Tsholotsho (close to Botswana), and  those staying in proximity to major national highways such as Murehwa 
(leading to Mozambique and Malawi). Farmers in Murehwa, which is close to the Harare markets, actively 
participate in trading of horticultural crops. This form of market gardening is apparently difficult for farmers in 
the other remote districts. There were also significant movements of people from districts of residence in 
search of off-farm income generating activities such as gold panning. 
 
In general, the four selected sites represent well  the cross-section of the regions in which Zimbabwean 
agriculture  --and Zimbabwean seed aid—continue to unfold. 
 
 
15 
 
Table 7: Overview of general livelihood patterns and population groups in the districts selected for the seed systems assessment study in 
Zimbabwe  
Zone Population   General livelihood patterns 
Beitbridge • Dominated by the Venda tribe 
• Total population = 92 189 (49% male ; 51% 
female) 
•  Population density  = 16 persons/km
2
 
• A major source of income is cross border trading and livestock (small 
ruminants) production.  
• Significant income also comes from remittances by household 
members working in nearby South Africa. 
• Subsistence livestock production is also a major source of livelihood. 
Bikita • Dominated by the Karanga tribe 
• Total population = 164 451  (48% male ; 52% 
female) 
• Population density  = 36 persons/km2 
• Subsistence crop and livestock production are the major sources of 
livelihoods. 
• Significant income also comes from remittances by household 
members working in nearby cities and out of the country. 
• Small-scale horticultural production is a major source of livelihoods. 
Murehwa • Dominated by the Zezuru tribe 
• Total population = 170 834 (48% male ; 52% 
female) 
• Population density  = 35 persons/km
2
 
• Marketing gardening is a main source of income because of close 
proximity to Harare market. 
• In good seasons, excess maize is sold to Grain Marketing Board. 
• Significant income also comes from remittances by household 
members in nearby cities and outside the country 
• Vending along the Nyamapanda highway to Mozambique & Malawi 
also generate income for households. 
Tsholotsho 
 
• Dominated by the Ndebele tribe 
• Total population = 128 154 (48% male ; 52% 
female) 
• Population density  = 12 persons/km2 
• The major source of income is cross border trading and livestock (small 
ruminants) production.  
• Significant income also comes from remittances by household 
members working in nearby South Africa and Botswana. 
• Subsistence livestock production is also a major source of livelihood. 
(Source: Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe, 2001; CSO, 2002a-d; Roth, M. and Gonese, F. 2003; Rukuni et al., 2004; Ministry of Public Service, Labor 
and Social Welfare, 2006) 
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IV.   THE STRESS CONTEXT  
 
The Seed System Security Assessment in Zimbabwe was carried in a complex and chronically- 
stressed environment.   Such stress has been caused by economic, political, health and 
climate-induced factors and these stresses, combined, have led to: significant food insecurity, 
wide scale breakdown of basic services, shortages of commodities, civil unrest, a contracting 
economy, unprecedented inflation and damaged agriculture since 2000. Efforts by the 
Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) to address the deteriorating situation only slowed down, but 
could not stop the decline. Interventions by donors, NGOs and UN agencies reduced 
shortages of food, saved lives and livelihoods, but became protracted with no clear exit 
strategy.   
 
The sketch below of the context in which the SSSA took place cannot do justice to the full set 
of root causes and effects which have contributed to declining livelihoods in Zimbabwe.  We 
simply give a glimpse of the kinds of stresses that have affected agricultural production and, 
by extension, seed security in Zimbabwe.   Extensive analysis of agricultural, political and 
poverty trends can be found in numerous publications (e.g.  Alwang et al., 2002; World Bank, 
2006)  
 
For ease of presentation, we divide stresses into economic, political, health and climate-
induced factors:  we recognize that they are intricately inter-related. The declines in 
agriculture are then traced, along with the rise in emergency seed aid assistance. 
 
Economic  Trends 
At independence in 1980, Zimbabwe inherited a centralized but specialized economy.  
Industry and commerce, based on agriculture, were highly developed and innovative 
producing essential goods and services sustaining the economy.  Agricultural extension, 
research services and loan facilities were provided for commercial, small-scale commercial 
and communal farming sectors.   Between 1980 and 1999, Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector 
grew steadily, albeit slowly: close to 50% of the GDP depended directly or indirectly on 
agriculture and agro-industry (World Bank 2006.)   
 
In the late 1990s, Zimbabwe’s economic growth began to slow down, following a balance of 
payments crisis and repeated droughts.  Since 1999, Zimbabwe’s economic conditions have 
continued to deteriorate, currently reaching a critical level. Estimates in June 2008 put annual 
inflation above 10 million percent .   Real GDP is estimated to have contracted further in 2007 
by more than 6 percent, after declining by about one-third between 1999 and 2006 
(http://go.worldbank.org/RFP74M2PK1)  
 
A recent assessment by FAO/WFP vividly summarizes the trends since 2001:    the GDP and 
agricultural growth had been in steady decline for the full decade, while the external debt has 
consistently risen, reaching US$ 6 billion (Table 8). 
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Table 8: Zimbabwe - Key economic indicators, 2001–2009  
   2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
est.  
2009 exp.  
GDP per head  
(US$ at PPP)
1/
  
214  204  185  182  174  170  165  145  lower  
Real GDP change  
(% year on year)  
-8.4  -5.6  -10.6  -4.2  -7.7  -4.6  -5.5  -12.6  from negative to 
slightly positive
2/
  
Agricultural GDP 
growth rate (%)  
-3.9  -22.7  -1.0  -2.9  -10.0  -4.5  -5.0  -17.5  positive 
2/
  
Consumer price 
inflation; avg (%)  
75  135  385  381  267  1 034  12 563  56 mill.  near zero  
Agricultural exports % 
of total  
39  36  31  23  21  14  22  23  higher 
3/
  
Total exports (US$ 
mill.)  
2 114  1 802  1 670  1 684  1 606  1 533  1 804  1 651  lower 
3/
  
Total imports (US$ 
mill.)  
1 791  1 821  1 778  1 989  1 994  2 000  2 113  2 630  lower 
4/
  
Trade deficit (US$ 
mill.)  
-323  18  108  305  388  467  310  979  lower  
Total external debt 
(US$ bill.)  
3.6  3.9  4.5  4.8  4.3  4.7  5.3  6.0  higher  
source: FAO/WFP CFSAM June 22 2009 
 
document sources: The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe; EIU; World Bank, Harare; and CFSAM expectation for 2009.  
1/ Given the significant out-migration of population not accounted for in the official population figures the GDP 
per capita is  
somewhat under-estimated and its decline overstated.  
2/ Due to estimated increase in crop production.  
3/ Mainly due to decrease in total exports and reduced mineral prices.  
4/ Due to lack of availability of foreign currency to pay for imports and reduced maize import requirements.  
 
Multiple factors have contributed to the steep economic decline and among those most often 
cited is the land reform of 2000.  Rooted in an effort to redress racial inequity, this 
government action shifted 9,000 large-scale commercial farms  and about 20 large agro-
industrial estates away from white families and towards smallholder black households (World 
Bank 2006) (see also section on political trends.  Other economic decline factors include an 
unreasonably high government expenditure, excessive domestic and internal borrowing, 
unwarranted government interference in commercial business—all of which fall outside of 
the expertise  involved in report.     
 
On a positive note, in March 2009, the government started on a program of economic 
liberalization and changed   currency away from the Zimbabwean dollar (ZAR) and to the US$. 
Grain market reform includes free movement and buying and selling of grain in the country, 
removal of import duties and designation of the government Grain Marketing Board as a 
buyer of last resort   (FAO/WFP, 2009). 
 
In reference to this SSSA, we suggest below how some of the economic trends during the last 
five years made it hard for farmers to get input supplies or to sell  their produce. 
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Hyper-inflation: and currency challenges  
 
 The country has suffered through a period of currency inflation for much of the last decade.    
In 2008, before the adoption of the US$, the annual rate of inflation had reached an 
estimated 56 million percent (the World Bank calculation) (FAO/WFP, 2009), with the highest 
currency denomination in circulation being a 100 trillion dollar note.  The table below gives 
an idea of the speed of currency change.   
 
Table 9: Inflation rates over time as quoted by the Central Statistics Offices report:  
 December 2008 
Time(Date) 
announced 
Period refereed Inflation (%) Source (Comment) 
 
14 Feb 2008 Dec 2007 66,212.3 Central Statistical Offices  (official figures) 
20 Feb 2008 Jan 2008 100,580.2 Central Statistical Offices  (official figures) 
04 April 2008 Feb 2008 164,900.3 Financial Gazette 
15 May 2008 Mar 2008 355,000.0 Zimbabwe Independent 
21 May 2008 Apr 2008 1,063,572.6 Unofficial reports (SW Radio Africa) 
26 June 2008 Annual 7,336,000 Zimbabwe Independent 
July 2008 Annual 231 million Central Statistical Offices  (official figures) 
 
 
For farmers (and others) not  only was money losing worth second by second,  but in an 
attempt to curb the currency (and inflation)  flow,  The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ)  
placed ceilings on money withdrawals.  Farmers would come into town to withdraw money 
and would sometimes be told that banks had run out of cash, or that they could only 
withdraw up to a certain amount stipulated by the RBZ. Bank withdrawal cash limits were too 
low to purchase agricultural inputs:  seed, fertilizer or other farming –related needs. 
 
Market Outlets 
 
Established market outlets for all products, including agricultural, also suffered the liquidity 
crunch. Most traders started demanding payments in foreign currency, illegally.  To curb sky 
rocketing Zimbabwe dollar prices, the GOZ established the Pricing Commission which could 
determine prices of all items on sale. Price increases had to be approved by this commission, 
but in reality, by the time a price was determined, another price increase would have become 
necessary – hence the rate of inflation was much higher than pace of price rise approval. 
Inspectors were sent out to monitor and arrest any managers who were charging ‘exorbitant 
prices’. Most input supply businesses closed, arguing that they could not sell products at 
uneconomic prices..  Markets where farmers sold their products, like the Grain Marketing 
Board (GMB) would accept and grade farmers produce and pay them through checks two or 
three months later, resulting in farmers’ losing significant money through such payment. 
Some resorted to selling their produce to private buyers who offered cash or foreign 
currency. The RBZ introduced some regulations that outlets and companies wishing to trade 
in foreign currency had to apply for licenses. Despite these setbacks communal farmers 
continued to trade in foreign currency.  
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Input Supply Irregularities 
Due to price controls, inputs became scarce on the formal market and could be found only on 
the informal ‘black market’ at exorbitant prices or in foreign currency.  In a move perceived 
by some as political, the GOZ initiated input support programs through the RBZ and 
Zimbabwe National Army-led   distributions, code named ‘Operation Maguta’ (meaning “self-
sufficient’).  Seed and fertilizer companies were directed to sell their product to the GOZ at 
controlled prices for distribution to newly resettled and communal farmers. The logistical 
problems were so severe that most inputs were distributed as late as December or January 
(while planting time was October and November).  
 
Imports 
 Price controls, banking regulations and inflation affected the industry as companies opted to 
reduce production, smuggle products out of the country or close shop.  Consumers 
responded by crossing to neighboring South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana to 
import most items, including basic groceries which became scarce in Zimbabwe. Some 
farmers near the borders also benefited from remittances from family members who have 
migrated in search of employment. Some agro-dealers also at border towns imported goods, 
including seed, for re-sale at a profit. Import duty on most items was relatively high, but was 
later lowered for agricultural goods.  This further crippled the local industry.  
 
The fertilizer industry in Zimbabwe is highly dependent on importation of some raw 
materials, mainly potash. At one time such imports were not possible due to foreign currency 
shortages. Hence the manufacture of compound fertilizer was curtailed leading to significant 
fertilizer shortages. As most soils in the communal areas of Zimbabwe require fertilizer 
application to obtain modest crop production, fertilizer shortages on the significantly reduced 
crop production.  Similarly, over 80% of farmers in Zimbabwe use hybrid maize seed- 
normally available only from formal seed sector shops. Seed, fertilizers and chemical 
companies reduced production, held onto hold onto their stocks until profitable prices were 
negotiated, or preferred to sell to relief agencies paying in foreign currency or reduced 
production.  
 
Emergence of a Barter Economy 
These diverse developments in the local economy affected the rural farming families 
significantly as many (most) could not access the foreign currency. Although the GOZ 
introduced foreign currency licenses and later the uses of multi-currencies, the rural 
economy, in particular, changed to a bartering one to meet their seed, fertilizer and other 
needs (see Box 2).    In certain communities , much of the barter trade was based on maize 
equivalents. 
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BOX 2.  LOCAL BARTER TERMS FOR SEED, DRAUGHT POWER & FERTILIZER 
   
Terms of Trade  Where 
 
1 goat = 10 kg hybrid maize seed      Murehwa 
1 cup maize seed= 1 cup shelled groundnuts seed    Tshol., Mureh.  Bikita 
1 chicken= 5 liters maize seed      Tsholotsho 
10kg top dressing or basal fertilizer = 10 kg maize seed   Murehwa 
1kg bar carbolic soap = 5 liter unshelled groundnuts     Tsholotsho 
20 liter storage container = 20 liter unshelled groundnuts   Tsholotsho 
Planting  labor of 2 cups of seed = receipt 1 cup of seed   Bikita 
Herding labor fin summer =  use of  draught animal tillage for 2 acres                    Murehwa  
Tilling 1 acre using draught animals= 1 bucket of unshelled groundnuts                 Bikita 
½ drain (about .3 ha) tillage with hoe == 1 cup maize or groundnut seed               Bikita 
6½ buckets (app. 125 kg) maize grain = 50 kg fertilizer   Bikita 
1 cup shelled g/nuts= 1 cup shelled Bambara nuts    Beitbridge 
10 liters pearl millet = 5 liters groundnuts     Beitbridge  
1 chicken= 5 liters unshelled g/nuts      Beitbridge 
1 goat= 50 kg unshelled g/nuts      Beitbridge 
Note:  The terms of exchange appear to be influenced by scarcity of seed. For example in Beitbridge 
where groundnut seed was reported to be in short supply locally, farmers exchange a goat (very 
valuable)  for a 50kg bag of unshelled groundnuts. 
 
Political Context 
Two features in this complicated political context particularly contributed in creating the  
current stressful context:  the land reform process,  and the protracted political tensions and 
post-election  uncertainties.  
 
The land reform process 
 The land reform process sought to correct one cardinal injustice of the past colonial era - 
inequitable distribution of land.  Black people had been forcibly removed from fertile land in 
high rainfall areas, Natural Regions I, II and III, and relocated to infertile areas in arid areas in 
Natural Regions IV and V. Despite significant donor support to the GOZ Land Resettlement 
Program (LRP) for twenty years post-independence, serious glaring disparities still existed 
between commercial and smallholder farmers on land distribution. On attainment of 
independence in 1980, the GOZ started the resettlement program to correct these previous 
injustices which was based on the willing seller willing buyer basis. 
 
In 2000 the GOZ embarked on the ‘fast track’ land redistribution exercise which at first 
targeted multi-farm owners and later the majority of commercial farmers. This exercise was 
frequently violent, with farm occupations often being directed by ex-combatants of the 
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liberation war.   This led to disruptions of farm activities as new farm owners tried to start up 
operations with minimal resources.  Capital was not adequate to maintain tractors and other 
farm machinery, to remunerate workers, and to contract specialist services. Agriculture 
production plummeted in the wake of additional problems of poor rainfall and poorly 
performing economy. The large seed houses lost experienced commercial seed producers 
and the contracted new seed producers found it difficult to honor their contracts.   The farm 
invasions (land reform) impacted on the smallholder farmers in multiple ways. Smallholder 
farmers who benefited could subsequently farm on larger tracks of land and expand their 
operations – but they held onto their plots in the communal areas, effectively denying land 
expansion by remaining smallholders. Beneficiaries also had to use high power soil tilling 
machinery on the predominantly heavy clay red soils on the invaded land : this practice was a 
sharp contrast to the ox drawn plows they used on the mainly sandy soils in the communal 
areas.  
 
Polarized political process 
The period from 2000-09 has been one of continuing political tensions and uncertainty.   An 
opposition party was formed in September 1999; violent elections started in 2000, and then 
continued in the 2005 elections.    
 
The March 29, 2008 presidential elections had no clear majority winner but combined 
opposition parties won the parliamentary elections. Violence marred the presidential runoff 
elections on June 27, 2008, leading to withdrawal of the opposition candidate.  
 
After intense negotiations between the various political parties for a settlement of the 
Zimbabwe crisis, The Southern African Development Community (SADC) announced an 
agreement on September 15, 2008. A Government of National Unity (GNU) comprising all 
political parties was to be formed. The official GNU started off in February 2009 and many 
analysts perceive that this marked the end of the political crisis in Zimbabwe, and the start of 
a new era of re-building confidence in government.   
 
The World Bank Vice President, who met Zimbabwe government officials in April 2009, 
acknowledged that the short-term program of the unity government points in the right 
directions. She, however, stressed that Harare is still a long way from building the massive 
confidence that is needed among development partners for funding to be provided through 
government channels for long-term programs.   
 
Brain drain 
The political and economic decline and continuing stresses have resulted in a significant 
migration, including massive brain drain, from Zimbabwe.  Specific studies show about 
500,000 overseas (SIRDC, 2008) as of the end 2008- but popular estimates go as high as 3 
million.  During the SSSA, one focus group discussion in Tsholotsho reported all participants, 
numbering 22, with a family member in South Africa.  The exodus is stalling the country's 
development because of the huge deficit in manpower.  The health sector gives an example 
of the degree of brain drain. Three-quarters of doctors leave the country within a few years 
of completing medical school (Motsi, 2003).   Similar  losses   are appearing  across specialized 
professions, engineers, lawyers, university professors,--and commercial farmers. 
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Health Concerns 
The decline of the Zimbabwe economy has resulted in poor service delivery which critically 
affects the social and health sectors. The public service was not well-remunerated; plant, 
equipment, tools and instruments were and continue to be in disrepair,  Several kinds of 
welfare issues went ‘out of control” :  including HIV/AIDS and  a cholera outbreak, and food 
security and malnutrition. 
 
HIV/AIDS 
The HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in Zimbabwe is around 25 percent, or the virus directly infects 
one in every 4 people.  Three hundred people die from the disease each week and 1.3 million 
children are orphaned. The declining economy in Zimbabwe has meant cutbacks on essential 
services to address the HIV/AIDS: palliative care for the infected and support for care givers, 
promoters of positive behavior and support groups. The overall likely effect has been a 
resurgence of infections and weaker support systems. Most HIV/AIDS patients working in 
towns eventually withdraw to rural areas to die as the cost of living in urban areas is just too 
high.  This move has exacerbated the situation of already over-burdened rural dwellers.  
 
Cholera  
According to WHO, more than 56 districts out of the 62 countrywide have reported cholera 
cases since the epidemic started in August 2008, (WHO, 2009 ).  The  Zimbabwe Association 
of Doctors for Human Rights (ZADHR) states that the cholera outbreak  in Zimbabwe 
surpassed Africa’s worst recorded (that in Angola) (DPA, 2009). The rate of mortality in 
Zimbabwe reached 4.6%,   nearly five times that which the World Health Organization (WHO) 
regards as ‘unacceptable’. The cholera rise took place against a background whereby the GOZ 
and City Council authorities could not afford to clear rubbish dump sites, to provide 
continuous clean water or to maintain sewage works.  
 
Food Security and Malnutrition   
The decline in the Zimbabwe economy resulted and continues to result in the inability of the 
GOZ to provide food and basic commodities for the vulnerable groups. Early recovery of the 
food security situation was prevented by the prolonged political disruptions and election 
violence, currency and price controls, cholera outbreak and continuing HIV/AIDS infections 
and deaths, poor rainfall in some seasons, logistical challenges in trying to provide aid and 
general economic decline. Smallholder farmers became more resource-poor as they disposed 
of their assets to provide immediate needs meant they were unable to recover without 
assistance.   A June 2009 report, provisionally estimates 2.8 million people will face food 
shortages in the 2009 /10 marketing year (from April to March) (FAO/WFP, 2009).   
Disasters, including Droughts 
Zimbabwe has also suffered from droughts in the years 2001/02, 2002/03, 2006/07 and 
2007/08.  Floods occasionally entered the picture. 
 
As smallholder agriculture is rain-fed, the distribution and quantity of rainfall during the 
season is critical and significantly contributes to crop growth and final yields.  Major drought 
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and non-drought ‘disasters’ that have occurred in Zimbabwe in the last 10 years are 
presented in Table 10 below.    
 
Table 10:  Disaster Conditions and Crop Production 2000/01 – 2008/09  
Year Disaster Date/Month recorded # people 
killed 
# people affected Agric. season 
2000 Flood Jan 26, 2000 70 266,000 2000 -2001 
Epidemic Jan 2000 93     1,675 
Epidemic Nov 2000 11 - 
2001 Flood Feb /Mar 2001 13 30,000/6,000,000 2001 - 2002 
Drought    (see Table 10) 
2002 No report    2002 – 2003 
2003 Epidemic Oct 9, 2003 40 18,000 2003 – 2004 
2004 No report    2004 -2005 
2005 Epidemic May 2005 14  2005 – 2006 
Epidemic Dec 10, 2005 73  
2006 No report    2006 – 2007 
Drought    (see Table 10) 
2007 Flood Jan 2007  2,100,000  
2007 – 2008 Epidemic Mar 25, 2007 67 10,000 
Flood Dec 13/Dec 19  18,000/2,000 
Drought    (see Table 10) 
2008 Epidemic Aug 26, 2008 1,561 29,522  
2009 Epidemic June 30, 2009    
Source: Disaster statistics Crop Production statistics drought / flood, agric production / areas / yields / 
no of people affected, assistance given, timeline 1999. (modified)  
 
Agricultural  Production Overviews 
With its population of just over 11 ½ million people, Zimbabwe has some 64% of the 
population living in rural areas, with the vast majority of farming is done by the smallholder 
sector.   Data on agricultural trends suggest the ways that stresses above have directly 
affected what is produced in the farmers’ fields. 
Long-term data on average areas planted to major food crops, and average yields (national 
basis) , are presented in Tables 10-11 (source; UNFAO, Harare).   The data spans a 30-year 
period.  Maize production area is rising, but the yields sharply declining (Table 11). The large 
fluctuations in maize yields in the last four years especially have been the result of limited 
access to fertilizer (supply and price), late planting (difficulty accessing seed on time) and 
mid-season droughts.   In contrast, good rains in 2009 led to an increase in maize yields with a 
national average of just over 0.8 mt/ha.   National production of maize in 2009 represented 
an increase of 130% over  the record low harvest of 2008 (FAO/WFP, June 2009).   
 
The small grain production figures show a markedly different trend.  Area and overall 
production in small grains has been generally rising—as farmers seed to diversify their crop 
portfolios.  However,  yields per hectare show about a 10% decline in the last decade (Table 
12).  
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Table 11:  Maize production figures 1980- 2009, nation-wide,  Zimbabwe 
  Maize 
Year Area (h) Production (t) Yield(kg/h) 
1980 1,177,700 1,510,700 1,283 
1981 1,363,400 2,833,400 2,078 
1982 1,416,400 1,808,400 1,277 
1983 1,333,900 909,800 682 
1984 1,360,600 1,348,500 991 
1985 1,256,000 2,711,000 2,158 
1986 1,314,000 2,412,000 1,836 
1987 1,211,100 1,093,700 903 
1988 1,299,500 2,253,100 1,734 
1989 1,198,300 1,931,200 1,612 
1990 1,149,800 1,993,800 1,734 
1991 1,101,200 1,585,800 1,440 
1992 881,000 361,000 410 
1993 1,248,347 2,063,003 1,653 
1994 1,738,450 2,109,283 1,213 
1995 1,487,606 884,962 595 
1996 1,459,611 2,065,347 1,415 
1997 1,406,074 1,552,703 1,104 
1998 1,181,207 1,195,929 1,012 
1999 1,477,990 1,606,588 1,087 
2000 1,373,117 1,619,651 1,180 
2001 1,239,988 1,526,328 1,231 
2002 1,327,854 604,758 455 
2003 1,352,368 1,058,786 783 
2004 1,493,810 1,686,151 1,129 
2005 1,729,867 915,366 529 
2006 1,712,999 1,484,839 867 
2007 1,445,800 952,600 659 
2008 1,722,322 470,668 273 
2009 1,521,780 1,242,571 817 
    
1980s average 1,293,090 1,881,180 1,455 
1990s average 1,313,129 1,541,842 1,166 
2000s average 1,488,681 1,146,572 790 
Recent 5 year Average 1,620,960 1,101,925 691 
 
source; UN FAO, Harare   
 
Note : drought years are emphasized  in bold
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Table 12: Small grain production figures 1980- 2009, nationwide, Zimbabwe 
  Sorghum Mhunga (pearl millet)   Rapoko (finger millet) Small Grain 
Year Area (h) Prod (t)) Yield(kg/h) Area (h) Prod (t) Yield(kg/h) Year Area (h) Prod (t) Yield(kg/h) Year Area (h) Prod (t) Yield(kg/h) 
1980 120,000 66,000 550       1980       1980 120,000 66,000 550 
1981 200,000 100,000 500       1981       1981 200,000 100,000 500 
1982 200,000 50,000 250       1982       1982 200,000 50,000 250 
1983 280,000 44,000 157       1983       1983 280,000 44,000 157 
1984 156,000 37,400 240       1984       1984 156,000 37,400 240 
1985 210,000 76,000 362       1985       1985 210,000 76,000 362 
1986 150,000 66,200 441       1986       1986 150,000 66,200 441 
1987 172,700 40,400 234       1987       1987 172,700 40,400 234 
1988 213,000 163,100 766       1988       1988 213,000 163,100 766 
1989 158,000 65,300 413       1989       1989 158,000 65,300 413 
1990 127,800 72,500 567       1990       1990 127,800 72,500 567 
1991 106,200 51,300 483       1991       1991 106,200 51,300 483 
1992 64,000 10,350 162       1992       1992 64,000 10,350 162 
1993 149,005 96,321 646       1993       1993 149,005 96,321 646 
1994 160,632 52,621 328       1994       1994 160,632 52,621 328 
1995 113,806 38,336 337       1995       1995 113,806 38,336 337 
1996 205,909 90,215 438 244,259 51,814 212 1996 37,951 17,999 474 1996 488,119 160,028 328 
1997 179,727 64,427 358 183,042 31,383 171 1997 39,273 16,233 413 1997 402,042 112,043 279 
1998 126,039 39,154 311 142,761 15,368 108 1998 26,543 5,661 213 1998 295,343 60,183 204 
1999 143,912 57,535 400 146,849 25,161 171 1999 36,595 16,735 457 1999 327,356 99,431 304 
2000 116,248 46,307 398 122,717 19,359 158 2000 29,673 11,634 392 2000 268,638 77,300 288 
2001 110,138 56,358 512 98,883 20,166 204 2001 57,306 23,028 402 2001 266,327 99,552 374 
2002 81,513 21,614 265 65,253 4,006 61 2002 67,103 10,157 151 2002 213,869 35,777 167 
2003 128,530 71,257 554 134,557 23,128 172 2003 35,610 18,434 518 2003 298,697 112,819 378 
2004 227,768 129,391 568 164,884 45,623 277 2004 51,816 21,080 407 2004 444,468 196,094 441 
2005 162,394 38,087 235 134,805 18,448 137 2005 36,735 9,262 252 2005 333,934 65,797 197 
2006 265,192 101,248 382 175,924 40,937 233 2006 57,124 21,675 379 2006 498,240 163,860 329 
2007 222,500 76,200 342 155,200 28,800 186 2007 66,500 15,000 226 2007 444,200 120,000 270 
2008 283,185 57,974 205 116,842 23,359 200 2008 72,460 11,839 163 2008 472,487 93,172 197 
2009           1980s ave 185,970 70,840 381 
           1990s ave 223,430 75,311 337 
Source: UN FAO: Harare         2000s ave 360,096 107,152 298 
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Table 13 rounds out the agricultural trends with figures for livestock. The commercial beef 
and dairy herds with pedigree cattle have declined dramatically.  Of the 1.6 million head of 
beef cattle held on large-scale commercial farms in 2000, only around 5,000 remained by 
2002.  However, cattle and goat numbers held in the smallholder sector have remained 
essentially the same since 2000 (FAO/WFP, 2007).  In 2002 the number of cattle held in the 
smallholder sector was around 5.05 million head.  In 2006 the numbers were reported at 4.99 
million head (FAO/WFP, 2007).  For goats, the number reported in 2002 was 3.38 million, 
versus 3.14 million in 2006.  (FAO/WFP, 2007). 
 
Table 13: Livestock numbers, 1980- 2009, nation-wide, Zimbabwe. 
Year Dairy 
cows Pigs Cattle Sheep  Goats 
1980 106,000 132,000 5,173,000 387,000 982,000 
1981 104,000 183,000 5,182,000 469,000 1,243,000 
1982 102,000 183,000 5,560,000 400,000 920,000 
1983 105,000 183,000 5,442,000 399,000 1,081,000 
1984 111,000 178,000 5,354,000 431,000 1,507,000 
1985 111,000 171,000 5,388,000 461,000 1,624,000 
1986 112,000   5,671,000 569,000 1,986,000 
1987 121,000 216,000 5,797,000   2,162,000 
1988 121,000 238,000 5,699,000 671,000 2,317,000 
1989 123,000 304,000 5,723,000 569,000 2,368,000 
1990 127,000 289,000 6,280,000 592,000 2,540,000 
1991 126,000 305,000 5,223,000 584,000 2,545,000 
1992 124,000 278,000 5,900,000 485,000 2,540,000 
1993 115,000 240,000 5,040,000 416,000 2,297,000 
1994 105,000 232,000 5,662,000 436,000 4,471,000 
1995 105,000 264,000 4,712,000 435,000 5,001,000 
1996 99,000 268,000 4,841,000 379,000 4,823,000 
1997 96,000 310,000 4,879,000 416,000 5,054,000 
1998 90,000 324,000 5,476,000 386,000 4,990,000 
1999 82,000 257,000 5,893,000 351,000 4,601,000 
2000   270,000   340,000 4,248,000 
2001 55,150 360,000 5,418,116 598,000 3,657,000 
2002 50,650 282,000 5,240,694 576,000 3,380,998 
2003 45,000 216,000 5,296,865 511,000 3,260,000 
2004 43,159 203,000 5,226,519 477,567 3,105,458 
2005 44,000 169,236 5,187,613 415,901 3,247,606 
2006 44,000         
 
source: FAO/WFP, CFSAM, 2007  (modified) 
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International Humanitarian Assistance: Seed Aid  
Against this background  of acute, chronic and complex disasters,  international aid has been 
abundant.  Food aid has been distributed in most areas of Zimbabwe for much of the last 10 
years, and continues in 2009, with an estimated 2.8 million needy.    We briefly focus only on 
seed-related aid below. 
 
Seed Aid  
Overview 
Emergency seed aid has been given in Zimbabwe during at least 15 of the last 29 years, since 
the country achieved its independence in 1980 (modified and updated from Rohrbach et al. 
2005).   The UN Food and Agriculture Organization first started keeping detailed records of 
such distributions in 2004, and Table 14 gives an idea of the overall magnitude of such 
emergency aid in recent years.  Hybrid and OPV Maize, small grains and variously kinds of 
fertilizer have formed the base of emergency seed aid inputs (Table 15).   Of particular note is 
the upcoming season, where the International Community is finalizing plans for direct supply 
of seeds and fertilizer ($140 million worth) for 600,000 smallholder farmers. This is one of the 
largest distributions in years and is being implemented after the productive harvest season of 
2008/09. 
 
Table 14: Emergency seed and fertilizer  beneficiaries,  Zimbabwe 2003-2009 
Agricultural Season Number of beneficiaries 
2003/04 985,000 
2004/05 422,000 
2005/06 372,000 
2006/07 315,000 
2007/08 232,000 
2008/09 310,000 
2009/10 Projected: 600,000 
source:  UNFAO Information Unit , Harare  
 
 
Table 15: Emergency Agricultural Inputs distributed (MT), Zimbabwe 2003-2009 
Season 
Top 
Dressing Compound 
Maize 
OPV 
Maize 
Hybrid Sorghum Millet Cowpeas Groundnuts 
Sugar 
Beans 
Small 
Grains 
2003/04 6,184 1,553 3,304 3,061 2,218 617 786 550   2,835 
2004/05 4,866 962 1,972 291 776 71 545 66 175 847 
2005/06 8,117 509 1,605 31 719 52 158 370 332 771 
2006/07 7,120 1,929 696 175 706 276 312 737 251 982 
2007/08 7,661 937 307 138 897 222 608 608 15 1,119 
2008/09 10,222 5287 1,282 54 822 117 208 247 173   
2009/10 In progress 
       source: UNFAO Information Unit, Harare 
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Types of seed aid given 
A considerable amount of emergency seed aid in Zimbabwe has consisted of direct seed and 
fertilizer distributions and guidelines exist to improve this work (Rohrbach et al., 2004).  New 
approaches have also been implemented, particularly in the last five to eight years. CARE 
International has considerable experience working with agro-dealers in Masvingo Province on 
seed assistance programs through vouchers (e.g. Musinamwana, 2009).   Catholic Relief 
Services pioneered the use of Seed Vouches and Fairs (SVF) in emergency, starting in 
Zimbabwe in 2002 (Bramel and Remington, 2004; Mazvimavi, 2008) and NGOs, such as Plan 
International are implementing SVF even this season (2009/10).   
 
The GOZ  has also managed various kinds of input supply programs.  For several seasons after 
2006, the RBZ and GMB operated input distribution programs aimed at increasing food 
production: seeds and fertilizer were distributed throughout the country to newly resettled 
farmers in commercial farms and to communal farmers. In 2008/09, there were logistical 
problems resulting in late arrival and distribution of most inputs,  some  arriving in December 
and January. During the SSSA, we found 50% of recipients in Murehwa planted late in the 
2008/09 season whereas in Bikita, many simply chose to keep the seed for the upcoming 
season.  Also in Bikita, some of the distributed Kalahari Early Pearl (KEP) did not perform well, 
leading farmers to condemn OPVs.  Because of the logistical challenges, it is possible that the 
maize had been mislabeled or mixed with grain. 
 
One of the most important but little reported ‘seed aid’ programs is the local community 
assistance. This is probably because it lacks structure unlike the large seed aid programs, 
small quantities of seed are involved, and/or it is usually based on kinship.  In the four 
districts visited during the SSSA, some resource-poor households who had not groundnut 
seed would work for neighbors and be paid half the quantity of seed they would have sown. 
This practice is probably widespread and forms the basis of the community seed system (see 
Section V, Coping Strategies.) 
 
Overall, emergency seed aid is now a continuing form of assistance for Zimbabwe 
smallholders.  GOZ input programs have also been implemented on an important scale  
 
 
Concluding comments 
 
Economic decisions, political events, health concerns and droughts have all combined to bring 
significant stress to the Zimbabwean people and to their economy.     
 
The impact of these stress conditions on a growing number of Zimbabweans has been 
profound:  drops in agricultural production, pervasive hunger and severe disruption of 
livelihoods. For a number of years, smallholder farmers have found it difficult to secure maize 
seed, fertilizer and chemicals because of their unavailability or high cost. Some have also 
been were forced to flee their homes due to  political violence, leading to delayed or no 
cropping at all. Many continue to have problems mitigating the effects of climatic vagaries.  
 
On the brighter side, the hardships experienced have facilitated the maintenance and growth 
of a robust community based and informal seed security structures (Section V) , helping to fill 
the supply gap created after closure of formal seed and fertilizer outlets.  Also, as of July 
2009, the inputs supply situation has improved slightly with stabilization of currency and re-
opening of some outlets, though access to seed and fertilizer still needs to be significantly 
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expanded. The general feeling among traders is that prospects for economic recovery have 
improved with the formation of the GNU and start of liberalization programs.   
 
For the 2009/10 season, The International Community is finalizing plans for direct distribution 
of seeds and fertilizer ($140 million worth) to 600,000 smallholder farmers.  Even In the short 
term, there is scope for improving seed assistance delivery mechanisms to smallholder 
farmers that include supporting   agro-dealers, and building on seed systems developed 
during stress periods. It is also time (or time is overdue) for contemplating exit strategies 
from protracted direct ‘emergency’ assistance and to blend these with high impact and 
sustainable development interventions.  
 
It is in this context that the SSSA aimed to review what actually was happening on the 
ground: what did farmers plant, what were their results, what do they see as their prospects 
over the coming seasons?
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V: SEED SYSTEMS IN ZIMBABWE: OVERVIEW 
 
Smallholder farmers use multiple channels for procuring their seed. These channels fall within 
formal and informal seed systems (with the latter also sometimes labeled as the local, 
traditional or farmer seed system).3 
 
The formal seed system involves a chain of activities leading to certified seed of named 
varieties. The chain usually starts with plant breeding, and promotes materials towards 
formal variety release. Formal regulations aim to maintain varietal identity and purity, as well 
as to guarantee physical, physiological and sanitary quality. Seed marketing takes place 
through officially recognized seed outlets, either commercially or by way of national 
agricultural research systems (Louwaars, 1994). Formal sector seed is also frequently 
distributed by seed relief agencies.  
 
The informal system embraces most of the ways farmers themselves produce, disseminate 
and procure seed: directly from their own harvest; through gifts and barter among friends, 
neighbors and relatives; and through local grain markets or traders.  Farmers’ seed is 
generally selected from the harvests or grain stocks, rather than produced separately and 
local technical knowledge, standards, and social structures guide informal seed system 
performance (McGuire, 2001). In developing countries, somewhere between 80% and 90% of 
the seed sown comes from the informal seed system (DANAGRO, 1988; FAO, 1998), although 
this varies by crop and region.  
 
What is important to highlight is that farmers themselves obtain their varied seed through 
both formal and informal channels.- and both  merit express and serious attention.  In 
Zimbabwe, for example, the same small farmers may routinely procure maize hybrids 
through formal seed systems (agro-dealers, commercial companies, government parastatals, 
and, sometimes, relief aid), groundnuts from their own harvest or local grain markets, and 
sorghum seed from their neighbors   (van Oosterhout, 1996).  
 
In the Zimbabwean context, the lines between formal and informal have started to blend, 
and to  a degree  the team has never seen before.  As is usual, modern varieties of the self-
pollinated crops have entered local channels, particularly for groundnut, cowpea, sorghum 
and  pearl millet.  But the breakdown of the formal sector has also meant that even hybrid 
maize  (normally sold only in specialized shops),  is now being moved in a series of more 
informal ways, for example, through   barter from the seed bulkers and via  direct sale by 
company employees.  
 
Also of note is the development of a ‘relief seed system’ which has become of distinct 
importance on the supply side in many parts of Africa, and particularly in Zimbabwe.  Relief 
seed aid has become repetitive in nature and involves a somewhat separate type of seed 
procurement and distribution network (Bramel and Remington , 2004).  
 
                                               
3
 This introduction draws from Sperling et al., 2008. 
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Figure 3 shows schematically the formal and informal seed systems (and their component 
channels) and how they may interact. Adapted from Almekinders and Louwaars (1999), the 
figure additionally highlights the importance of the local seed market and seed relief 
channels.   
 
This section now moves to more detailed analyses of the seed system structures and 
processes currently in place in Zimbabwe. Information is also added of fertilizer inputs, and 
farmers coping strategies more generally.  Issues linked with gender and seed security are 
highlighted at the end. 
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Figure 3: Channels through which Farmers Procure Seed. These are depicted by the cylinders: Own 
seed stocks, exchange with other farmers , and purchase through local grain markets constitute 
‘informal’ channels, while commercial seed stockists, government or research outlets , relief supplies 
constitute formal channels. The arrows indicate the flow of seed in the ‘informal’ and ‘formal’ sectors 
respectively. Adapted from Almekinders and Louwaars (1999). 
 
FORMAL SEED SYSTEM IN ZIMBABWE 
Introduction 
 
Zimbabwe has been long known for having an unusually well developed national seed 
industry. When functioning well, more than 15 companies were involved in the seed 
production and marketing of over 20  different crops (Takavarasha et al., 2005). 
 
Maize is by far the most important production focus of seed industry and the only important 
food crop for which farmers are dependent on the formal seed sector.  In the past, 
commercial seed companies have also sold seed of other crops, but these have been a minor 
focus relative to maize.  Some of the commercial crops for which seed was previously sold 
included: wheat, barley, sunflower, soybeans and cotton.  Staple food crops for which seed of 
improved varieties was also previously sold included sorghum, peal millet, cowpeas and 
groundnuts.  Much of the seed of non-maize food crops had been produced by smallholder 
farmers working in conjunction with seed companies the Agricultural, Technical, and 
Extension Services (AGRITEX), NGOs and some international agricultural research centers.  It 
was purchased from the farmers and sold primarily into the relief seed market (Bramel and 
Remington, 2004).   Also, due primarily to collaborative efforts between the International 
Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) and commercial seed companies, 
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sales of seed of improved varieties of sorghum increased from 281 mt in 1998 to 1102 mt in 
2002.  Sales of improved varieties of pearl increased from 7 mt in 2000 to 278 mt in 2002 
(Heinrich, 2004) 
 
Between 2006/07 and the beginning of 2009,  the formal seed sector nearly closed due to 
price controls, inflation and currency constraints, and an unfavorable policy/regulatory 
environment.  Most networks of contract seed growers had to be completely re-organized 
after the elimination of large-scale commercial producers.  Further, essentially all retail seed 
outlets closed.  However, with liberalization of the regulatory/policy environment and 
introduction of US$/ZAR (Rand)  economy in the first quarter of 2009, most seed houses have 
been expanding grower networks, and are re-opening retail outlets.  In addition, since about 
March of 2009, agro-dealers in urban and rural areas, and other retail outlets in the rural 
areas, have also started to open and stock agricultural inputs – especially seed of hybrid 
maize.   These new initiatives are very important and hopeful--- but also very fragile. 
 
 
Structure of Formal Sector variety and seed systems 
Variety development systems  
At the turn of the century, variety development systems for all important commercial crops 
were functioning well in Zimbabwe.  There were several components to these systems.  First, 
a number of seed companies had their own effective breeding programs, including SeedCo, 
Pannar, and others.  In addition, there were several International Agricultural Research 
Centers (IARCs) that had offices and field programs either in Zimbabwe or in neighboring 
countries in the SADC region: these centers were also developing materials and making these 
available to national research systems and private seed companies.  Two IARCs based in 
Zimbabwe that had active breeding programs were the International Center for Maize and 
Wheat (CIMMYT), and the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
(ICRISAT), the latter producing improved sorghum and pearl millet materials.  A third 
component of the variety development system was the national Department of Research and 
Specialist Services (DR&SS) that maintained breeding programs for many of the major food 
crops including maize, sorghum, pearl millet, finger millet and pulses.  These were housed in 
a unit called the Crop Breeding Institute (CBI).  CBI was also responsible for coordinating a 
“Variety Release Committee” that met annually to review data submitted by their own 
breeders, or by private sector companies, in support of the release of new varieties for 
Zimbabwe.  In addition to CBI, the Ministry of Agriculture maintained (and still maintains) a 
Seed Services unit.  This unit is responsible for certification of seed for commercial sale, 
evaluations of seed quality, and the implementation of national seed regulations in general. 
 
Variety development programs were significantly disrupted during the land reform process, 
in 2000.  Some of the larger seed companies lost some or all of the farms on which they had 
been operating their breeding programs.  Because of economic difficulties, some of the IARCs 
re-located their scientists and breeding programs outside of the country, and funding for 
DR&SS breeding programs also declined.  Also, as price controls for seed (especially maize 
and wheat) came into effect, the whole profitability of breeding programs in-country became 
questionable, and a number of companies moved the majority of their breeding programs to 
neighboring countries. 
 
Today, at least one company does maintain a limited breeding and research program in 
Zimbabwe, but most have moved the bulk of these operations to neighboring countries. 
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Released Varieties 
 
Examples of the types and numbers of varieties of different crops that have been formally 
released in Zimbabwe and produced and marketed by the formal seed sector as of 2009 are 
presented below (Tables 16-20). 
 
Table 16:  Released maize varieties 
Maize by type Number of seed 
companies 
Number of released 
varieties 
Years of release 
White hybrids  7 83 1970 -2008 
Yellow hybrids 7 18 1970- 2007 
OPVs  2 8 2003- 2008 
Source:  P. Setimela, CIMMYT, Zimbabwe – presentation, Harare, June 2009  
 
 
Table 17:  Released sorghum and pearl millet varieties 
Crop Variety Name Date of release
 
(where 
available) 
Sorghum  DC75 
PAN88 
NS551 
SV1 
SV2 
SV3 
SV 4 
Macia 
ZWSH 1 (Hybrid) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
1987 
1987 
1998 
1998 
NA 
1992 
Pearl millet PMV1 
PMV2 
PMV3 
1987 
1992 
1998 
Finger millet FMV 1 
FMV 2 
1992 
1992 
Source:  P. Setimela, CIMMYT, Zimbabwe – presentation, Harare, June 2009; Heinrich 2004 
  
 Table 18:  Released bean varieties and sources of seed 
Variety  Source 
Iris CBI 
Nandi Pannar 
Pan 148 Pannar 
Bounty  SeedCo 
Speckeld Ice Progene seeds 
Cardinal Progene seed 
Source:  P. Setimela, CIMMYT, Zimbabwe – presentation, Harare, June 2009  
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Table 19: Released cowpea varieties and source of seed 
Variety  Source 
CBC1  CBI 
CBC2 CBI 
CBC3 CBI 
PAN311 CBI 
 IT18 SeedCo 
Source:  P. Setimela, CIMMYT, Zimbabwe – presentation, Harare, June 2009  
 
Table 20;  Released varieties of groundnut and sources of seed 
 
Variety Year of 
release 
Currently in the 
market 
Source 
Falcon 1990 Yes CBI 
Flamingo 1982 Yes CBI 
Jesa 1999 Yes CBI 
Ibanda     CBI 
Tern 2005 Yes CBI 
Natal Common   -   CBI 
Nyanda   -  Yes SeedCo 
SC rion   -   SeedCo  
Source:  P. Setimela, CIMMYT, Zimbabwe – presentation, Harare, June 2009  
 
Adoption of improved varieties   
 
Adoption of improved varieties of maize in Zimbabwe is higher than almost any other African 
country (Table 21).  Over 80% of the maize area in the country was planted to hybrids in 
2006/07 and nearly 10% was planted to recognized open pollinated varieties.  The promotion 
of OPVs is ongoing- but development agencies and farmers are split about whether they 
represent a viable option (Box 3) and whose option (Box 4).  Part of the challenge is 
indoctrination:  for years it was ‘near illegal’ to plant OPVs as the government was trying to 
boost food self sufficiency through hybrid use intensification.   Government policy in 2002 
reinstated OPVs. 
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Table 21: Estimated maize seed supply and need in eastern and southern Africa 
Region/country 
Maize area 
(x mil ha) 
Estimated seed 
need(x 1000 
MT)
1
 
Improved OPV maize seed sales Hybrid 
maize seed 
sales in 
2006/07 (x 
1000 MT) 
Adoption 
rate 
2006/07 (as 
% of maize 
area)
2
 
Adjusted 
adoption rate 
in 2006/07 
(as % of 
maize area)
3
 
(x 1000 MT) 
2004/05 2005/06  2006/07 
Eastern Africa  6.6 161.8 4.0 3.5 11.1 42 33 (23) 37 
   Ethiopia     1.7 42.4 0.4 0.4 2 6.2 19 (8) 21 
   Kenya       1.6 38.9 0.6 0.1 1.7 26.3 72 (71) 74 
   Tanzania  2.6 64 0.6 2 3.9 7.3 18 (4) 22 
   Uganda     0.7 16.5 2.3 1 3.5 2.2 35 (9) 54 
Southern Africa  5.4 133.4 9.3 9.8 12 38.5 38 (28) 52 
   Angola     0.8 19.3 0.8 0.1 0.8 0.2   5 (12) 10 
   Malawi       1.4 35.3 5.2 4.5 5.4 2.5 22 (14) 50 
   Mozambique 1.2 30.3 1.2 2.2 3.1 0.2 11 (9) 22 
   Zambia       0.6 14.1 0.3 1 0.5 9.7 73 (23) 81 
   Zimbabwe   1.4 34.4 1.8 2.1 2.2 25.9 80 (82) 93 
Total/average  12.0 295.1 13.3 13.3 23.1 80.5 35(26) 44 
Note:      
1
Estimate based on area and planting rate of 25 kg/ha. 
                
2
In parentheses are figures observed in 1997 by Hassan et al. (2001). Only seed sales in 
2006/07 were used in the estimation. 
3
Adjusted for OPV sales in 2004/05, 2005/06 and 2006/07 assuming that similar quantities 
purchased in the first two years were recycled in 2006/07. That is, total improved OPV seed 
planted is aggregated over 2004/05, 2005/06 and 2006/07. Note that total area under 
improved maize varieties is 4.2 million ha (0.92 million ha under OPV) before and 5.3 million 
ha (2 million ha under OPV) after adjustment with previously purchased OPV seed. 
Source: DTMA seed sector survey, 2007/2008 
 
BOX 3:  ARE OPVS REALLY INFERIOR TO MAIZE HYBRIDS? 
 
Yes, to some extent, but not to a smallholder farmer who may lack the necessary  cash to purchase 
hybrid seed and fertilizers on an annual basis . In an effort to protect the seed maize industry in 
Zimbabwe, it was almost ‘illegal’ for extension to be seen to be promoting OPVs until the early 2000s.   
 
Data from  multi-locational trials in fourteen sites over two seasons show the following:  the 
performance of OPV is comparable to hybrids with or without fertilizer.     
Variety  Description Average yields (t/ha) 
With fertilizer Without fertilizer 
SC 513 Early hybrid 3.15 2.26 
ZM 351 Early OPV 2.87 2.00 
Difference  0.28 0.26 
Source: Muungani et al. 2007 
 
Consider the cost of hybrid seed (US$ 50/ha) and the fertilizer cost (US $155/ha). What is the value of 
the additional yield?  The value of the marginal increase in output with fertilizer is $68.88 and without 
fertilizer is $63.96. 
 
Are OPVs therefore an option for cash-strapped farmers?  Some farmers are beginning to think so—
but adoption has been slow.   
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BOX 4: OPEN POLLINATED VARIETIES: WHOSE OPTION? 
 
Zimbabwe is a maize country. Most of the farmers grow maize regardless of the 
environmental context. The Seed Systems Security Assessment covered for of the five Natural 
Regions in the country, that is, Murehwa (NR IIB), Bikita (NR III), Tsholotsho (NR IV) and 
Beitbridge (NR V), and maize was among the first four most important crops in spite of 
records of failure in NR IV and V. Although maize is not the most important cereal in drought 
prone marginal areas, farmers still grow maize as back up for drought-tolerant crops such as 
sorghum and millet. 
 
Hybrids were introduced in Zimbabwe in the early 1900s (Bourdillon, et al., 2002). Southern 
Rhodesia 52 (SR 52) was the first hybrid variety to be released in 1960. This was followed by  
R 201 and R 215 released in late 1960S. There has been deliberate promotion by extension to 
promote the hybrids based on the attributes of high yield, pest resistance and 
environmentally- specific adaptation.  SeedCo, one of the leading seed houses in Zimbabwe 
has to date released more than thirty different varieties of which two are OPVs (Matuba and 
Obatnapa).  Other seed houses such as Pioneer and Pannar have released more than forty 
different hybrids.  
 
CIMMYT has released two OPVs ZM 421 and ZM 521.  While there is some initial OPV 
adoption, the message from the communities is that still prefer using hybrids, and many 
farmers still have little understanding of OPVs.   Most communities have their own traditional 
local varieties such as ‘garabha’ in Murehwa, ‘bhabhahla’ in Tsholotsho and ‘Hickory king’ in 
Bikita. Communities tend to grow their local varieties in times of seed crisis. Some farmers 
even recycle grain from hybrid seed harvest (F2) as a coping strategy.   
 
Although OPVs are a better option for farmers in remote areas, with little access to formal 
sector seed,  farmers tend to be ‘obsessed’ with hybrid seed across the country. Without 
much information, farmers will take time to appreciate OPVs ---- despite the fact that 
smallholder farmers are often more interested in low costs of inputs rather maximum yields, 
a preference that should influence the development of policies. 
 
 
 
There is also adoption of improved varieties of other important cereal crops.  By 2000, 
approximately 30% of the area planted to sorghum, and 27% of the area planted to pearl 
millet in Zimbabwe was planted with improved varieties (Partnerships for Progress: the SADC 
ICRISAT Sorghum and Millet Improvement Program.  
www.fao.org/docs/eims/upload/206572/1_3_4 cases.pdf.  July 2009). 
 
Certified seed production systems 
Certified seed programs in Zimbabwe have to a large extent focused primarily on maize.  All 
other crops have been somewhat secondary, though there prior to 2000, there was some 
production of certified seed for commercial crops like sunflower, soybean, and for a limited 
time – sorghum, pearl millet, finger millet and cowpeas.  A decade ago, most seed companies 
worked through outgrowers in the large-scale commercial sector, though some also had their 
own seed production farms.  At least one company (SeedCo) worked with national and 
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international research institutes to produce certified seed of small grains and cowpea seed 
through smallholder farmer groups. 
 
Certified seed production systems suffered during the land reform process.  Initially, most of 
the large seed production companies (e.g., SeedCo, Pioneer, Pannar) had large in-country 
seed production programs.  In a recent interview with one large international seed company 
at their main seed processing plant in Zimbabwe, the manager indicated that before the land 
reform process, the company used to produce seed in Zimbabwe and export it all over 
southern Africa.  Today, they produce a limited amount in country and have become net 
importers. 
 
Most of the major seed companies continue to produce certified seed in Zimbabwe, though 
the amount produced is less than the national requirement.   Challenges to increasing seed 
production have included the following: 
 
• There are concerns about price.  In the past the price of seed (especially maize and 
wheat) was fixed by the government, which made it un-profitable for the out-growers to 
produce seed and sell it to the companies.  There are also concerns that any seed 
produced could be requisitioned by government, at any time, to support large scale 
inputs distribution programs. 
 
• With the loss of the large-scale commercial farmers, seed companies have had to 
establish new networks of out-growers.  These new seed producers need time to gain the 
necessary experience and expertise.  They also had much smaller amounts of land, which 
means seed companies have had to contract more growers, and this significantly 
increased their transaction costs. 
 
• Before the introduction of the use of the US dollar, the inflationary environment made 
doing business in general extremely challenging.   (e.g. Table 22 summarizes maize prices 
over a six-year period, 2003-2009) 
 
Table 21:  Maize prices 2003-2009 
Year Maize for 25 
kg/ha 
Wheat for 
100 kg/ha 
Sorghum for 
10kg/ha 
Groundnuts for 
100kg/ha 
Sugar beans 
for 90 kg/ha 
2003 4313 15000 2944 103500 107640 
2004 14000 450000 150000 190000 150000 
2005 610000 585000 343000 750000 270000 
2006 1620000 7150000 210000 5000000 2160000 
2007 125000 100500 2400 236000 450000 
2008 250000000 --- 75000000 500000000 2250000000 
2009 35 120 11 50 100 
Source: Zimbabwe Ministry of Agriculture: Economic and Marketing Department 
 
 Notes: 
The prices are given on the basis of seed required pre hectare of crop planted.  Prices from 2003 to 
2008 are in Zimbabwean dollars and those for 2009 are in United States dollars. Note that after, 2006, 
some of the zeros were removed from currency denominations. 
 
Because of the hyper inflationary environment prevailing at the time budgets were done, the seed 
prices given are those for the month of July each year.  
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However, in the new regulatory environment, certified seed production systems are again re-
starting and scaling up.  One seed company indicates that they have produced 4,000 metric 
tons this year through their new growers, and that these growers are gaining in experience 
and average seed yields per hectare are improving.  Another company, Agri Seeds, will have 
5000-6000 mt available (up from 1200 mt in 2007/08).  A  Food and Agriculture Organization 
Coordination meeting also suggested an overall 23,550 mt estimated current inflow to seed 
houses (FAO communication 14 May 2009). 
 
It should be noted that the Seed Unit in DR&SS is still able to support these processes.  There 
is an opportunity now, if the economic environment remains stable, to significantly expand 
the amount of maize seed that is produced in Zimbabwe – and perhaps seed of other crops as 
well.  Having an initial supply of foundation seed will be critical. 
 
As yet there is no indication that private sector seed companies have a strong interest in 
producing certified seed of open pollinated varieties (OPVs) of maize (one exception being 
Agri Seeds) , or of any of the  important  self-pollinating cereals or pulses (sorghum, millets, 
cowpeas, groundnuts, soybean, etc.).  The availability of certified seed for any of these crops 
is likely to remain problematic for some time to come unless new strategies to promote sales 
of these crops are developed and supported by the private sector (e.g., small pack sales of 
new varieties, as is done in East Africa).  Nonetheless, there is great potential for certified 
seed production of these “orphan” crops, as has been demonstrated by the seed production 
efforts of the Farmer Field Schools (FFS) in Tsholotsho this past season (see Section VIII).  FFS 
farmers produced over 100 mt of good quality seed of open-pollinated crops in 2008/09  (see 
the site report on Tsholotsho for further details).  
Outside country developments of key importance for seed security 
Many of the larger private sector seed companies operate throughout the southern Africa 
region, and not just in Zimbabwe.  Some of these include SeedCo, Pioneer and Pannar.  Thus 
there are significant linkages between seed companies in Zimbabwe and operations in 
neighboring countries.  In particular, South Africa is a major seed producer.  Some companies 
also produce seed for Zimbabwe in Zambia ( e.g. SeedCo has a large processing plant there).  
In a recent discussion, one major seed company indicated that it would take about four  
weeks  for them to get certified maize seed from their counterparts in South Africa, from the 
time the order was placed until the seed arrived.  They also indicated that they could import 
almost any quantity required , and very quickly.  It is likely that most of the major seed 
companies could import significant amounts of certified maize seed as well [with a focus on 
non-genetically modified (GMO) seed].    The potential to import seed of other crops would 
be less certain, especially for varieties formally released in Zimbabwe. 
Summary: Formal seed sector development over the last 5-10 years 
The loss of large-scale commercial out-growers following the land reform process in 2000 
caused significant disruption to the certified seed production systems of the private sector.  
Following this process, the seed companies had to switch to new, more numerous, smaller-
scale, out-growers.  It took time for the new seed producers to learn how to maximize both 
production levels and seed quality.  At the same time, the seed companies needed to work 
with larger numbers of farmer-growers (due to reduced farm sizes), which led to increased 
transaction costs associated with more fragmented seed production. 
 
From about 2002, price controls started to come into effect for both grain and seed of some 
major crops (especially maize and wheat).  This had a significant impact on what the seed 
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companies could afford to pay the seed growers, which in turn led to production dis-
incentives and/or side-selling.   
 
Price controls for maize and wheat grain also in turn affected demand for inputs including 
seed and fertilizer.  The regulation that all maize grain had to be sold to the government-
controlled Grain Marketing Board at a fixed price created a dis-incentive for commercial 
production.  This situation prevailed roughly from 2003-2008. 
 
Due to increasing control of prices of commodities, there has been significant growth of what 
became known as the ‘informal sector’.  Major commodities (including hybrid maize seed, 
maize grain, other food commodities and fertilizer) were often available in the “informal” 
sector at prices significantly above the ‘controlled’ prices when they were not available from 
the ‘formal’ sector.  
 
In the 2007/08 cropping season, the government implemented a large seed and fertilizer 
distribution program.  The government had set the price at which maize seed could be sold, 
and there was considerable pressure on all seed houses to provide essentially all of the maize 
seed they had produced in-country to the government at the gazetted prices.  The seed 
houses necessarily complied, but were generally not happy with the fact that the price was 
fixed.  They were paid with large amounts of Zimbabwe dollars which were devaluing at 
exorbitantly high  rates. 
 
There have been large donor-supported seed and fertilizer distribution programs in 
Zimbabwe since 2004 (and earlier).   The vast majority of seed produced by the seed 
companies was delivered to farmers either through NGO or government relief programs.)  
The next most important source of certified maize seed for farmers in the last few years has 
been through the “informal’ market channels.  Formal commercial retail markets for maize 
seed and fertilizer have been essentially non-existent for the last two cropping seasons. 
 
Recently (Feb-May 2009) the re-liberalization of the market environment for both certified 
seed  and fertilizer, and for the sale of output commodities is creating new opportunities to 
get businesses up and running again.  For example, stores in Murehwa that used to sell agri-
inputs just started re-opening in March 09.  The outlet for SeedCo in Murehwa opened on 
July 10, 2009 for the first time in more than two years.  At the time of the survey they had 15 
MT  of certified hybrid maize seed in stock. 
 
Most of the major seed companies are also still functioning in Zimbabwe, albeit at much 
reduced levels compared with 10 years ago.  So there is now an important opportunity to re-
establish the formal seed sector and related retail market networks in the country.  This 
potential recovery is still fragile, and needs to be encouraged with appropriate support.  The 
right kind of relief programs at this time – ones that promote rather than compete with the 
formal seed sector and retail networks – could be extremely valuable in jump-starting the 
recovery.  Conversely – relief programs that compete directly with the retail sector (e.g., 
direct seed distribution) could be quite detrimental. 
 
It should also be noted that farmers could benefit from having access to good seed of 
appropriate improved varieties of other important food crops beyond maize (e.g., 
groundnuts, cowpeas, beans and cereals such as sorghum, pearl millet and finger millet).  It 
would be useful to consider the re-establishment of some of the effective smallholder 
farmer-based seed production systems for these crops that were functioning before 2000.  It 
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would also be useful to promote the re-establishment (or in some cases – new development) 
of retail market networks for these crops. 
 
INFORMAL SEED SYSTEM IN ZIMBABWE   
Introduction 
 
Sorghum, pearl millet, groundnuts, cowpeas, Bambara nuts, sugar beans and sweet potato 
constitute the bulk of crops that are important in the informal seed sector in Zimbabwe.  
Others include open pollinated maize varieties, soybeans, sunflower, white beans and finger 
millet.    Except for maize, the informal sector supplies over 95% of the seed Zimbabwe 
farmers sow.   The informal sector includes all the ways framers themselves produce and 
dissemination seed, through own stocks, barter/gifts and markets, with gift-giving being 
remarkably extensive in Zimbabwe (see Section VIII).  Sources of seed sold in informal 
channels   will vary according to the size of the market. In big markets, such as those in towns, 
seed might come from distant farming areas in outer lying districts, provinces and even 
across boarders.  In smaller markets the seed usually comes from local farming community.   
 
 Of late due to the collapse of the economy and the resultant shortage of maize seed   in the 
formal market, hybrid maize has also made inroads into the informal markets.  In this case 
hybrid maize bought in 10kg, 20kg, 25kg or 50kg packs is repackaged into smaller packets of 
2kg and 5 kg and sold in the informal venue – from trucks or open market stalls. In the same 
manner, hybrid maize seed, used to pay employees of some seed companies, has found its 
way into the informal market.  
 
It is these informal markets which have been the backbone of seed provision during these 
years of stress in Zimbabwe.  The informal seed system has moved its normal range of crops, 
which are key for production stability and nutrition, and many of which are associated with 
women.  Unusually, the informal sector in Zimbabwe in recent years has also been the prime 
deliverer of the formal seed sector crop--- maize.  All this has happened in the absence of 
significant financial or legal support.        
 
Special ways of moving crops and varieties through the informal sector 
 
Many trends have helped the informal sector in Zimbabwe remain stable and unusually 
dynamic,  partly as  numerous  specific links exist  between the informal and the formal seed 
sector systems.  In normal times, when trials and crop demonstrations are a common feature 
with the public, private sector and International agricultural institutions, new and improved 
varieties have entered the informal channels on a consistent basis and in multiple ways. The 
following are some of the special ways crops and varieties have moved (and still move) 
through the informal sector. 
 
Institutional channels Participatory variety evaluations (PVS) 
 
 In order to guide variety development programs, both private and public, farmers are 
sometimes invited to their research stations to evaluate varieties that are being developed.  
In the past, farmers have sometimes asked for and been given either a few heads or small 
quantities of  the variety material to take back with them. Such material has been planted on 
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a small scale first and, if it showed some traits that farmers were interested in, spread in the 
communities through gifts, exchanges and sales--- particularly for small grains.  Traits farmers 
may particularly value include: early maturity, tolerance to mid season dry spells and 
droughts and high yield gains.  A good example of such spread is the pearl millet variety 
Okashana, released in Namibia but multiplied by farmers in Tsholotsho before it was even 
released in Zimbabwe.   
 
On-farm trials  
 
As research institutions such as DR&SS, ICRISAT and others have conducted both agronomic 
and variety on-farm trials.  Some of the material used in the trials, has found its way into the 
farmers’ fields in subsequent seasons.   If such material performs well,  it spreads  very 
quickly in the community through gifts, exchanges and sales.  
 
Field days that are held on sites where the on-farm trials have been conducted   also help the 
spread of such material,   even beyond the hosting community .  Through field days, farmers 
have learned about new materials, increasing their demand for the materials. 
 
 In the same manner,   variety demonstrations carried out by extension to compare old or 
local varieties with new or improved varieties have also helped channel varieties into 
communities. 
  
Cross border trade  
 
Some materials find their way across borders. These are usually moved across borders by 
cross border traders, middlemen or by people who visit some relatives in neighboring 
countries.  Examples include some varieties of sweet potato that have found their way into 
farmers’ fields in Murehwa from Mozambique and Malawi, some maize varieties that have 
found their way into the Zimbabwe from Botswana and South Africa.   
 
(Note that organizations such as FEWSNET carefully document informal grain trade.  It might 
be equally useful to map cross border variety and seed trade) 
 
Locally-based multiplication programs 
 Some concerted, community based seed multiplication programs also have helped multiply 
seed on a novel scale.  
 
Farmer Field schools (FFS) 
 
Farmer Field Schools started in Zimbabwe in the 1996/97 season with a program on 
Integrated Production and Pest Management, (IPPM) otherwise commonly known as 
Integrated Pest management (IPM). In 2003/2004 season, FAO sponsored some FFS on 
Integrated Soil Nutrient and Water Management (ISWNM). Farmers in these FFS were also 
trained in the multiplication of pearl millet, sorghum, cowpea and groundnut seed. The FFS 
schools multiplied seed as a group and as individuals.  
 
In Tsholotsho, the number of FFS multiplying seed grew from 6 in the 2003/04 to 46 in the 
2008/09 season. The quantity of seed multiplied by these FFS also grew tremendously. In the 
2003/04 season for example the FFS produced 14.5 mt of pearl millet seed and this increased 
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to 84mt in the 2008/09 season. Groundnut seed production increased from 10.2mt to 28mt 
in the same period.  
 
In the past, the same FFS were contracted by SeedCo- a seed house to multiply pearl millet 
and sorghum seed for them for four seasons. The Grain Marketing Board also contracted the 
same farmers to multiply the same crops. By July 9, 2009 Agri Seeds had already purchased 
30 mts of cowpea seed from just one community .  It is worth noting that about 75% of the 
pearl millet and sorghum multiplied by the FFS is sold outside the Tsholotsho district. The 
remainder is sold at seed fairs or at the household level. All the  groundnut  seed produced by 
the FFS is sold locally. 
 
Other community based multiplication schemes 
 
There are other community based seed multiplication efforts other than FFS. These are either 
group or individual efforts. In Murehwa for example farmers multiply their own sweet potato 
seed.  The Zhunde Ramambo (Chief’s granary) concept where a group of farmers produce 
grain on a field provided by the chief is also being practiced in Murehwa. This grain can also 
be used as potential seed when seed is in short supply especially following droughts. 
  
Seed Assistance 
 Special seed related assistance has also had impacts in introducing new varieties of different 
crops, conserving local landraces and providing seed in times of possible seed stress. The 
following programs have been prominent in this regard. 
 
Seed fairs 
 
 Seed fairs, where farmers are given seed vouchers to purchase seed were started by CRS in 
2002. These were later continued by such organizations as Care International, ICRISAT and 
Plan International. Seed fairs are implemented in various forms. In some cases farmers and 
agro-companies bring seed and other inputs to sell at the ‘fair’, that is, a temporary dedicated 
venue where voucher holders and potential seed sellers are brought together.  This is the 
model used in CRS and Plan International organized seed fairs. Another version is used by the 
Care International:  farmers are given vouchers to purchase seed and other inputs from agro-
dealers   (see Mazvimavi  et al. 2008).  
 
Seed banks 
 
Programs to conserve and preserve genetic material of local landraces (including traditional 
vegetables) help such materials to remain in dynamic, in use-- and prevent total loss of 
genetic resources.  Such material can be used in further development of varieties or given 
back to communities to plant in times of seed stress.  COMMUTECHH started such seed banks 
soon after independence, in the early 1980s.   
 
Direct Seed Distribution 
 
Many NGOS and the GoZ have been involved in direct seed distribution, at least every two to 
three years since independence in 1980 (and every year of the last five years) . These 
programs sometimes introduce farmers to new varieties.   In the SSSA, specific follow-up 
showed that ‘emergency’ seed distribution has been more important than normal 
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development and extension programs in diffusing new varieties.  New varieties of maize, 
sweet potatoes, cowpea, groundnut, pearl millet and sorghum have all been introduced 
through emergency programs (see Section VII for specific statistics.)  It might be seen as 
unfortunate (and unwise) that emergency programs are being used for variety introduction.  
Such introductions should be accompanied by honed technical advice and multi-season 
follow-up.  These are not skills and activities which emergency providers necessarily possess.    
 
Summary:  Informal Seed Sector 
The informal seed sector has played an important role across Zimbabwe and especially   in 
the Semi Arid Areas of Zimbabwe (SAAZ) where the majority of smallholders farm – and 
where much of the emergency seed aid unfolds. The informal sector has remained dynamic 
through new variety introductions and skill- building related to seed production.  It has also 
continued to produce the lion’s share of all seed—except for hybrid maize.   Preliminary 
efforts to connect informal seed production with private seed companies have been 
promising.  Experience shows that farmers can produced high quality seed and in 
impressively large quantities.   
 
The crops produced by the informal sector provide important production stability and 
nutrition balance for most farming families.  The sector could be an even important source of 
better quality seed across a large range of crops, and on a sustainable basis,   if it were given 
modest financial, technical, and business development support.  The need to further 
strengthen and professionalize the informal seed sector in Zimbabwe is discussed in Sections 
VII and VIII.   The informal sector has been too long overlooked by donors and formal seed 
industry specialists.  It represents an economic and livelihood opportunity –and has great 
unrealized potential to contribute further to seed security and to food security. 
 
RELIEF SEED SYSTEM 
The presence of a relief seed system needs to be signaled as it is flourishing across much of 
east and southern Africa and particularly in Zimbabwe.  Basically the relief seed system is a 
relatively new term (Bramel and Remington, 2004), coined to recognize the very real 
phenomenon of seed supply systems geared mainly to feed the repeated emergency seed 
distributions.   The functioning of such relief systems involves a clear set of steps: a disaster is 
declared, seed need is assumed, and then a well-established chain of suppliers moves into 
action.   Such systems are completely dependent on the continuing of such crises for their 
financial solvency. 
 
The relief seed system is presently in full gear in Zimbabwe for the 2009/10 season.  About 
23,550 mt  of maize has already been identified for free distribution, along with 4090 mt of 
soybean and  modest quantities of sorghum (950 kg) and wheat (943 kg). (FAO Coordination 
Meeting among Zimbabwe Seed Houses, 14 May 2009). 
 
While beneficial for the supplier,   who markets large quantities of a few crops and with few 
transactions,  free  distribution of seed , given repeatedly  has been shown to have negative 
effects, across African countries (Sperling et al, 2008).   Repeated free distribution denies 
markets to seed/grain traders (Rohrbach et al., 2004; Walsh et al., 2004), and, it comes to be 
expected, it also constitutes a perverse incentive and undermines local seed acquisition 
practices.  A good number of Zimbabwean farmers interviewed asked that free distributions 
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be stopped-- they saw them creating changed behavior-- and sometimes being used as a 
political, rather than needed agricultural tool.  Repeated distribution of seed can not only be 
detrimental, but it fundamentally also signals that the seed security problem being addressed 
has probably been misdiagnosed.  
 
Fertilizer production and distribution in smallholder areas 
Fertilizer is frequently used as a complement to seed, even by small holder farmers.  The 
SSSA could only touch of important fertilizer-related issues, both here in the background 
analysis, and also in field investigations (section VII). 
 
About 70% of the chemical (inorganic) fertilizers used in Zimbabwe have traditionally been 
manufactured locally with a few of the raw materials such as potash being imported (IDC, 
2008). Supply of ammonium nitrate, the main source of nitrogen, is often supplemented 
through importation of urea. Annual deficits in the top dressing fertilizer are about 20,000 
mt.  About 52% of the fertilizer supply does go to the smallholder sector (Table 23), and over 
80% of this fertilizer is allocated to maize.  
 
Table 23: Traditional typical hectarage and demand (mt ) for different fertilizer types 
in Zimbabwe 
Crop Typical 
Historical 
Hectarage 
NPK 
Compounds  
Ammonium 
Nitrate 
Total Fertilizer 
Demand 
Commercial Maize 240 000 60 000 60 000            120 000 
Small Scale Maize 1 200 000 50 000 80 000            130 000 
Soybean 70 000 10 000        -              10 000 
Cotton 330 000 15 000 15 000 30 000 
Tobacco 200 000 80 000 40 000            120 000 
Other Crops 300 000 40 000 30 000 70 000 
Summer Crops 2 340 000 255 000 225 000 480 000 
Winter Crops 80 000 45 000 35 000 80 000 
TOTAL Demand 2 420 000 300 000 260 000 560 000 
 (Source: Windmill & ZFC unpublished reports) 
 
Over the past decade, there has been a decline in fertilizer production in the country. 
Production of ammonium nitrate has declined from 250,000 mt in 1999 to less than 75,000 
mt in 2008 (Figure 4,top), while production of phosphate (P2O5) declined from 40,000 to less 
than 10,000 over the same period (Figure 4, bottom). This decline has been attributed to the 
following factors by the major manufacturers: 
• Forex shortages  
• Price controls 
• Electricity shortages and unreliable supplies 
• Coal Shortages 
• Brain drain and skills shortages due to various economic challenges 
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Consequently, availability of fertilizer on the market has been severely limited, driving prices 
beyond the reach of most smallholder farmers. The decline in production has also meant that 
even initiative of government and other development agencies could not acquire sufficient 
quantities of fertilizer to meet identified relief programs from within country stocks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Trends in the manufacture of ammonium nitrate (top graph) and phosphate 
(P2O5) (bottom) fertilizers in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2008  
 (Source: Windmill & ZFC unpublished reports) 
 
A major source of response to the shortage has been importation, but significant quantities 
were only imported in between 2005 and 2008 (Figure 5).  The decline in production has also 
been associated with withdrawal of sales offices that traditionally provided services to 
farming communities. A major consequent of the decline in production patterns has also 
been the reduction in the range fertilizer types. The most predominant fertilizer types that 
remained on the market were the basal Compound D and ammonium nitrate top dressing 
fertilizer, both for maize. However, a major challenge was also the lack of timely supply of the 
fertilizers. While farmers in areas such as Murehwa had relatively high chances of accessing 
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the limited fertilizer on the market, those in remote areas such as Bikita were most adversely 
affected. The problem was compounded by the non-existence of manufacturing capacity in 
neighboring countries (excluding South Africa), which hitherto, had depended partly on 
supplies from Zimbabwe.  Only very modest supplies of fertilizer were available within the 
country through informal channels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Patterns in locally manufactured and imported inorganic fertilizers in 
Zimbabwe between 2001 and 2008  
 (Source: Windmill & ZFC unpublished reports) 
 
 
The SSSA team found fertilizer supplies starting to be available, for the farmer buyer, during 
the July 2009 assessments.  Price was the compelling constraint.  Using barter economy rates, 
the price has  gone up five-fold in but two to three years.  Using the barter prices from 
Murewha: a 50kg bag used to cost 3 buckets of sweet potatoes; in July 2009, it cost the 
equivalent of 15 buckets (see Box 13).  
 
COPING STRATEGIES AND EMERGENCE OF A BARTER 
ECONOMY-   TO ACCESS SEED 
We now turn to the focus to farmers strategies for input acquisition, and especially for seed.  
Farmers in Zimbabwe have long had a series of coping strategies for accessing seed related to 
drought,   However, in the last few years, a new set of coping strategies related to accessing 
seed has emerged, some associated with  increasing poverty, but many surfacing due the 
unstable currency  (Zimbabwean dollar), or scarcity of currency notes altogether (US$).  
 
In terms of responding   to increasing poverty,  several   seed sourcing strategies are 
remarkable :  
 
a. Maricho (piece work or casual labor) usually but not exclusively for agricultural tasks such 
as weeding, planting harvesting. Although maricho are usually undertaken within the 
local community, farmers are also now going to outside communities, including small-
scale commercial farming areas, to look for this type of work. In instances where needy 
farmers are engaged to weed or plant, it means that their own fields will be attended to 
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later, often when the rains have advanced.  Therefore, there is a good chance of casual 
workers getting a low harvest, even if the rain season is good.    
 
b. Sharing seed obtained as aid or exchanging it for other types or varieties of seed.  
 
c. Occasionally (rarely?) farmers select and sowing maize seed from grain issued by NGOs as 
food aid rations. This may be done by both primary beneficiaries and non-beneficiary 
community members who have acquired grain from recipients of food aid. (In this SSSA, 
the food aid contribution to actual maize seed planted was negligible, just 2.4% of total 
seed sown- see Table 32). 
 
 
The currency dilemma combined with increasing poverty is also affecting means of  obtaining  
seed.   Novel coping strategies include the following: 
 
d. Barter trade, particularly in the last five years.  Farmers exchange commodities such 
as crops and small livestock for seed. Units of measure vary in size but the most 
common are 400ml tea cups, 5 liter containers and 20 liter buckets. Although this 
practice is largely confined to the local community, outside traders may also barter 
on a larger retail level.  e.g. In Beitbridge, the team found traders obtaining large 
amounts of second-hand clothing (and soap, empty containers) so as to exchange 
such clothes for seed  procured from the surrounding farming areas. 
 
e. Obtaining seed through exchange with groceries and clothing sent as remittances by 
relatives working outside the country (e.g. South Africa and Botswana) 
 
Most recently, the adoption of the multi-currency (US$, ZAR, Pula etc) has presented its 
special set of challenges.  In the rural countryside, (and indeed nearly everywhere), US 
currency notes are hard to find,   particularly the smaller denominations- ($1, $2, $5, $10)  
which would be used by the small farmer to buy seed. Hence, re-packing of seed and fertilizer 
in smaller units has also emerged and barter trading and/or commodity exchanges assumed 
more importance. For example in Bikita, Reapers, an agro-marketing company, was reported 
to be procuring maize grain from local farmers in exchange for both basal and top dressing 
fertilizer. Agro-dealers in Murehwa were repackaging fertilizer in 1kg packs and selling it at 
$1.00 per kilogram. 
 
In normal situations, farmers buy their agricultural inputs soon after harvest, after selling 
their produce. However, with the adoption of foreign currency which is still in short supply, 
many farmers are finding it difficult to raise enough money for the agricultural inputs they 
require. Moreover, local prices for produce are comparatively low.  In Murehwa and Bikita 
farmers were selling maize grain for US$2.00 while in Bikita it was R20.00. This means, for 
example in Bikita, where 5kg maize seed cost between R145 and R150, a farmer has to sell 7-
8 buckets to raise enough money for 5kg maize seed.  
 
Finally, not all coping strategies are necessarily effective.  Pervasive use of coping strategies 
can sometimes lead farmers into agricultural decline ((see case example in Box 5). 
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  BOX. 5.  COPING OR CRIPPLING STRATEGIES? 
 
MaDawu ,  a 65 year-old widow, resides  in Tsholotsho, with her unmarried daughter and her 
minor children.   On the day her husband died, five years ago, his relatives came to collect her 
family’s 5 head of cattle-- but left her to continue farming and living in the home she had built 
with her husband.   
 
Because she has no draught power and tills her field by hoe,  MaDawu  cannot produce 
adequate food for herself and her dependents.   To supplement their harvests, she and her 
daughter take-up maricho work all year-round.   During the agricultural season, the pair 
engages in tasks such as planting, weeding, harvesting, guarding crops against birds and 
winnowing.  They sleep out of the homestead at least four days a week—returning to catch 
up on their own farming needs during the day of two leftover between wage labor bouts. 
 
The neglect to her own farm has lead to a declining cycle in home harvests: she plants late, 
barely weeds, and can afford little in the way of inputs.  The cycle continues of not harvesting 
enough – and her and her daughter having to continue to work for the better off families—
even for food. 
 
 In 2008/09 season, seed aid was distributed to vulnerable households in the local area:  
MaDawu  missed  out on the aid because both she and her daughter were off  working 
elsewhere.   So for 2008/09, MaDawu once again had to source for seed through maricho. 
 
Gender Issues to consider when thinking about seed security 
We end this section on system structures and processes with a note on women. Seed security 
assessment and seed security interventions are not necessarily gender neutral, and these 
thought should serve as a ‘reminder’ to guide both assessment and subsequent action. 
 
 It has been noted that women in developing countries often manage seed-system processes, 
especially storage and seed exchange (Sperling, 2000). In Zimbabwe, other additional 
important issues to be considered when thinking about women and seed security include: 
 
a) women’s land access,  land tenure and property rights 
b) impact of HIV/Aids 
c) traditional women’s crops 
d) seed sources and storage for women’s crops; and 
e) formal research and extension. 
 
 Land and Property Rights 
In communal areas of Zimbabwe, land rights are regarded as traditional rights, primarily 
facilitating men who were born in a certain area to provide a living for their households. 
Residential and arable land is allocated to married men by traditional leaders and married 
women have access to it only through their husbands. Problems associated with land tenure 
security and land administration systems have been proven to be an integral part of the 
challenge facing widows and other vulnerable women.  Women who lose their husbands 
through death or divorce are often vulnerable to property rights violations inflicted to them 
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by either relatives or by the wider community (Izumi, 2006).  With respect to arable land, the 
ability of women to fully utilize it usually declines with the loss of a husband. This inability is, 
at times, used a basis by relatives for land seizures, both temporary and permanent. (see Box 
6 ). 
 
On dissolution of their marriages, the women return to their natal homes. In such cases, if 
they require land for agriculture, this may be allocated in pieces by their relatives.  Women 
may be expected to work in their families’ fields (Izumi, 2006). 
 
Even within a functioning household, access to land by married women to grow their own 
crops is subject to negotiation and can be a cause of conflict if husband is not in favor of the 
wife’s plans.  Therefore, how much land and its quality from the household field women are 
eventually granted depends on individual women’s ability to negotiate effectively. Often, 
their husbands will prioritize crops men have control over. In Bikita women reported that 
they are often allocated less fertile portions to grow their own crops. 
 
HIV/AIDS and Migration 
One effect of HIV/AIDS and labor migration by males in rural communities of Zimbabwe has 
been an increase in the number of female headed households. It is estimated that 60% of the 
households are headed by women.  In Tsholotsho, women estimated that 50% of the 
households in their community are headed by women. In Bikita the estimate was much 
higher, at 75%. These developments impact on availability of labor for agricultural 
production. Also, migrant family members, including spouses often return home already ill 
and requiring home-based care; this is usually provided by the women. 
  
 
Women’s crops and control over harvest  
Traditionally, there are some crops that are regarded as women’s crops. In Zimbabwe, these 
crops include sweet potatoes, groundnuts, Bambara nuts, cowpeas, finger millet, sorghum, 
pumpkins and pearl millet. The crops are mainly grown for preparing key dishes of food for 
the family. Pumpkin and cowpea leaves for instance are used as vegetables (fresh and dried). 
Cereal crops (finger millet and sorghum) although mainly used for sadza are also used to 
make non-alcoholic fermented drink locally known as mahewu. Groundnuts are consumed as 
roasted or boiled grain or are processed into peanut butter which is mixed with vegetables or 
other traditional dishes. 
 
Although it is generally recognized that women use the crops for food for their families, 
women also sell excess harvests or products to earn income. The crops are generally 
marketed locally, to outside traders mostly from urban areas, who come to the areas 
specifically to buy them.  The traders either pay cash for the crops or acquire them through 
barter trade. In Murehwa, however, women said they sometimes take their produce, 
especially sweet potatoes, to sell on their own in Harare.  Overall, women in all sites reported 
facing marketing challenges for crops because there are limited local markets. They observed 
that of late, outside traders are finding it difficult to travel to rural areas because of increased 
transport costs.  Women in Bikita reported that they were finding it difficult to sell sweet 
potatoes because there is an over-supply of the commodity in the area.   
 
Income earned from women’s crops is commonly used to buy personal assets, mainly, 
utensils, personal clothing and in some cases, small livestock (poultry and goats). Women in 
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Beitbridge said they also use the income to meet the needs of the girl child, especially 
sanitary ware. In Murehwa and Bikita women reported that assets procured by women using 
their own income form part of the estate-“nhaka”- of the women to be shared by her 
relatives and given to her children after her death. If the husband survives the wife and re-
marries, the new wife is not allowed to use the utensils bought by the late wife: she has to 
procure her own.  
 
BOX 6:  ARE THESE REALLY WOMEN’S CROPS? 
 
It is well known in Zimbabwe that women have special crops.  “Women’s crops” include the 
small grains (finger millet, sorghum and pearl millet), sweet potatoes, as well as all the pulses 
(groundnut, sugar beans, cowpea and Bambara nuts).   Although used mostly for food, 
women can sell small quantities of their crops to purchase items such as household utensils, 
clothing and even small livestock.  In theory, women also have decision-making power over 
their crops--- can offer gifts to relatives, neighbors and visitors—even without asking their 
husband’s permission. 
 
But is this truism really true? Do   ‘women’s  crops’ really exist?.   Evidence suggests that the 
gender divide is not so divided. 
 
On the one hand, there is a tendency for women’s crops—to become male—once they gain 
lucrative marketing value.  Hence, In Murehwa, sweet potatoes, a woman’s crop, became 
male-dominated as soon as it gained higher market value and  as big volumes  began moving  
to Harare stalls and stores .    
 
On the other hand, 60% of  communal  households, the majority, are indeed female headed,--
- due mainly to outmigration, or mortality associated with HIV/AIDS..  This means ,  de facto,  
that all crops might be ‘women’s crops for many households in Zimbabwe. 
 
 So women seem to have true control over crops—mostly when they have subsistence 
value—or when there is no man around. 
 
In Tsholotsho, women said that to assert or protect their control of their crops, some couples 
keep separate granaries because the wives fear that their husbands might use harvests from 
their hard work to support “small houses”— aka  mistresses. Wives in polygamous unions 
keep separate granaries. 
Sources of seed for women’s crops 
Seed for women’s crops is not easily available in the formal market. Hence, most of the seed 
for women’s crops is obtained locally through informal seed systems i.e. from own saved 
seed, barter, gifts and labor (maricho) or goods exchanges.  The following diagram presents 
findings from a focus group discussion held with women in Murehwa on their sources of 
groundnut seed in 2008/09 season. Except for very modest government distribution (SADC), 
all came from local channels.   
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Figure 6:   Women’s Focus Group Discussion Ward 14, Murehwa.  
 
 
 
note: numbers identify order of importance of seed source channels, with 1, retained, being most 
important. 
 
Generally, women in all sites were found to be seed secure for most crops. The only 
exceptions were noted in Beitbridge and Murehwa where groundnut seed and rice were 
reported to be difficult to obtain locally, respectively. In Beitbridge, the explanation for this 
was that low rainfall makes it difficult for the crop to develop sufficiently for it to be used for 
seed.  As a result, women in Beitbridge reported exchanging as much as 1 goat for a 50kg bag 
of unshelled groundnuts. 
 
Variety security on the other hand was reported to be a challenge for crops such as sweet 
potatoes (Murehwa and Tsholotsho), groundnuts (Beitbridge & Bikita). Given the prevalence 
of recycling of local seed, it seems that there is limited introduction of new varieties 
 
Outside the community, the informal markets are the main source for seed. However, seed 
sold in these markets is usually sold as grain, mainly for food, and therefore may not always 
be sorted by variety.  Women have to look carefully when they want to buy preferred 
varieties or which are adaptable for their regions.   
 
Seed Storage 
Potential seed from women’s fields is selected and stored after harvest. Groundnuts and 
Bambara, are stored unshelled and only shelled and seed selected when ready to plant. 
 
Storage of  crops was reported to be a challenge. In Bikita and Murehwa the main challenge 
cited was the prevalence of theft. Because of this, farmers refrain from storing their crops in 
granaries. Instead, they store it in the house, at times in their bedrooms. Women in Murehwa 
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said they usually store the potential seed outside their own homes in fear that children might 
consume it or that they, themselves, might succumb to the temptation of utilizing the 
potential seed for household food or sale. They entrust someone usually their in-laws to keep 
the grain for them until planting time. In Beitbridge, they said they mix groundnut seed with 
burnt goat dung to preserve it and to reduce the likelihood of it being consumed. In 
Tsholotsho, the women said they mix seed with poisonous substances such as paraffin. 
However, other household members, including children are made aware of this so that they 
do not consume it. 
 
  
Formal Research and Extension 
Introduction of new varieties for women’s crops (groundnuts, cowpeas, sorghum and pearl 
millet) in the communities has been mainly through NGO initiated interventions, particularly 
Farmer Field Schools (Tsholotsho and Murehwa) and Conservation Farming.  However, 
membership of FFS is low in some areas and as a result, the spread of new technologies is, at 
times, slow. For instance, in Murehwa CTDT has 130020 registered beneficiaries for all their 
interventions but only 432 are members of FFS.  Moreover, the selection of beneficiaries 
often targets specific vulnerable groups e.g. female headed households, chronically ill and 
physically handicapped. Participants of women focus group discussion observed that some of 
the targeted beneficiaries are not always able to utilize the seed either because they are too 
ill or have inadequate resources     
 
All this suggests that there is need for more rigorous interventions geared towards improving 
women’s access to seed for their crops.  In seed security assessment, and subsequent 
interventions, issues of land use, harvest ownership, right to sell produce might all be usefully 
considered.   
 
Given that seed of  ‘women’s crops’ is mostly procured from local channels, female-linked 
production has generally been stable over these turbulent years—as informal systems have 
generally fared well.   Some new varieties have entered   informal channels (as show through 
processes of PVS, seed fairs, etc. above).     However, much   more   can and should be done 
to bolster variety dynamism and female-linked seed production gains.  Just as the informal 
seed sector generally could thrive with more support, so too, can women’s linked seed and 
food production enterprises, more specifically. 
 
Concluding comments  
This section has review the history and recent status of the structures and processes which 
bring seed, and other inputs to individual farmers and communities.  Formal sector seed 
production, has been particularly compromised over the last few years, due to lack of inputs, 
price controls, and devalued currency.  However, production and distribution networks are 
starting to re-open, and need to be supported, rather than undermined.  The overwhelming 
focus of the formal sector has been on commercial crops, particularly maize. However, many 
other crops contribution to production stability and nutrition. Minimally, efforts should be 
given to adequate producing adequate foundation seed for these key, but ‘orphan crops’.  
 
The informal sector seems to have remained stable these years, and probably has even 
grown in importance, as crops such as maize, normally sold in formal outlets such as agro-
dealers, increasingly moved towards informal channels of barter trade or black market sale.  
A number of process have existed to introduce new varieties into such local channels, but 
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these need to be revitalized and regularized, that is, used on a consistent and predictable 
basis.  The potential for increasing the scale of production of high quality seed within informal 
channels looks promising.    
 
Over the last few years, farmers have developed a range additional strategies getting access 
to seed.  While some of these coping strategies are linked to the currency dilemma, many 
have evolved simply due to poverty, and ‘maricho’ was highlighted as particularly notable 
during the fieldwork period. 
 
And a final note on women.  Their prime links to the informal channels mean that the security 
for so-called women’s crops has been relatively stable.  But the label of ‘women’s crops, puts 
Zimbabwe females in a small and  mistakenly-labeled box. Sixty percent of communal 
households are female headed, and, in addition, a number of the so-called women’s crops 
are being increasingly commercialized. So, in essence, all crops in informal and formal 
channels are potentially linked women.  This means that their special concerns --   and well as 
a farmer’s routine concerns- might best be reviewed in seed security assessments—and 
subsequent interventions. This assessment made only very modest moves towards more 
gender-sensitive SSSAs. 
    
 
We now move to the more specific analysis of   seed security findings ‘on the ground’, as 
documented during July 2009. 
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 VI: FIELD FINDINGS: ACROSS SITES 
 
This section reviews the field findings emerging across the four assessment sites.  General 
trends in formal and informal seed sector functioning are first outlined and results from   
community-level analyses are then presented.  We focus on some of the overall  trends  
which might guide future action.   
 
While fieldwork only took place in four sites, the choice of locales offers good coverage of 
typical Zimbabwe smallholder agricultural regions, and gives insight particularly into the 
variable areas in which humanitarian aid might be given.  These range from the better off 
natural region IIB  (Murehwa) to the very poor extreme of natural region V (Beitbridge).   
 
 Site by site findings, and recommendations tailored to specific zones of action are presented 
in Section VII. 
 
FORMAL SEED SECTOR FUNCTIONNING 
Agro-dealers 
Agro-dealers were opening up in every city, town and growth center visited during the 
assessment (Annex).  This is a novel and very positive development as many had closed doors 
in the last five years as price controls, pre-determined outlets (GMB), and currency 
devaluation had rendered business unprofitable.  New outlets even opened during the course 
of the field assessment, indicating that the next few months could be a dynamic period of 
transition: e.g.  a SeedCo outlet opened its doors in Murewha on July 10, 2009.  Anticipating 
expanded business, not only were agro-dealers selling seed and fertilizer, but so were general 
delivery stores, and many non-specialty shops,  such as grocers and clothes stores ,  which 
would put 5-10 bags of inputs on offer.  Note that prior to the current stress, Zimbabwe had 
unusually extensive formal sector networks, with more than 15 companies involved in the 
production and marketing of seed  (T. Takavarasha et al., 2005)  
 
The amount of stocks available for sale was impressive  for the time of year,  many months 
before sowing and well before  farmers’ main period seed purchases in September and 
October .   Established agro-dealers had generally upwards of 15T maize for immediate sale, 
with the majority indicating that these were just initial stocks, which could be replenished 
when, or if, depleted.    Table 24 gives an idea of  the scale of stocks on offer in mid-July 2009 
from  the select few  agro-dealers willing to share inventory information in the specific zones 
visited.    
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Table 24:   Select  Agro-dealer inventories,  Mid-July 2009 
DEALER  Seed  and/ or Fertilizer  
 
Pioneer (seed house) 4000 T maize 
Agri Seeds (seed house) 5000-6000 T maize 
 
Murehwa 
 
SeedCo    (town outlet) 30T maize 
Bulawayo  
Bulewayo Seed Center 90T maize           90T fertilizer         
Farm and City 200 x 20,000 kernels (10kg) maize 
40 x 50,000 kernels  (25 kg) maize 
1000 x 10 kg maize (another variety) 
Bikita  
Masvingo Farm Supplies 30T maize 
Red Star 150T (mid August) 
N. Richards 30T maize 
Beitbridge   
N+R ( 7T maize programmed) 
Bambazonke (60T maize programmed) 
 
Dealers generally assessed as quite positive farmer buying patterns.   In Masvingo, for 
example, Masvingo Farm Supplies (MFS) had sold 8T maize immediately upon opening in 
March 2009 (from stocks carried over from 2008), while N. Richards, had sold 15T in one 
week mid-July and had ordered another 15T to arrive the following week.   Dealers expect 
farmers to have even more cash to buy purchases after the sale of the May-June harvests, 
which are ongoing.   Anticipating farmers’ limited access to US currency, dealers are making 
available smaller packets on inputs: two, and particularly five and 10kg packs of maize and 
fertilizer, along with the normal 20 and 25 kg packs.    
 
Agro-dealers have expressed optimism but concerns over staying open during this critical 
period, and the case of MSF is an illustrative one (Box 7).   Economic controls are relaxing, 
and farmers are showing they have some buying power.  However, many dealers have also 
expressed   dismay over the upcoming free direct seed distributions (DSD) which aim to 
deliver US$ 140 million worth of maize seed and fertilizer.  Even if free seed  is provided only 
in November 2009,  hearing about the prospect of  such aid can change farmers’ buying 
patterns immediately--even five months earlier, in July 2009.   Evidence for such anticipatory 
behavior came from the Murehwa site, where in 2008-09, 50% of farmers in the district 
planted maize late, as they delayed sowing until the free fertilizer came, in mid December 
(DAEO, Murehwa, personal communication).  
 
In terms of  bolstering  agro-dealers,  two immediate  challenges are apparent; 
 
• To get inputs for  sale  into the regions, to agro-dealers  (versus only  to centralized 
relief agencies procurers) 
 
• To encourage farmers to buy inputs  now ,   knowing that free seed and fertilizer will 
be distributed in massive quantities later in the year.  
 
 
 
 56 
 
BOX 7.  HOW DIRECT SEED AID IS KILLING THE AGRO-DEALER BUSINESS 
 
Masvingo Farm Supplies (MFS) is the largest agro-dealer in the province (Masvingo). Their 
booming seed business, driven by maize, has meant that sales during the ‘seed purchase 
season’   have   provided   them income to last all year--   that is, until free seed relief slashed 
their business and undermined their very existence. 
 
MFS has operated as a specialized agricultural input wholesaler. To survive, they have 
diversified into retail sale and even expanded their goods on offer to include groceries.  AT 
their peak, MFS had 14 branches and moved over 210T of maize seed a season, serving over 
100,000 commercial and communal   farmers   with agricultural inputs. 
 
Last August (2008), MFS closed its doors and let all 150 employees go. (150 employees, their 
families, their extended families—upwards of 600 people lost critical income.)  Free seed 
distribution translated to no MFS business. They re-opened March 2009, with 15 staff only, 
and had hopes for renewal.  Sales to-date have been promising and the 8T of last year’s 
maize stocks sold out in the first few weeks.  Many farmers could afford the 10 kg packs—
even before cashing in on the expected harvest sales in June and July.  MFS has already 
procured another 30T of maize seed, from Pioneer and Pannar, and is still hoping SeedCo 
might avail them some supplies.  This looked like the first real business they would have in 
years. 
 
But---now MFS learns that the seed relief business is again in full swing.  Is there no other 
way, they ask?  What about subsidies to farmers through agro-dealers?  or expanding use of 
vouchers to formal seed stores?    This year could be their  make- or- break one. 
 
 
Agro-dealers voiced their multiple constraints, many of which are distinct to this transition 
period.  At the regional level issues include:  e.g. how to muster up the initial currency  to 
purchase initial bulk supplies; how to adjust prices between the US$ and SA Rand; how to get 
supplies to come to the regions, when they are being purchased centrally in Harare.     
 
At a higher level,   Managing Directors of seed companies also  raised challenges quite unique 
to the current Zimbabwe situation:  how to get the currency to pay their outgrowers (who 
have  produced seed);  how to re-build a network of trust among decentralized agro-dealers ;  
and how to rebuild their farmer clientele base.  Some such as Agri Seeds are poised to expand 
quickly: for the year 2007/08 they produced 1200 mt of maize seed but this year, 2008/09 
have reached 5000-6000 mt.  Clearly, given the importance of the formal seed and fertilizer 
sector in Zimbabwe, such a sector needs to be supported, not undermined during this initial 
stages of re-opening.   A  full analysis of the formal sector  current constraints, all along the 
value chain should be a first priority for those interested in small farmer production and 
livelihood viability. Managing Directors of the Zimbabwe Seed Trade Association (ZSTA) , 
SeedCo and Agri Seeds also expressed a strong interest in  helping to lead such an analysis, as 
soon as possible.     
 
In brief, the agro-dealers network is starting to re-open, important quantities of inputs are 
already on the shelves,  and  initial evidence suggests farmers have some purchasing power.  
Any aid focus should minimally aim to support and strengthen these  processes—that is, to 
keep these agro-dealers functioning and to enhance farmers’ ability to pay for input goods.  
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Innovative traders agents 
Innovative efforts in extending the reach of agro-dealers were also noted during the 
assessment.  Starting from 1995, CARE International in Zimbabwe initiated its ‘Agribusiness 
Entrepreneur Network ‘--- AGENT program.  It set up a network of community-based agents 
to sell agri-inputs and allied products to smallholder farmers.   The program trained over 800 
agents and at its height covered five provinces and 33 districts.  Basically, it brought a 
network of retail shops much closer to its rural buyers.   Currently the program is active in 
Masvingo and the Midlands (the three  districts of Chivi, Mberebgwa and Mwenezi)  and has 
106 active trader agents.  CARE not only provides services to farmers through supporting such 
trader agents, but equally enhances agents’ own business skills, loan prospects and 
entrepreneurial  opportunities.   
 
 From 2002-2007, CARE also engaged in a special Voucher Input Scheme, aimed to improve 
immediate agricultural recovery coping mechanisms.  This more emergency response also 
worked through their AGENT program (Box 8).  It  made sense to work through local traders 
even  during emergency  response as: a)  The AGENT program had the infrastructure to roll 
out a program quickly ; b) such AGENTs were strategically located in rural  wards—hence they 
were accessible and had an established relationship with program clients; and c) by working 
through AGENT, CARE made sure this rural network was not cut out of the agri-input supply 
chain—even during emergency.   This market intervention was designed to support local 
market actors.  In contrast, states CARE : “Direct distribution programmes generally sideline 
the local actors and jeopardize their businesses’  (Musinamwana, 2009).   
 
 
BOX 8:  CARE- AGENT PROGRAM 
Mutual trust relationships among urban wholesalers, rural traders and agro-dealers 
restarting 
 
Through the AGENT voucher agro-input distribution program, 2002-2007,   CARE 
International in Zimbabwe facilitated procurement of seed and fertilizers by rural traders and 
agro-dealers through major wholesale trading partners based in Masvingo town. This 
relationship, based on a guarantee of procured agro-inputs by CARE in the initial years – later 
developed naturally into a trust relationship where the same agro-inputs could be procured 
without a guarantee from CARE.  
 
The range of goods were later expanded from seeds and fertilizers to include major 
household items obtained from wholesalers – soap, cooking oil, washing powders and farm 
implements. According to wholesalers and rural traders involved, business expanded 
significantly, ushering in a new partnership of confidence and mutual trust – until it was 
abruptly terminated though widespread trade interference caused by price control 
enforcement  and hyper-inflation, in mid 2007 to late 2008. Businesses were forced to trade 
at a loss, and most opted to close down rather than trade at the set uneconomic prices. 
 
Now,  July  2009, all the work done towards building confidence and trust has to start afresh, 
albeit with new traders and the few who can afford to reopen. Looking forward, prospects to 
re-establish these trade links are bright as price controls have been removed and free trading 
is in place. Financial conditions and business continue to improve as some rural traders have 
already secured loans of up to US $1,000 to be repaid back to financial institutions at an 
interest rate of 10% over the set  3 months.   Interventions such  as the AGENT program 
based on mutual trust relationships merit further expansion. 
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The CARE AGENT model certainly bears revitalization.  In terms of an emergency response, 
the Swiss Development Corporation (SDC) , working with CARE,  is taking  a lead for the 2009-
10 season in providing farmers with vouchers  linked to agro-dealers. Basically, even during 
an emergency response, the project is trying to stimulate private-public sector partners and 
revive local economies.   SDC also writes:  “Technical support plays a very important role in 
achieving desired impact in emergency agriculture [emphasis added].  The programmed will 
ensure the short and medium term availability of AGRITEX extension services to both 
vulnerable and other smallholder households” (de Santis, 2009). 
 
In general, given that agro-dealers are a key resource for small farmers (including poor 
farmers), efforts are needed also to help them become even more small farmer-oriented, 
during emergency as well as more normal times.  This would include: 
 
 Moves to greater small farmer client orientation  : 
 
• packing seed and fertilizers in ‘affordable sizes’; 
• early stocking up of seed and other inputs  
• putting on offer farmers’ priority varieties in any region, as well as a diversity of 
varieties (allowing  choice and specific need targeting) 
 
INFORMAL SEED SECTOR FUNCTIONNING 
Overall assessment 
The informal sector provides farmers with seed of basically all the crops they grow, except for 
maize, wheat and horticultural vegetables.   Thus it provides over 95% of the seed  for  crops 
such cowpeas, Bambara nuts, sorghum, finger millet, pearl millet, sweet potatoes,  and 
soybeans (see section V,  on Informal Sector) .  Such crops are key  for production stability, 
for nutrition, and to address equity concerns, —as many are identified as women’s crops. 
 
Several assessment thrusts suggest that informal sector supplies are abundant in 2009 and 
that the channels that produce,  disseminate  and sell informal sector seed are operating 
well. 
 
• Home harvest was exceptionally good. The 2008-09 harvest was a good one, as 
assessed  by all four farming communities, and supported  by the Ministry of 
Agriculture Crop and Livestock Assessment Mission.  Following on a  ‘bad’ year,  
maize production 2008-09 was 160% more than that of 2007-08; and the 2008-09  
combined  small grains was  190% more than the previous year (and 110% more that 
the recent five-year national production average) (Ministry of Agriculture, 
Mechanisation and Irrigation Development, 2009). 
 
• Social networks of exchange remain  strong.   Gift-giving and community exchange 
has long been documented in Zimbabwe (Friis-Hansen and Rohrbach, 1993).    Such 
social networks continued to function during the 2008-09 season, providing 10 to 
38%   of the seed sown  of maize, groundnut, finger millet, cowpea, sorghum, pearl 
millet and Bambara nut.  (see Table 33 below).  It is impressive that such extensive 
gift-giving took place, just  after the ‘bad season of 2007-08.  
 
 59 
 
• Local markets have good quantity of supplies, as assessed by traders themselves.  
Open markets in all sites visited had good supplies of a large variety of crops.  Part of 
the abundance was   attributed to a good harvest and part due to improved access to 
fuel and transport facilities which helped agricultural produce move.  Overall, The 
quality on offer generally looked good to excellent: the legumes in particular were  
full grained,  generally sorted to a single variety (except cowpea), free from inert 
material and with little evidence of damage in storage.   Both traders and farmers 
clearly recognize differences between grain and potential seed (Box 9), with the 
sellers putting substantial ‘potential seed’ on offer.    The varieties and seeds stocks 
which have potential as seed usually double in price during sowing periods:  for 
example, a cup of sugar beans may cost US$ 0.25 in July,  and US$ 0.50 in September.  
 
BOX 9:   MANAGING  ‘  POTENTIAL’  SEED 
 
Open markets serve as an important source for farmers’ seed.  While these are commonly 
referred to as ‘grain’ markets,  farmers and traders exercise considerable agency in  managing 
and selecting among grain supplies to ensure that some can be used as ‘potential seed’. 
 
Traders don’t sell just anything 
 
Traders aim to sell a high quality product and 
clearly recognize that some of their stocks 
will  be used as  seed:   prices do double 
around planting time for ‘potential seed’ . 
 
 
As one woman trader in Bulawayo explained: 
 
• varieties are kept separate 
• seed is graded by quality 
•  protective chemicals   are used in 
storage to minimize damage   
Farmers don’t plant just anything 
 
In scouting out potential seed from markets, 
farmers   seek out varieties, they know.  They 
further screen for visible quality traits:  are 
the grains mature?; are they not damaged by 
pests?.   Farmers  may also buy potential 
seed within a larger grain batch and make 
the refinements for ‘seed’ at home, sorting 
out the non-seed trash (the twigs, pebbles, 
sand,  broken grains.) 
 
As important as the product is the provider. 
Farmers  try to buy planting material from 
people they trust—sellers  who will tell them 
the  origin, so as to know if the material is 
adapted--- and  sellers who will be held 
responsible—if the planting material proves 
sub-standard. 
 
Local level seed production initiatives 
The big surprise in the informal sector was an abundance,  not a lack. This abundance was 
most apparent where local level seed production has been given special technical and 
organizational support, particularly in the Tsholotsho region.  In Tsholotsho, farmer field 
schools (FFS) and community-based seed multiplication groups have long been supported by 
AGRITEX, ICRISAT, The Community Technology Development Trust (CTDT) and others.   Seed 
production in the FFS started in 2003 and been substantial each year since,  ranging from  39 
mt during the drought year of 2007-08, to the current  2008/09 stock of 155 mt for crops of 
pearl millet, groundnut, sorghum and cowpeas seed (Table 24— 2009/09,  and section VIII for 
production across years)   
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Table 24:  Tsholotsho Farmer Field School Seed production 2008/09, for 46 FFS  
Crop Variety Seed 
produced by 
FFS (mt) 
Seed 
produced by 
FFS 
members 
Total (t) 
Pearl millet Okashana 14 70 84 
Groundnut Nyanda 7 21 28 
Sorghum Macia 18 17 35 
Cowpeas IT 18 4 4 8 
Source: AGRITEX- Tsholotsho district office 
 
Similar support by The Community Technology Development Trust (CTDT)  has resulted in 
comparable  local based seed production,  but which  have gone a step further (Table 25).   
CTDT-facilitated groups working areas of Tsholotsho, Murehwa and Uzumba Maramba 
Pfungwe (UMP)  produced over 311 mt of high quality pearl millet,  sorghum and cowpea  
during the years 2005/06 to 2007/08.  This seed production has directly linked local organized 
groups to the formal sector,  delivering  supplies to the Seed Company of Zimbabwe (SeedCo) 
and Agri  Seeds  & Services.  CTDT adds:  ‘smallholder farmers in these districts retained over 
a quarter of what they delivered for their own seed and food security in the same period’  
(CTDT, 2009). 
 
Table 25: On-farm seed production and sales by smallholder farmers in Tsholotsho and 
      UMP Districts 
Year 
Pearl millet 
(mt) 
Sorghum 
(mt) 
Cowpeas 
(mt) 
2006 150 30 10 
2007 20 33 10 
2008 16 11 31 
Total 186 74 51 
 (source: CTDT, 2009) 
 
The point is that farmers in some of the more stressed  drought-prone regions of Ziimbabwe, 
such as Tsholotsho don’t want to receive seed from outside humanitarian or development 
agencies as a priority, rather they want to sell their own seed.   The team promised one such 
group that they would make known  that they had surpluses to market  this year (Box 10). 
 
Sale of seed produced is indeed a problem. One farmer group (producing over 100 mt 
2008/09),  recounted that only ¼ of their stocks generally sell locally, much of this  being 
groundnut.  For the rest, ¾ of  their production,  the group has  generally relied on outside 
markets to move their sorghum and pearl millet seed (both of improved varieties).  In the 
past, their clients have included GMB, Agri Seed, NGOs such as ORAP and CADEK, and 
National Foods.  They have also sold large quantities in emergency-related operations such as 
Seed Fairs.  However, the seed markets have been irregular, and most recently, with currency 
challenges, seem to be drying up.  
 
There is a strong need to tie any further local level seed production initiatives with a clear 
marketing strategy: that is an identification of actual demand and precise marketing outlets.  
This should be done before seed is multiplied.   Farmer groups might also benefit from 
training in agro-enterprise and business development more generally.  In brief, these farmer 
groups have mastered the techniques for producing good quality seed.  They now need help  
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to professionalize their operations as a sustainable business enterprise.  Experience 
elsewhere suggests that these local seed production enterprise can be sustainable only if ; a) 
high quality seed is hard to produce on farm- and hence a demand exists (such as with 
groundnut);  or b) if seed production groups constantly multiply the initial stocks of new and  
demanded varieties.  So they move initial stocks before there has been community 
saturation.   For community seed groups to multiply novelties, they need to be systematically 
linked the sources of such innovation, such as government research centers. 
 
BOX 10:  CAN FARMER SEED PRODUCTION EXPERTS CONTRIBUTE 
MORE TO REGIONAL  SEED SECURITY? 
 
Can small holder farmers contribute to seed security in their communities?  Yes they can, if 
well trained. In the 2003/04 season there were only six farmer Field Schools (FFS) producing 
seed in Tsholotsho. Today the number has grown significantly to forty six. In the 2008/09 
season the FFSs produced 84 tones of pearl millet, 35 tones of sorghum, 28 tones of 
groundnut and 8 tones of cowpea seed.  
 
This is enough to plant 16000 ha of pearl millet, 3500 ha of sorghum, 350 ha of groundnuts 
and 133 ha of cowpeas.  
 
If more FFSs are formed and the farmers trained in seed multiplication and entrepreneurial 
skills, there is no doubt that these seed production experts could make a great impact on 
seed security in their districts and beyond. 
 
An announcement 
The 26  women in the  FFS in Vukani  want YOU to buy THEIR  high quality seed this 
emergency aid season. they have immediately available: 
• 78T of Okashana (pearl millet) 
•  50T Macia (sorghum) 
• 20T Nyanda (groundnut) 
 
 
 
Stability of local systems—harvest to sowing ratios. 
Such surpluses in the local system are unusual, and give testament to substantial efforts of 
developmental support agencies, especially in Tsholotsho.   However, seed security stability 
might  be expected across most crops, knowing the amount of the harvest needed for seed, 
or the harvest-to-sowing sowing ratios.    In theory, the percent of a normal harvest  required 
to meet the sowing needs in the next season is the inverse of the multiplication rate.  Small 
seeded crops generally have high multiplication rates and thus only a very small proportion of 
the harvest is needed as seed. For the dominant small grain crops of dryland Africa -- millet 
and sorghum – typically less than  1% of the harvest is needed for seed. Thus, for these crops, 
even in a bad year, the seed requirement is unlikely to be a significant drain on the harvest, 
unless there is almost total harvest failure. Large seeded crops (for example, groundnut) on 
the other hand may require upwards of 10% of the harvest to be set aside as seed. For these 
crops therefore, seed availability is more likely to be an issue, especially in bad years.   
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In practice, such were the trends found in all four sites in Zimbabwe (see  also section VIII) .   
For the millets and sorghums, there were virtually no problems with seed availability.  One 
might give such crops in aid interventions only if the aim is to introduce new varieties, which 
is  more properly a developmental rather than emergency intervention.    In contrast, farmers 
in all sites did highlight concerns about groundnut seed availability and quality,  which  might 
be due to a series of factors (Box 11).   In terms of groundnut seed availability, it  was  also 
revealing to find the extent to which poorer  farmers seem  relatively more disadvantaged.  In 
Bikita, poorer farmers need  up to 25% of their groundnut  harvest to meet their  seeds as 
they may lack  lime or gypsum , or  have less capacity to weed.  Community assessment for 
the average farmer were half that,  about 12-13% of the harvest. (Table 26)  
 
 Table 26  a&b : Harvest to Sowing Ratios 
 
a. Tsholotsho example 
 
 PEARL MILLET Average farmer Poor Farmer 
 
Area sown (ha) 
 
   1.5    0.4 
Seed needed (kg) 
 
    8     2  
 
Harvest (kg) 
 
  640  
 
  160 
 
% of harvest need to meet seed needs 
 
  1.3 
  
  1.3 
 
 
 
b. Bikita example 
 
GROUNDNUT Average farmer Poor Farmer 
 
Area sown  (ha) 
 
.9 .1 
Seed needed (kg) 
 
90 10 
 
Harvest (kg) 
 
720  
(might use lime or 
gypsum) 
 
40   
(less capacity to 
weed) 
 
% of harvest need to meet seed needs 
12.5% 25% 
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BOX 11 :  GROUNDNUT SEED:  WHY IS MULTIPLICATION SO DIFFICULT 
 
Groundnut is an interesting crop in terms of seed production because not all grain can be 
used as seed for planting, why? 
• During growth, if the soils are deficient in boron, the embryo will not develop well 
resulting in dead heart. Whilst the grain may be plump, the embryo will be dead and 
planting such grain will be a waste of nutritional food and also would result in poor 
plant stand. Therefore any seed crop should be grown in soils with adequate-boron 
or the crop should be fertilized with basal compound which contains boron (e.g. 
Compound L in Zimbabwe) at planting. 
• Most of the short season varieties grown by the smallholder farmers are not dormant 
at maturity so that when harvesting is delayed or when not properly dried, 
they sprout, thus affecting seed quality. Therefore effort should be made to harvest 
on time, quickly air dry the crop as well as remove all sprouted seed during seed 
cleaning. 
• Groundnut seed is rich in proteins and fats (ideal foods for micro-organism) and if not 
handled well after harvesting  will quickly loose viability. The recommendation is to 
air dry the seed crops (not exposing the pods to the sun). Generally, groundnut seed 
will remain viable for longer if stored in pods in a cool dry place and shelled just 
before sowing, but one needs to protect against storage pests such as rats.  
• The groundnut seed is fragile with the embryo located at the very tip of the seed and 
the seed covered with a thin papery testa, hence very prone to damage during 
transportation.   
It is essential to dress groundnut seed with a fungicide at planting to take care of seedling 
diseases. 
  
(from Patience Nyakanda, APLUS and formerly groundnut breeder at the Crop Breeding Institute) 
 
In sum, the informal seed system functioned well in 2008/09.  The technical production of 
groundnut presents some challenges, but for other crops, farmers have been able to produce 
and access adequate seed supplies.   
In addition, there is important potential for community-based groups to become more 
involved in seed-related business.  Numerous FFS  already have demonstrated their capacity 
to produced seed  on an impressive scale.  However their  operations need to be better tied 
to markets and, more generally, need to  evolve toward more professional agro-business 
models.  Local seed businesses also  can only be sustainable  if they are tied to a constant 
source of new varieties.   To be sustainable, the informal system will also require ongoing 
links to formal sector variety  innovations: such links might best be explicitly programmed.    
 
There is great potential for the informal system to contribute even more to rural seed 
security ---and income in Zimbabwe.  Developmental efforts might usefully give real priority 
to  such system strengthening.   
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COMMUNITY LEVEL RESULTS- ACROSS SITES 
Community (Ward) level assessments were done in all four sites and  included community 
meetings,  special focus groups with women,  key informant interviews (with  local leaders, 
shopkeepers, NGOs staff), and formal individual  farmer interviews.  The varied methods 
allowed for considerable cross-verification. 
Crop diversification and value added products 
There is a impressive amount of processing of crops within communities, to add value  to  
basic agricultural products and especially to generate income (Table 27). All major crops 
could potentially undergo transformation into saleable products.  This transformation is in 
addition to the  sale of  raw products directly, such as sweet potato.  Sweet potato came to 
prominence as an important and direct source of income in both Murehwa and Bikita, when 
decreasing wheat production (due to input scarcity) forced communities to find wheat bread 
substitutes.       
 
Table 26:   Crop value –added products; Examples across sites   
CROP Value-Added Product 
 
Sorghum/millet/maize Beer 
Groundnuts Peanut Butter 
Groundnuts/Sunflower Cooking oils 
Sunflower Extraction of oil and cake is used for livestock 
feed 
Soybean Bread 
Soybean Milk 
Leaves; beans/cowpeas Relishes 
 
Farming communities also reported fairly rapid processes of crop diversification, partially  in 
response to  the  high cost of maize seed, and partially to stabilize production and open 
income opportunities.   For example, in Murehwa, sweet potatoes and sunflower were new 
crop entries;  in Bikita, cowpeas entered as a new crop and sorghum use was intensified.  
Despite constraints in the economy, and problems accessing inputs,  the Zimbabwe farming 
systems have been unusually dynamic. 
 
Most important crops 
In listing their  three most important crops,  farmers  mentioned maize across the board in all 
four sites,  although with only about half the farmers  in Tsholotsho and Beitbridge  giving it a 
priority status.  So unlike ‘common wisdom’, not 100% of  Zimbabwean farmers center their 
agriculture around maize.  Groundnut also appeared as of high interest across sites.  A cereal, 
either sorghum, pearl millet or finger millet,  was  also usually cited as a central entry. 
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Table 28:  Farmers’  three most  important crops grown  across sample wards, in   
      diverse agro-ecological zones. 
Crop Murehwa Tsholotsho Beitbridge Bikita All sites 
Freq  %  
farmers 
Freq % 
farmers 
Freq % 
farmers 
Freq % 
farmers 
Freq % 
farmers 
Maize 43 100 22 52.4 22 55 40 100 125 75.3 
Sweet potatoes 19 44.2 - - - - 2 5 21 12.7 
Cowpea 6 13.9 14 33.3 12 30 8 20 40 24.1 
Groundnut 24 55.8 24 57.1 29 72.5 21 52.5 98 59.0 
Finger millet 22 51.2 - - - - 19 47.5 39 23.5 
Bambara nut 4 9.3 5 11.9 2 5 11 27.5 22 13.3 
Pearl millet 2 4.7 30 71.4 23 57.5 - - 55 33.1 
Sorghum - - 32 76.2 27 67.5 11 27.5 69 41.6 
total sample 43   42   40    40    165  
 
 
Results of 2008/09  Cropping Season 
Performance of varieties 
Going crop by crop, farmers across sites assessed the 2008-09 season as an average  or good 
one.  Also, the overwhelming majority indicated that they will re-sow the varieties they had 
on offer ,  which is a clear sign of crop and variety appreciation .    
 
 The major varietal dissatisfaction noted concerned  cowpea in Tsholotsho,  which scientists 
from NARS say was wrongly labeled at IT18.  It seems  the variety was something different 
from what was advertized. 
 
Table  29:   Farmers’ assessment of performance of varieties planted in 2008/09 cropping 
 season , across sites 
Crop 
 
Performance of variety planted (%)  
Poor Average Good 
% of farmers who would 
re sow the variety 
Maize 39 67 89 75.3 
Sweet Potato 19.44 19.44 61.11 83.3 
Cowpea  34.15 21.95 43.9 76.9 
Groundnut 14.53 43.59 41.88 96.6 
Finger millet 20.93 34.88 44.19 88.1 
Bambara 14.29 47.62 38.1 95.2 
pearl millet 12.5 43.75 43.75 84.4 
Sorghum 19.05 27.38 53.57 87.8 
 
Types of varieties used 
Analysis of types of varieties planted also shows interesting dynamism in Zimbabwe small 
farmer agriculture.  As expected, the majority, three-quarters,  grow a hybrid maize variety, 
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although some of this seed was retained seed.   Of unusual interest is the use of modern 
varieties for cowpea, pearl millet and sorghum (58, 48 and 59% respectively).  The 
percentages are high, given that there is virtually no formal seed sector attention to these 
crops.    Most of the varieties were made accessible to farmers via special NGO or CGIAR 
projects (such as the SADC regional Sorghum Millet Improvement  Project -SMIP),  and 
sometimes being supported by AGRITEX .  
 
The OPVs were dominant only in Tsholotsho, where 67% of farmers grew them, partly due to 
rigorous NGO and extension campaigns (see site specific report, Section VII). 
 
Table 30:  Types of varieties planted  across all sites 
Crop Local Modern OPV Hybrid 
Maize 14.56 0.0 13.3 72.2 
Sweet potatoes 94.7 5.2   
Cowpea 42.3 57.7   
Groundnut 78.8 21.0   
Finger millet 100.0 0.0   
Pearl millet 52.0 48.0   
Sorghum 41.2 58.8   
Bambara nut 94.4 5.6   
 
  
Overwhelming  farmers found the seed they sowed in  2009/09 in good condition. Also, given 
a choice, farmers indicated they had planted the varieties they actually wanted to sow.  The 
exception was for maize: while half of farmers were content with seed in their possession, 
the other half did desire a renewal of the hybrids. Farmers plant seed with which they are 
most familiar, and the issue of hybrids versus OPVs remains a debated one,  across  providers 
and users  (see Boxes  3 and 4). 
 
Table 31:   Adaptations in seed source, varieties and quantities planted, across all sites 
Crop Frequency % of farmers who planted 
the varieties they wanted 
to grow 
% of farmers who evaluated 
the seed condition as good 
Maize 116 53.9 92.4 
Sweet potato 20 76.3 86.1 
Cowpeas 38 71.1 81.6 
Groundnut 93 78.3 91.7 
finger millet 31 90.0 100.0 
Bambara nut 18 69.4 93.8 
Pearl millet  55 81.8 92.7 
Sorghum  31 76.8 95.6 
 
Sources of seed 
Detailed analysis was done on farmers’ sources of seed, crop by crop,  for  the 2008/09 
season.  Fourteen possible options were explored to get specific insights for the strategies 
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being used to access seed.     In the end, all but the option of ‘contract growers’ was identified 
as a actual seed source strategy used within  the sample.  
 
Two bodies of information were put side by side to  assess seed source use on the ground .  
First, what percent of farmers used a given source:  this  presents the scope  of seed source 
options for the majority of farmers (Table 32) .    Second,  what percent of seed came from a 
given source:  this serves as the  bottom line for determining  which sources were able to 
deliver  significant amounts of seed---  and which not (Table 33).    
 
Findings show that the options  of  ‘own stock’ and ‘social networks’  were a key source for 
seed for  all crops, both in terms of  the percent of  farmers  using  the source and  quantities 
of seed actually accessed.    The degree of gift- giving  across crops was remarkable  across all 
crops, according to both parameters.  
 
Use of markets was particularly  important for maize, obtained primarily from agro-dealers 
and local shops, although various types of barter  (goods and labor) also provided about 10% 
of the seed sown.   Markets were also key for two of the legumes, groundnut and Bambara  
nut.  In the  case of legumes, it is exclusively the local shops and open markets which 
provided the seed, rather than the formal seed suppliers.  What is remarkable and important 
in the case of both maize and legumes is that about 1/3 of the seed was purchased by some 
means, even during the 2008/09 period of extreme economic hardship.  
 
Sorghum , pearl millet and finger millet seed were obtained mostly from farmers’ own stocks 
and social networks, as would be expected. 
 
Development interventions were a significant seed source only for maize and much of this 
through the government program of Operation Maguta.  The lack of development efforts 
promoting other crops is perhaps lamentable.  
 
Interestingly, although the 2008/09 season was a stress period,   aid (both seed aid and food 
aid) were an important seed source only for the crops being introduced or promoted in an 
ward,  for instance, the case of cowpea in Murehwa and sorghum in Bikita .  Although the 
team had been briefed in Harare that maize food aid had been sown on an important scale,  
such aid sources  provided only about a 1/10 of the maize seed in our sample (and some of 
this was probably also Operation Maguta)  
 
In sum, farmers used a diversity of channels and multiple strategies to access their seed for 
the 2008/09 season.   Home saved seed,  gift giving and use of varied markets were the most 
important sources across crops.  Even during this economically volatile period,  farmers found  
ways to barter and buy at significant levels .  Development and emergency aid together 
provided  only a quarter of the total maize seed sown, suggesting that  even during this high 
stress period, farmers used mostly their own channels, and their own initiative, to get the 
seed they needed for this key  crop. 
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Table 32:   Percent of farmers who used each  seed source during 2008/09 cropping season 
     by crop across all sites 
Source 
Maize Ground 
nut 
Finger  
millet 
Cowpea Sorghum Pearl 
millet 
Bambara 
nut 
N=125 N=98 N=39 N=40 N=69 N=55 N=22 
own stocks/ social networks 62.4 58.2 74.4 60.0 81.2 92.7 59.1 
Retained 25.6 30.6 51.3 30.0 36.2 41.8 40.9 
Carry over 7.2 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 3.6 0.0 
Gifts from social networks 29.6 26.5 23.1 30.0 43.5 47.3 18.2 
Seed markets 39.2 32.7 12.8 7.5 2.9 10.9 18.2 
Local shops/vendors 16.8 19.4 0.0 5.0 0.0 5.5 9.1 
Agro dealers 10.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 
Contract growers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Irrigation scheme 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Barter trade 6.4 10.2 10.3 2.5 1.4 1.8 9.1 
Labor 3.2 3.1 2.6 0.0 1.4 1.8 0.0 
Development interventions 13.6 3.1 0.0 2.5 4.3 1.8 0.0 
Community groups 0.8 3.1 0.0 2.5 1.4 0.0 0.0 
Extension/research 12.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 1.8 0.0 
Seed/food aid 20.8 3.1 0.0 25.0 23.2 7.3 4.5 
Seed aid direct distribution 16 3.1 0.0 20 21.7 5.5 4.5 
Seed voucher 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 
Food aid 4.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 
 
 
Table 33:   Percent of seed  obtained from each source, in relation to total  seed planted in 
      2008/09 cropping season across sites 
Source 
Maize 
Ground 
nut 
finger 
millet 
cow 
pea sorghum 
pearl 
millet 
Bambara 
nut 
Own stock and social 
networks  37.8 65.4 88.8 46.2 74.2 81.3 60.7 
Retained 19.1 47.4 50.5 24.8 56.1 45.3 50.7 
Carry over 5.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 7.9 0.0 
Gifts from social networks 13.5 17.9 38.3 21.4 17.7 28.1 10.0 
Seed markets 37.6 30.6 11.2 12.1 0.9 7.6 30.6 
Local shops/vendors 13.0 18.9 0.0 11.5 0.0 4.8 8.7 
Agro dealers 14.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 
Contract growers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Irrigation schemes 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Barter trade 6.1 8.9 6.7 0.5 0.3 0.3 21.8 
Casual labor for seed 3.1 2.8 4.5  0.6 0.8 0.0 
Development interventions 13.3 1.8 0.0 1.1 4.4 3.4 0.0 
Community seed groups 0.1 1.8 0.0 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Extension/research 13.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3 3.4 0.0 
Seed/food aid 11.3 2.2 0.0 40.6 20.4 7.7 8.7 
Seed aid direct distribution 8.1 2.2 0.0 35.1 20.3 4.3 8.7 
Seed voucher 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 
Food aid 2.4 0.0 0.0 5.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 
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Seed maps   
Community mapping of seed sources served to   confirm  findings on evolving seed source 
strategies.   Communities groups worked together to map the seed sources for a particular 
crop, comparing current sources with those used during the five years previous.   Site by site 
maps appear  in Section VIII.   Several examples showing the level of detail are given below. 
Example:  Pearl Millet; Beitbridge 
For pearl millet in Beitbridge ward 10, all seed is now sourced local system through own 
stocks and gifts.  Within the last five years, own stocks and gifts have remained  important, 
but there have also been pearl millet-related interventions by World Vision, and, at time, 
farmers have gone to neighboring districts to get pearl millet seed. 
 
Figure 7a.  Beitbridge Sources of pearl millet seed during the 2008/09  season 
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Figure 7b: Sources of pearl millet seed 5 years ago       
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Example: maize in Bikita   
In Bikita, ward 15 , the primary sources of maize seed during the 2009/09 season were GMB 
seed and the Maguta program (GOZ)  and retained seed from recycled hybrids SC513, open 
pollinated varieties ZM521, Red Cob and Hickory King. Other  primary sources include the RBZ 
program sourcing from Pioneer Seeds, the informal market, mainly sourced from South 
Africa, and the SADC seed, sourced from donors. Very small amount came from maize 
selected from food aid (Figure 8a). 
 
The customary sources in the past five years include CARE, GMB, and Masvingo Farm Supplies 
direct sales to farmers .  Other sources include local shops and agro-dealers, and retained 
seed of hybrids and open pollinated varieties. Seed sources for maize have changed from the 
usual agro-dealers, NGOs, GMB and local retained seed to include very diverse options – 
SADC, RBZ, Food Aid and the Maguta Program. 
 
Figure 8a: sources of Maize seed during 2008/09 season 
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Figure 8b: Maize : sources of seed last five years 
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Proposed  seed sources 2009/10 
 
Double-checking strategies,   the team also asked farmers to  look  forward  to next season 
and describe which amount of seed they would obtain from which source  (interviewers 
distanced themselves from appearing as potential seed suppliers).   
 
Overall, farmers indicated they had clear possibilities for obtaining their seed requirements 
for all crops, except for groundnut.  In fact, they could more than meet their requirements  
(Table 34 last row, figures greater than 100%)  except for the 93%, or 7% shortfall, for 
required groundnut seed.     
 
Generally for the small grains, farmers are counting mainly on their own stocks, 
supplemented by purchase at local markets.  For the legumes,  again, home-saved stocks and 
open markets will be used, with local markets being a main source particularly for Bambara 
nut. Cowpea, in Murehwa is an exception as the crop is relatively new and farmers still expect 
outside assistance from the NGO, World Vision especially for new varieties. 
 
For maize, farmers have retained some stocks (recycled and carryover), but aim to purchase 
the bulk of the seed from agro-dealers: they sense such a strategy possible.  Agro-dealers in 
all regions sampled during the assessment already have maize seed stocks and, financially, 
farmers are optimistic they can obtain cash needed for maize purchase.   At the time of the 
assessment, it was not possible to confirm that all cash needed for maize purchase  by 
farming families was available as the sale of the 2008/09 crops was ongoing:  it is mainly from 
harvest sales that farmers expect to generate seed money.  It was the primarily the cost of 
fertilizer, rather than seed, that farmers signaled as posing the larger problem  (see Boxes 13 
and 14) ).  
 
At this point, relatively few farmers are on counting on emergency aid  for seed.  This could 
likely change as during the course of the assessment in July, newspapers were already 
starting to advertise the upcoming free distributions.  
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Table 34:    Farmers’ planned seed sources for 2009/2010 cropping seasons, all sites      
       (percent of seed expected to be accessed from each source) 
Source 
Maize Cowpea Groundnut  Bambara 
nut 
Sorghum Pearl 
millet 
Own stock/social 
networks 26.2 65.2 54.4 49.7 83.2 78.7 
Retained 20.5 62.9 48.3 41.3 77.7 71.2 
Gifts from social 
networks 5.7 2.3 6.1 8.4 5.5 7.5 
Seed markets 58.9 25.7 33.3 61.4 21.6 21.0 
Local shop/vendor 23.8 9.9 10.1 0.0 9.3 9.2 
Agro dealers 25.5 5.3 2.4 3.0 2.4 0.0 
Barter trade 7.3 5.3 17.7 58.4 7.6 7.3 
Contract growers 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Urban markets 1.3 5.3 2.5 0.0 2.4 4.5 
Irrigation scheme 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Development 
interventions 4.7 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 5.0 
Community based 
groups 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Extension/research 4.7 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 5.0 
Seed/food aid 11.7 26.8 4.7 0.0 4.9 1.5 
Seed aid direct dist. 9.4 23.9 3.7 0.0 4.1 0.0 
Seed vouchers 0.1 2.9 0.8 0.0 0.8 1.5 
Food aid 2.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
       
% of seed to be 
sourced 101.5 117.7 93.7 111.1 109.7 106.2 
 
Community assessment of seed security  
Finally, as a cross-check to the above quantitative data, the community itself was asked to 
assess the seed security of its members.  Seed Security was defined as either having the seed 
already in hand, or being able to access the seed with some certainty (though purchase, 
barter, gift, or other).  Community meetings at all sites involved upwards of 50 people, men 
and women, and the discussions were intense and interactive.  Table 35 presents the 
communities own assessment of those within the ward who they deem seed secure for the 
upcoming season, 2009/10.   Seed security was assessed for the three most important crops 
as prioritized by the community group.  The results surprised the assessment team.  Except 
for groundnut, farming communities themselves assess they will be 90-100%  seed secure 
for the upcoming season.  For groundnut, much will depend on how much seed is put up for 
sale in September and October 2009, and for what price.  For now, groundnut producers are 
holding onto to their stocks, anticipating that the prices will rise sharply as the planting 
season approaches. 
 
Note that the qualitative community assessment largely correlates with the other 
information gathered during the SSSA:  that is, with the quantitative results for 2008/09 and 
with the quantitative seed source projections for 2009/10.    
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The SSSA, reviewing the full evidence (qualitative and quantitative, from community and 
beyond), prefers to be a bit more conservative than the community in assessing seed security 
and the ‘seed needy’.   Much still remains unknown about prices to be received for produce 
sale .  We suggest a figure of 10 to 15% of the maize needy, but highlight that  much of this 
would be for the chronically poor.     
 
  Table 35:  Community assessment of the percent of its members who are seed secure. 
Crop Murehwa Tsholotsho Bikita Beitbridge 
Maize n/a 100 90 100 
Groundnuts 100 75 75 90 
Sorghum  100 100 100 
Pearl Millet  100 100 99-100 
Finger Millet 100  100  
Sweet Potato 100    
Note: n/a= data not available 
 
Special note on SPR 
Allied with the overall community assessment of seed security, the issue of ‘eating all of one’s 
seed’   was raised:  Do farmers eat their seed?  if yes, how common is this practice and under 
what condition might it evolve?   The answer across communities was a conclusive one.  The 
practice is very rare even in extreme stress conditions--- unless seed of the right crops and 
varieties can be easily re-stocked. (Box 12)   
BOX 12:  DO  FARMERS REALLY EAT SEED? 
 
Seed is the input at the heart of agriculture.  It gears what farmers will grow, if and when they 
will harvest.  Seed, to produce, has to have a certain quality and has to be adapted to quite 
specialized circumstances,  including, in Zimbabwe,  often to drought  conditions. 
 
So do farmers really eat the family jewels? 
 
Community discussions, intensively debated across sites,  suggest  that it is rare for farmers 
to eat their seed.  Only the infantile, or poor managers would truly squander such an 
important resource.     
 
There are, of course, standard exceptions, rooted in planned strategy.  Farmers  will eat their 
seed  stocks  If  they can easily access desired seed again, as is the case for buying  pulses on 
the open markets.  Also, knowing that NGO  or governmental aid is on the way, farmers might 
eat their recycled maize--   in anticipation of  yet another free hybrid handout.      
 
Post-script.  Do farmers eat seed aid? :  A women in Beitbridge shared her 2007 story.   She 
only needed the two  kilos of maize aid—-so boiled the other three .   Relief aid gave her 
seed----and two full family meals).   
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SPECIAL ISSUES:  SEED AID AND VARIETY ACCESS 
Seed aid 
The team only tangentially touched on emergency seed aid issues directly.   Slightly over a 
third of those interviewed  had received seed aid during 2009/10 with that group  also having 
received seed a mean other  1.5 times  over the last five years  (Table 36).  Seed aid was 
received mostly for maize, followed by  cowpea and sorghum  in areas  newer crop 
introductions. 
 Table 36:   Seed aid receipt in 2008/09  
  
Percent of farmers who 
received seed aid in 
2008/209 cropping season 
Percent of farmers who 
received seed aid in the five 
years prior to the survey 
Average Number of times 
seed aid was received in the 
last 5 years 
All sites 36.3 57.6 1.5 
Murehwa 48.8 52.3 2.2 
Tsholotsho 24.4 52.3 1.6 
Beitbridge 31.6 57.9 1.4 
Bikita 40.0 47.5 1.3 
 
Looking at the whole sample,  almost 60% (57.6) have received seed aid over the last five 
years, with the figures changing only slightly when full seed aid history is assessed.  Basically, 
much of their seed aid is recent.  Of interest is that there is not a big difference in times seed 
aid has been received between the higher and lower stress areas  (e.g. comparing Murehwa 
and Tsholotsho).   As expected, the Beitbridge sample has been involved in emergency seed 
aid receipt to a slightly higher degree. 
 
Access to new varieties 
Trying to assess the degree to which emergency seed aid might be a source for innovation, 
the team compared  the frequency with which new varieties were received  by farmers in an 
‘emergency intervention  versus the frequency through which they were proffered within 
developmental initiatives.  At this point,   emergency has been more important than routine 
research and development work (R+D) in exposing farmers to novel crops and varieties (Table 
37).  This trend can be partially  understood given the  limited resources availed to  AGRITEX 
and other government  agencies for R+D over the last five years for circulating in rural areas.  
However, it might be questioned whether emergency initiatives should make novel 
introductions (if or when) (Sperling et al., 2006),  as emergency personnel might not be able 
to provide farmers with the much needed technical advice and multi-season follow-up. 
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Table 37:  Access to new varieties through seed aid and development interventions 
Location 
Number of 
observations 
Ever received new 
varieties through 
seed aid (%) 
Receive new varieties 
through development 
interventions (%) 
All sites 165 45.8 25.3 
Murehwa 43 40.0 17.6 
Tsholotsho 42 55.3 34.8 
Beitbridge 40 48.8 9.3 
Bikita 40 37.2 37.2 
 
 
FERTILIZER USE 
 
Fertilizer use was  briefly assessed across the four  sites.   The results can be considerable only 
as suggestive, as intensive analysis and cross-checking of data was not possible.   
 
Crop emphasis  
Farmers use fertilizer on a routine basis particularly in  the better rainfall sites of Murehwa 
and Bikita.  In 2008/09, they continued to use fertilizer in these two sites in particular, with a 
significant drop in use only in Bikita (Table 38).  
 
Table 38. Use of fertilizer in the sampled areas across sites 
 
% of farmers who 
usually use fertilizer 
% farmers who used fertilizer 
in 2008/09 cropping season 
Over all sample (All sites) 62.18 49.09 
Murehwa 97.14 90.70 
Tsholotsho 46.34 35.71 
Beitbridge 20.00 17.50 
Bikita 90.00 50.00 
 
 
Fertilizer use was overwhelmingly concentrated on maize but  the sample sizes being too 
small  to make conclusions on the other crops (Table 39).    While over 70% of those 
interviewed indicated that their fertilizer use was ‘abnormal’ for the 2008/09, the 
quantitative data on rates of application  does not give the same clear picture. 
 
 On average famer s used a total of 115.78 kgs (among those who applied fertilizer)  although 
with the rates having  a large standard variation (+/-128.99).  This translates to   or 8.10 kgs/1 
kg  of seed or  202.50 kg/ha. Such rates seem well within the range of ‘normal’,  as Murehwa 
farmers might use 300-400 kg ,  wth estimates suggesting  Tsholotsho farmers applying 75-
150 kg/ha and those in  Beitbridge using  even lower amounts.,    
 
 
 
 
 
 76 
 
Table 39. Crops on which fertilizer was applied 
Crop 
All sites 
N=93 
Murehwa 
N=37 
Tsholotsho 
N=28 
Beitbridge 
N=5 
Bikita  
N=23 
Maize 64.5 94.6 42.9 60.0 43.5 
Cow pea 5.4 0.0 7.1 0.0 13.0 
g/nut 7.5 5.4 10.7 0.0 8.7 
Pearl millet 3.2 0.0 7.1 20.0 0.0 
Sorghum 19.4 0.0 32.1 20.0 34.8 
 
Price 
The fundamental concerns raised by farmers about fertilizer had to do with price, and 
especially the very high terms of trade.  For example, according to farmers in Murehwa,  the 
fertilizer cost is now  is five times  (500%)  that which it was just 2-3 years ago.  The prices are 
somewhat difficult to calculate exactly- as the country has moved from barter equivalents to  
US$ currency rates.  Box 13 shows actual fertilizer prices in sweet potato equivalents, as this 
was the means by which farmers paid for their fertilizer inputs. 
 
 
BOX 13:  HOW MANY BUCKETS FOR A BAG?   TRADING SWEET POTATO FOR FERTILIZER 
 
The price of inputs has skyrocketed in the last few years—and farmers in Murehwa 
are particularly concerned about fertilizer costs. 
 
“Before” , 2-3 years ago,   
1 bag of fertilizer (50 kg)  could be exchanged for 3 buckets of sweet potatoes 
 
 Now in 2009 
1 bag of fertilizer (50kg) costs 30 US$ 
1 bucket of sweet potatoes sells for 2 US$ 
  
1 bag of fertilizer (50kg) costs the equivalent of 15 buckets of sweet potatoes. 
 
 
So a bag now costs 5 times (500%)  what it did a few seasons ago. 
 
 
 
MONEY:  Purchasing Power/ Access to Currency/   
        Understanding  US$ Value 
Across sites, the overwhelming issues in terms of seed security—did not directly relate to 
seed at all.  THE critical issues revolved around money and purchasing power.  Prices for 
inputs were high (see Section VIII),  and farmers  felt they were not getting adequate prices 
for their produce (which at the time of the assessment was just at the point of sale—to 
generate needed liquidity).    Box 14 gives an indication of such inputs in relation to funds 
received for harvest sale.   
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BOX 14:  COST OF PRODUCTION:   IS IT REALLY WORTH PLANTING MAIZE IN 2009/10 
 
The relative costs of inputs needed to plant an acre of hybrid maize appear below.  The focus 
has been simplified to include only seed and fertilizer.  Labor costs have not been added.  Nor 
have transport costs been added, should the farmer not sell locally, and move the  maize 
grain to outlets such as the Grain Marketing Board.  
 
Even a quick sketch shows that the Zimbabwe farmers in 2009/10 will receive very modest 
economic returns on his/her maize production.  For sale on the market, farmers will have (at 
most) a $US54 profit margin per acre ($166-112).  Profits for sale to the GMB will depend on 
transport costs—and the ability of the GMB to make purchases at all. 
 
To plant an acre of maize 
10 kg seed=                                         US$ 22=            11 buckets sweet potatoes 
2 bags Compound D fertilizer                   60              30 “ 
1 bag ammonium nitrate                           30             15 
 
cost of direct inputs                                  $ 112          56 buckets    
 
Return from sale at local market 
 
1500kg/18 kgs= 83 buckets= US$ 166 
 
 
Return from sale to GMB 
 
1500kg= US$369  ($246/mt) 
 
But- transport costs not included! 
 
The change to the new currency was welcomed by many as it has relatively stable value and 
helped to stimulate the return of goods onto shelves.  However the move to the US$ has also 
brought a number of distinct disadvantages.  As there is basically no change available 
(nothing under US$1), prices are being inflated up to the higher units.  Also, getting currency 
notes,  the FOREX, either individually, or into local commerce, has taken more time than will 
be expected. (Some of the small notes, US$1 and 2, are being re-used and reused—and  
quickly are tattering into shreds).     Farmers also do not have an intrinsic sense of the  
currency and particularly how their produce should be valued in the new FOREX.   Even open 
market traders were quite  unsure of how the currency changed itself will affect prices  for 
inputs as sowing season arrives. 
 
So, in brief, the issues related to money  are multiple, and distinct . They include: 
 
• lack of actual currency notes  in rural areas (individually, and in commerce) 
• lack of change (small money) associated with the currency- which in itself 
leads to higher unit costs (as merchants round up) 
• lack of farmer purchasing power, especially in relation to low prices received 
for produce 
• Unfamiliarity with value of currency, including uncertainty of how the new 
notes in themselves will affect open market prices  
 
Box 15 further elaborates on specifics of current challenges.  The main point is that these 
challenges  are real and compelling and need to be addressed immediately.   Any aid given 
should be given with a keen vision for lessening these urgent constraints:   money has to 
get into communities--- and quickly; commerce needs to be stimulated and ; and 
purchasing power strengthened. Obviously, there is no one magic bullet for addressing these 
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multiple and complex problems. improvements can be made step by step---   if those making 
emergency aid (and development) decisions are aware of and sensitive to these primary 
constraints.    
 
 BOX 15:  HOW THE CURRENCY CHANGES AFFECTS FARMERS’ AGRICULTURAL DECISIONS 
Zimbabwe officially abandoned the local Zimbabwe-dollar (ZWD) for other more stable 
foreign currencies (FOREX),  such as the South African rand (ZAR), United States Dollar (US$) 
and  the Botswana Pula among others. This decision was made as the ZWD was very prone to 
hyper-inflation ---and savings, pricing, access and use of the currency proved difficult. The 
introduction of the FOREX was initially applauded by many, including farmers, as agricultural 
inputs began to be found again on the formal market.  Prices for maize seed and fertilizer 
companies have settled at about US$2.00 per kg of seed and about US$0.60 per kg of 
fertilizer. Although these are comparable to regional prices of an average of US$ 650/mt,  the 
move has been  ‘ a  bitter pill to swallow’ for  small scale farmers.  
Rural farmers have also indicated that FOREX is difficult to access and they  feel most of their 
produce is being under-priced. For instance,  if one uses sweet potato  equivalents,   
Murehwa farmers  can only buy a bag of fertilizer at  5 times the rate of what they needed 2 
or 3 years ago (Box 13). These  high costs have  affected all inputs such as seed, labor, fuel 
and draught power hiring. Although farmers reckon that FOREX is easy to save, since it is not 
affected much by inflation, they have  challenges to raise surplus money to save. During the 
ZWD era, money was traded on the informal ‘black market’ at exorbitant rates, yet 
‘dollarization’ has ushered a new crop of money changers who are exploiting the farmers 
using what is being called a ‘cross rate’. This is when products charged in ZAR are converted 
to say US$  at a lower rate or vice-versa to benefit the vendor. Most of the farmers are not 
sure of which crops to grow because of these ‘unfair’ price regimes. 
 
SUMMARY: ACROSS SITE FINDINGS 
Overall the seed security situation of the four wards assessed proved to be much better than 
the team had expected and had been led to expect. This is especially true  in light of the 
2009/10 donor and government plans for US$ 140 million of  emergency  seed and fertilizer, 
and  given the official calculations that one half of the  farming population, or  600,000 
households are  in critical need of input help.   
 
Communities themselves were quite positive in their overall seed security assessment.  For  
small grain seed,  all  could meet 100% of their seed needs.   In two the four sites, 
communities signaled groundnuts as a potential problem for about a quarter of families, 
depending on the supplies to on  offer in open markets  at sowing time, ( Groundnut is  not 
being put forward in the aid package?) The community assessment for maize seed security 
was  very good: 90-100% of households have in stock or can access the seed they need, 
mainly through direct purchase.   Such community assessment correlated to a high degrees 
with the quantitative findings from the 165 individual interviews.  
 
Reviewing the overall evidence (qualitative and quantitative data) , the SSSA team would be 
slightly more conservative than the community in assessing security.  Particularly for maize, 
we would  put figures of ‘ maize needy’, at around 10% or a high of 15% , with many of these 
needy would falling into the normal chronically poor category.     
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This 10-15% figure for maize-related aid  is based on an assumption that other farmers will 
have the opportunity to themselves acquire needed inputs.  This implies that input supplies 
of seed and fertilizer  will continue to reach rural shops in important quantities, and that the 
emergency aid process will not waylay the much needed supplies. 
 
The strength of the informal seed systems was of particular note in the assessment findings.   
Potential seed available in community-based groups and in open  markets, generally  looked 
well filled and sorted-   and appeared in abundant quantity.  The 100mt available for sale 
from  but a single farmer field school 0FFS) group in Tsholotsho  is a signal of both the 
strength—and potential-  for supporting and professionalizing the seed security roles of these  
informal or local systems.  
 
Related to seed per se, the only critical issue found by the SSSA is related to formal sector 
functioning. Given the last few years of policy challenges (especially  price control, and 
currency value breakdown), this sector will take time to recover.  However,  even during the 
short period of the field SSSA, agro-dealers were starting to open their doors , general 
delivery dealers were starting to stock packets and even non-specialty stores (food stores, 
clothes shops) were starting  to stock 5 and 10 bags of maize seed here and there.  Evidence 
clearly shows that this sector is starting to put supplies on offer--and farmers already buying. 
One immediate challenge related to the formal sector supply, and specifically to agro-dealers, 
is to make sure they  remain open  and do not fold  again. 
 
Fertilizer assessments were not done extensively.  Communities themselves raised access to 
fertilizer rather than to maize seed per se, as the major constraint, mainly due to its unusually 
high cost. SSSA team calculations reinforce the community assessment of the relatively high 
costs of production, and especially of fertilizer, in relation to remuneration received for maize 
grain sale.  
 
The SSSA found that the overriding problem around the issue of  seed security, and the 
functioning of seed systems more broadly,  had little to do directly with seed at all.  
Immediate and key constraints revolve around money and purchasing power: the terms of 
trade for farmers have escalated enormously; farmers  were just starting to market produce 
and were concerned about low remunerations ;  there is little actual cash (and particularly 
$US currency notes) in rural economies. 
 
As the next section moves toward making recommendations, we underline here the prime 
challenges for addressing seed security concerns  at this highly fluctuating time in Zimbabwe: 
 
 To restart and reinforce  the formal sector seed and input supply—supporting not 
undermining fledging efforts; and   
 To inject cash into local economies 
These two BIG challenges should help shape immediate  seed  security interventions across 
and within  the sites of assessment. 
 80 
 
 
VII: FIELD FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 SITE BY SITE  
This section contains the  field notes of the four site assessments.   They should be of interest 
to development and humanitarian aid professionals working in these particular zones of 
action: Murehwa, ward 14;   Bikita, ward 15; Tsholotsho, ward 12; and Beitbridge, ward 10.   
The seed system security assessments on focused  on local , community-based concerns.   
The field reports review the current seed security situation and  then tie the findings to   
action in specific  zones, both for the short and for the medium term.  The site-specific 
recommendations  appear  at the end of each  site  report. 
These  site-specific field reports, together,  provided the basis for the chapters ‘Field Finding: 
across Sites’ (VI) and ‘Overall Recommendations: across sites’ (VIII). 
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Seed System Security, July 2009:  Murehwa District 
Part of the seed assessment in Zimbabwe focused on the socially cohesive north-eastern 
administrative district of Murehwa in Mashonaland Province. It is predominantly a high maize 
growing area and has relatively high rainfall (>700mm/year) and declining soil fertility. The 
assessment was carried out in ward 14, Chanetsa area, in July 2009. 
 
Overview of Crop and Livestock Production in the District 
The Murehwa community has a complex agricultural system based on field crop, livestock 
and horticultural crop production. The agricultural system in this area has been based on the 
three sectors: the commercial sector mainly focusing on maize, soybeans   and wheat;  the 
small scale commercial farmers mainly growing maize, tobacco and other crops such as 
groundnuts and soybeans; and the communal sector which has a widest range of crops. 
Households in communal Murehwa mainly grow maize, finger millet, groundnuts and sweet 
potatoes. According to AGRITEX, communal farmers constitute more than 80% of the 
population with a land holding of 1.5-2.5 ha per household. There has been a significant 
change in the types of crops grown and marked crop yields decline between 2004/05/06 
seasons and 2008/09 (see table 40 below). 
Table 40.  Production trends for major crops in Murehwa district 
Source: Murehwa District Agricultural Extension Office (DAEO), July 3, 2009 
 
There has been a decline in livestock holdings. The major livestock in Murehwa are cattle, 
goats, sheep, pigs, donkeys and poultry. Table 41 below shows the livestock number for 
period 2003 to 2009. 
 
Table  41. Number of livestock by type for Murehwa district 
Year Cattle Goats Sheep Pigs Donkeys 
2003 117,400 14,712 5,137 10,637 799 
2004 112,200 14,463 4,110 9,891 794 
2005 97,520 13,113 3,897 7,993 797 
2006 95,528 12,215 2,866 5,121 692 
2007 88,239 11,905 2,812 3,013 720 
2008 86,527 11,817 2,423 2,330 795 
2009 70,000 10,028 1,082 2,814 259 
 Source: Murehwa District Agricultural Extension Office (DAEO), July 3, 2009 
Season 2004/05 2005/06 2008/09 
Crop Total area 
planted (ha) 
Yields 
(t/ha) 
Total area 
planted (ha) 
Yields 
(t/ha) 
Total area 
planted (ha) 
Yields 
(t/ha) 
Maize 47,298.15 1.8 36,320.50 1.2 35,550.0 0.62 
Groundnuts 10,363.02 0.9 871.3 0.9 7,580.0 0.6 
Soybeans 1469.81 1.0 1368.5 1.2 2901.5 0.7 
Cowpeas 76.86 0.4 150.0 0.5 2139.0 0.4 
Sunflower 2225.42 0.4 1299.0 0.5 5317.0 0.5 
Sweet potatoes 1214.2 4.0 2867.0 4.2 6200.0 3.5 
Sugar beans 685.17 0.8 1557.0 0.6 27772.0 0.5 
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Community Perspective on Key Agricultural Trends  
Season Quality (good or bad season) 
It has been over a decade since the Murehwa community have experienced what they can 
term a good season. A ‘good’ season was defined by the community as one: in which rainfall 
is good and evenly distributed (without a mid-season drought;, in which ‘the inseparable 
twins – seed and fertilizer’ are easily accessible; and in which  communities are able to access 
seed and plant on time to be able to attain good yields. Based on these perceptions, 
communities ranked the 2008/09 season as ‘average’, 2007/08 as ‘poor’ and 2006/7 as 
‘average’ in terms of season quality and crop production. In 2008/09 rains were fairly good 
but the distribution was poor. As in the past four seasons, maize seed was not available on 
the formal market, but was rather mostly found on the informal market at exorbitant prices 
of as high US$50 for a 10kg pack. However, some of the farmers used seed they have carried 
over from the previous season (2008/09) Maguta program (which was distributed late) and 
others from NGOs such as CRS and Community Technology Development Trust 
(CTDT/COMMUTECHH).  
 
On rating the 2007/08 season as poor, the community indicated that below normal rainfall 
was received: it was poorly distributed and ended as early as February, negatively affecting 
critical crop growth stages. This was exacerbated by the high rate of loss of value of the local 
currency and unprecedented inflation, thus rendering fertilizer, labor and fuel expensive.  
 
The community drew similarities between the 2006/07 and the 2008/09 season which were 
both average. Although these two were similar in-terms of rainfall, the 2006/07 season was 
better since fertilizer and hybrid seed were available at vendor shops and agro-dealers in 
Harare, at Murehwa Centre and at local agro-dealer shops. During the 2006/07 season, most 
farmers in Murehwa could afford purchasing fertilizer since as little as 2 by 50kg bags of 
sweet potatoes sold at Mbare could raise enough to buy a bag of fertilizer: thus input access 
was better than 2008/09. Also in that year, CRS and CTDT held seed fairs and other 
households got seed from these aid-related. At least seed was distributed on time and most 
was planted as opposed to the 2008/09 season where up to 50% of seed aid was not planted. 
Fertilizer Channels 
Crop production without the use of fertilizer in Murehwa is almost a non-starter. According 
to the District Agricultural Extension Officer, the most important factor affecting crop 
production in the district is fertilizer availability, then draught power, seed and rainfall 
(quantity and distribution)-- in that order. Getting access to fertilizer was also assessed as the 
most important constraint by the community as well.  Most of the farmers in Murehwa 
normally use fertilizer (see table 42). 
Table 42. Fertilizer use in Murehwa 
Description % of Households (based on responses) 
Usually use fertilizer  97.1 
Used fertilizer 2008/09 cropping season   90.1 
The strategy for fertilizer was normal  20.9 
 
Most of the soils in the district are sandy to sandy-loam, formed from the granite parent rock 
with poor inherent soil fertility. Hence almost all crops in the district require fertilizer and/or 
manure. Most of the farmers access fertilizer from local vendors in Murehwa or Harare or on 
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the ‘black market’ at unusually prices as high as US$60/50kg bag. Recently, fertilizer supply 
has improved significantly on the formal market and prices have stabilized at US$ 30-34 per 
50kg. The general practice is that farmers purchase fertilizer when they sell their own 
produce at market. Before the dollarization, farmers reckon that fertilizer was easy to access 
since they could sell two 50kg bags of sweet potatoes to buy a 50kg bag of fertilizer. 
However, the current fertilizer prices require the farmers to sell 7-10 by 50kg bags of sweet 
potatoes at the market at an average price of US$ 5/bag. However, during stress times, 
farmers may even use ‘manure tea’, a liquid from soaked manure as top dressing fertilizer 
and some could even use human urine as copping strategies. 
Trends in crops grown 
 According to the community, the major crops grown in the district are maize, finger millet, 
groundnuts and sweet potatoes. They indicated that in the 1990s maize was the major crop 
in terms of both importance and area planted, constituting more than 50% of the land 
allocation, with groundnuts and other crops such as sweet potatoes, finger millet and 
Bambara nuts and rice (grown then) sharing the other 50% land allocation. Since the turn of 
the millennium (nine seasons ago), maize has remained a major crop but its land allocation 
has been declining. Sweet potatoes have became a major cash crop and finger millet has 
replaced groundnuts as the second most important crop as finger millet substitutes for maize 
as a cereal during drought periods. Due to the decreases in annual rainfall and its poor 
distribution, wetland crops such as rice have been abandoned  in favor of crops which can 
withstand adverse conditions, such as cowpeas and cassava. Other than sweet potatoes 
becoming a cash crop and maize converted from being also a cash crop to predominantly a 
food crop, economic challenges have led to the introduction of other crops such as 
sunflower. This is mainly used to extract cooking oil, with the residual ‘cake’ being used to 
feed livestock (chickens and/or cattle). In the same period , soybeans, initially a commercial 
sector crop is being adopted by the communal farmers. The soya is used to make flour which 
is used to bake bread, and they are also sometimes pressed for soya-milk. 
 Table 43. Crop production in Murehwa district, by season and crop-use  
Crop Use for 
Food  
Use  for  
Income  
Comments 
Rainy season (Summer):  October to April  
Maize H L Only sold when households need inputs 
Finger millet H M Mainly used in the off season to brew beer for sale 
Groundnuts H L Processed into peanut butter, used as a substitute for cooking 
oil. 
Sweet potato M H Has been used as a cash crop but the market is no longer 
lucrative. 
Soybeans M L Processed into a range of by-products such as bread, milk, 
scones etc 
Cowpeas H L Has poor market 
Sunflower H L Extraction of oil and cake is used for livestock feeds 
Beans L - Low production, mainly in gardens 
Rice  L No longer a popular crop 
Cassava L  A minor crop 
Sorghum L - A minor crop 
Post-rainy season (Winter): May to September 
Horticulture H H Used for both relish and income generation. 
Key: H=High, M=Medium, L=Low  
Source: Murehwa Community Focus Group, July 2, 2009 
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Trends in varieties grown 
 Farmers in Murehwa mainly grow hybrid maize particularly SC 513, PHB 30G97 and DK8031, 
which are produced by commercial seed houses. These have replaced old hybrids such as SC 
501 and SR 52. Although COMMUTECHH has introduced two improved Open Pollinated 
Varieties (OPVs) of maize such as ZM 521, ZM 421 and others through Participatory Plant 
Breeding in Farmer Field Schools, these have not been as popular as the local traditional 
variety called ‘garabha’ or ‘mabhagu’ .  Areas planted to the local usually increase during 
periods of high stress,  such as after a drought or when inputs are scarce. The local variety  is 
normally grown in gardens in winter so as to save the germplasm.  
 
Table 44.  Type of the varieties planted of the selected important crops, Murehwa  
Crop  Local Modern OPV Hybrid 
Maize 13.2 0.000 3.0 83.8 
Sweet potatoes 97.2 2.8 0.0 0.0 
G/nuts 84.2 15.8 0.0 0.0 
finger millet 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
All finger millet varieties grown are local or traditional varieties called ‘gwezere’ and 
madhura’: groundnuts varieties are also mainly old.  Groundnut varieties grown include: natal 
common, bob white, valencia and makulu red, as well as a few modern ones such as Nyanda 
and Aqua (introduced by COMMUTECHH). Farmers in Murehwa have two popular local sweet 
potato varieties ‘Ngoronhatu or Ngoroshanu’ and ‘shirikadzi’ which constitute the bulk of the 
varieties grown. Farmers have also accessed improved sweet potato variety locally called 
Birchnough, the name indicating the place were the initial planting material was collected 
from by the farmers during an exchange visit (correctly called Brondal).  
 
Table 45. Farmers’ assessment of performance of varieties planted in 2008/09 cropping    
 season  
Major crop planted) Performance of variety planted (%) % of farmers who would re 
sow the variety 
 Poor Average Good  
Maize varieties 20.93 37.21 41.86 71.43 
Sweet potatoes varieties 11.1 22.22 66.67 100.00 
G/nut varieties 8.3 37.50 54.17 100.00 
Finger millets 22.7 27.27 50.00 86.36 
 
Most of the farmers evaluated the maize varieties they sowed in 2008/09 season as  average 
or good in performance, and over 70% were willing to continue planting these varieties. A 
minority  indicated the maize varieties they had sown were not appreciated. (Note: Most of 
this was relief seed). Continuous use of one crop variety has its own weakness. In Murehwa, 
local finger millet varieties called ‘gwezere’ and ‘madhura’ are now susceptible to pests and 
diseases and some farmers are worried about them, which was probably the reason why 
some farmers were not willing to plant these again. Some new varieties have been 
introduced through relief and development seed channels. For instance, CTDT introduced 
new groundnut varieties called Nyanda and Aqua, and a cowpea variety called CBC 1. New 
sweet potatoes varieties called Brondal and Nemagold have been introduced by CTDT.  
Planting material for the crop is usually preserved as ‘live seed banks’ in-situ in gardens and 
protected wetlands. 
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Seed Channels 
A good portion of the maize crop sown in the 2008/09 season came from farmers’ own stock 
(retained or carryover) or from shops (local shops and agro-dealers).  Seed aid and 
government programs also provided about ¼ of the seed which farmers in the Murehwa 
sample sowed.  Planting material for the other crops was, and continues to be based on the 
local seed systems. Farmers keep their own seed of local maize varieties, groundnuts, finger 
millet, cowpeas, soybeans, beans, sorghum and sunflower as seed and sweet potatoes as 
runners in gardens.  
 
Prior to March 2009, maize was a controlled product, and it was only allowed to be sold and 
bought by the Grain Marketing Board (GMB). Over the past 5 to 10 seasons, relief seed aid 
has been delivered through the GoZ-controlled channels partially coordinated by the Ministry 
of Agriculture’s through AGRITEX, GMB-managed input loan scheme, the Zimbabwe National 
Army (ZNA)-led Operation Maguta, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ)-input scheme and 
the recent Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)-sponsored input scheme (only in 
2009). Most of the seed was distributed late and hence farmers could usually store for the 
next season. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also distributed seed through 
relief seed aid, assistance through developmental projects and seed fairs. Farmers normally 
keep their own seed for local OPVs which they then use in high stress times such as droughts 
(‘garabha’ or ‘mabhagu’, also identified as ‘Hickory King’). Despite hybrid maize seed being 
difficult to access on the formal market, a number of farmers purchased from local vendors 
and agro-dealers. Gifts also were a very important source for maize seed.  Relatively little 
seed was procured via  barter or casual labor (Table 46). 
 
Table 46. Percentage of seed planted in 2008/09 cropping season by source, Murehwa 
Seed Source % of seed that came from the source by crop 
Maize Groundnuts Finger millet 
Retained 11.68 69.19 49.44 
Carry over from previous season 14.00 7.53 0.00 
Local shops 14.15 0.00 0.00 
Agro dealers 8.98 0.00 0.00 
Community groups e.g. FFS 0.00 0.22 0.00 
Gifts from relatives/friends 17.73 8.49 30.95 
Barter/purchase from relatives 1.35 12.73 12.61 
Government programs (Relief) 18.72 0.00 0.00 
Seed aid direct (NGOs Relief & dev)  8.98 0.00 0.00 
Casual labor 4.42 1.85 7.00 
Total seed (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Table 46 also shows that crops such as groundnuts and finger millet were distributed mainly 
through the informal seed channels, such as use of home-saved seed, gifts from relatives and 
friends, bartering for other seed types, grain, livestock etc and eve exchange for labor.  This 
use of the informal seed system which has multiple seed channels is critical because 
weaknesses or failures in one channel can be compensated by another (Sperling, 2008). 
  
Is seed relief the option? Table 47 shows that significant percentage of the relief seed , 
almost half,  accessed in 2008/09 was not planted. In the case of maize, although some of the 
seed was planted, some was also stored, maybe for use in 2009/10 season (this was mainly 
SADC seed distributed late). Some farmers donated the seed as gifts to relatives and friends 
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and a very few ate the seed. All cowpea seed from seed aid was planted probably because 
farmers thought it was an early maturing variety and would still produce leaves and grain 
even when planted later in the season. 
 
Table 47. Utilization of seed aid by the beneficiaries among the sampled farmers in 
 Murehwa site 
Crop  Maize Cowpeas 
Type of use N Mean Std. Dev. Utilization (%) in 
whole sample 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Utilization (%) in 
whole sample 
Planted 17 5.3 6.9 51.3 0.647 1.539 100.0 
Eaten 17 0.9 3.6 8.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Give as gift 17 0.6 2.4 5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Exchanged 17 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Stored 17 3.5 5.2 34.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total    100.0   100.0 
 
 
Seed Source Mapping: Seed channels for the major crops (Maize, Finger millet 
and Groundnuts)  
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            Most important                    Medium important                      Least important 
 
 
Figure 9. Channels through which farmer source finger millet seed.   Finger  millet seed was 
procured solely from the informal seed channels mainly home-saved (retained) seed, gifts 
from friends and relatives and bartering. Community members indicated that finger millet 
seed was easily accessible from relatives and friends, as compared to crops such as 
groundnuts,  Bambara nuts, cowpeas, soybeans or sunflower. 
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Figure 10. Channels through which farmer source maize seed, Murehwa                                                   
The main sources of maize seed in Murehwa for season 2008/9 were farmers own stocks 
(retained and carryover), gifts and  seed relief. Government programs (such as Operation 
Maguta  and Champion farmer input schemes), SADC-sponsored inputs and seed aid 
constitute the predominant relief sector. There was also seed assistance through development 
projects such as conservation farming and purchases from the ‘black market’ in Murehwa or 
Harare. These constitute the ‘formal’ channels. Farmers’ own stock (usually local variety 
‘garabha’), barter exchange (for other seed types, grain, food or livestock etc), gifts and 
selection from grain (own harvest) constitutes the informal channels. Note that most of these 
sources have other links (traceable to origination). Diagram based on Sperling (2008) p 6. 
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Figure 11. Channels through which farmer source groundnut seed.  Ground seed sources: 
Mainly from the informal seed channels such as home-saved (retained) seed, this can be 
accessed by other farmers’ thorough gifts, barter exchange for grain, other seed types or even 
livestock. Farmers can also access seed from the open markets such as Mbare Musika, A2 
resettlement areas and other districts such as Mutoko, Goromonzi and as far as other 
countries such as Malawi, Mozambique and South Africa.   
Seed harvest to sowing ratio 
 It is well known in Zimbabwe that farmers keep their own seed for most of the crops, such as 
local and improved OPV maize varieties, groundnuts, finger millet, cowpeas, soybean, 
sunflower and sugar beans. Seed for these crops is usually drawn from the previous harvests. 
Thus, it is against this background that seed needs can be quantified through a simple 
calculation called the ‘harvest to seed’ ratio. The greater the multiplication rate of a 
crop/variety, the smaller the proportion of the harvest is needed to meet the sowing need for 
the next season. In times of good harvests farmers in Murehwa may keep more than they 
normally require as they give as gifts or may trade the extra seed in exchange of other crop 
seed, grain, livestock, labor and even money.  Of course, the seed harvested has to be of 
acceptable quality, so sometimes the harvest to sowing ratios might be higher, as grain has to 
be sorted—to obtain acceptable quality seed. 
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Table 48. Sowing needs per household: Local variety maize and finger millet, Murehwa. 
Seed Parameter Local Maize variety 
(Garabha, Hickory king) 
Finger millet  
Planted area per household (ha) 0.4 0.2 
Seeding rate (kg/ha) 25 8 
Sowing needs (kg) 10 2 
Multiplication rate (grain produce divided by 
seed sown) 
40 100 
Harvest (kg) 400 200 
% of harvest required to meet sowing needs (100 
divided by multiplication rate) 
2.5 1.0 
 
This means that a farmer only needs 2.5% and 1% of his/her harvest for maize and pearl 
millet respectively. However, the percentage may increase slightly in stress conditions such as 
droughts, as the crop harvest decline. 
 
Table 49. Sowing needs per household: groundnuts and cowpeas, Murehwa. 
Seed Parameter Groundnuts Cowpeas 
Planted area per household (ha) 0.25 0.2 
Seeding rate (kg/ha) 100 100 
Sowing needs (kg) 20 20 
Multiplication rate (grain produce divided by 
seed sown) 
10 12.5 
Harvest 200 250 
% of harvest required to meet sowing needs 
(100 divided by multiplication rate) 
10 8 
 
Legume seed is difficult to manage. However, farmers in Murehwa only need 10% and 8% of 
their harvest for groundnuts and cowpeas respectively. The message from the two tables is 
consistent – a fall in crop yields does not necessarily imply a seed shortfall. However, seed 
quality can be an issue during high stress times such as droughts.  
 
 
Markets Overview 
Informal markets 
a) Farmer sellers 
Farmers in Murehwa purchase ‘potential seed’ for crops such as groundnuts, cowpeas, 
Bambara nuts, many varieties of bean, sunflower and sorghum in local informal markets at 
Murehwa Centre or even as far as Mbare Musika in Harare (about 85km away).  Much of the 
potential seed is locally sourced: farmers come to the markets to sell their produce to buyers. 
The open market recognizes that some of the grain sold is actually potential seed and this is 
manifested in the increase of prices towards planting time. Prices of potential seed may 
double in September just before planting season. 
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Figure 12. Three levels of grain (potential seed) trading system, for Murehwa district 
 Usually based at Mbare Musika, Harare  
 Buys from farmers and mid-traders 
 Select and sort as ‘potential seed’  
  Sells to farmers at the market 
 
 Usually gets produce from farmers 
 Select and sort as ‘potential seed’  
 Predominated by women 
 Can re-sell to farmers during shortage 
 
 He/she sells directly to neighbors 
 Also sells at the local Murehwa market themselves 
 And at Mbare Musika too. 
 At times sells to mid-level traders called ‘Koronyera’ 
 
 
b) The Mid-level buyer:  
Middlemen locally called ‘Koronyera’, who can either be local or from Harare, buy much of 
the produce for resale.  After these local middlemen, (60-70% the majority whom are 
women) have bought this produce as food or potential seed (depending on crop), they move 
to a place where it can be sold at a profit, such the road-side of Murehwa-Nyamapanda 
highway. Some middlemen sell to bigger traders at Mbare in Harare, about 85km away. For 
instance, farmers sell a 20l tin (bucket) of groundnuts at US$2.00 for re-sale locally for 
US$3.00, or as high as US$4.00-5.00 at Mbare.  Generally, the crops they trade include 
groundnuts, Bambara nuts, cowpeas, beans, maize and vegetables such as butternut, 
tomatoes, onions etc.  As the rainy season approaches, August onwards,  prices may rise by 
as much as two to three-fold since select stocks will now be sold as ‘potential seed’. The 
middlemen usually sort and select the products for sale as potential seed. Potential seed is 
also sold in the supermarkets, usually  packaged as food. 
 
c) Big traders 
Big trades are usually found at Mbare Musika market. They have a wide range of  market 
clientele, including: the urban people who normally by for food, rural farmers who buy for 
food as well as potential seed. Buses going to and from almost all destinations in Zimbabwe 
are hosted at Mbare market: hence it provides an important and lively trading locale. 
Murehwa farmers get most of their agricultural inputs from vendors at this market.  
 
Formal markets 
The formal market is mainly focused on hybrid maize seed from major seed houses, such as 
Seed Co, Pannar,  Pioneer etc.   Pioneer Seed Company is the closet to Murehwa (about 40km 
away) and has agro-dealers at Murehwa Centre, such as A1 Seeds. 
 
a) A1 seeds and other smaller shops: A1 Seeds is an agent of a number of seed companies, 
such as Pioneer and some vegetable seed companies. There are other small hardware 
shops which sell seed and fertilizer.  However, during the period of the field assessment, 
controls seemed somewhat lax on quality and  some of these outlets were repackaging 
Big traders at Mbare 
Musika in Harare 
Medium-sized traders at 
Murehwa Centre locally 
called ‘Koronyera’ 
Farmer who sells his/her 
own production as grain 
(potential seed) 
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the fertilizer and seed in smaller packs. These were being sold at US$ 1.00/kg for 
fertilizer, meaning a 50kg bag priced at US$34.00 goes up to a cumulative US$ 
50.00/50kg. Maize seed  was also being repackaged into smaller packs of 2kg per unit. 
  
b) Seed Company of Zimbabwe (SeedCo) - SeedCo re-opened their seed shop/depot in 
Murehwa on July, 03, 2009, for the first time since 2007/08 season. They have 30mt of 
seed available for sale and they can access more if stocks are selling. They have two 
varieties: short-medium variety SC 513 and medium-long variety SC635. The company 
sells only for cash and does not give credit. 
 
Table 50.  Maize seed stocks at Seed Co Depot, Murehwa  
Crop Variety Units /Packets  Unity Price (US$) Total quantity 
(mt) 
Maize SC 513 10 kg 22.00 - 
 SC 513 25 kg 50.00 - 
 SC 635 25 kg 70.00 - 
Total     30 
Source: Seed Co Deport, Murehwa, July 4, 2009. 
 
 It is the first time in more than six years that seed has became available from the formal 
sector as early as July. This means farmers can access the hybrid seed early enough for the 
2009/10 agricultural season, which commences in October/November. 
 
Box 17:   Pioneer Seed Company: Boora Growth Point, near  Murehwa 
 
• Company only deals in hybrid maize only and not OPVs. 
• They have a total of 42 growers each with an average of 50ha 
• The company started harvesting in March, which they do at 35-40 moisture content 
• Packages their seed in 2kg (only on demand e.g. for supermarkets targeting urban 
farmers) 5kg, 10kg and 25kg packets. 
• The current price is US$ 2000.00/ton (i.e. approximately US$ 20.00/10kg pocket) 
• The company used to be seed exporters but now they are importers. 
• Initially produced up to 5,000 MT per season in 2003 when but this season they have 
4,000MT and are able to import more quickly from their sister company in SA 
• Last season (2008/09) the bulk of their seed was distributed through the seed relief 
by government through the RBZ input scheme and through NGOs 
• Have sales representatives in all provinces in the country who identify and liaise with 
Agro-dealers and other Seed House Agencies 
• For the 2009/10 season they have already started distributing their seed through 
Agro-dealers 
Source: Pioneer Seed Company, Boora near Murehwa, July 2, 2009  
 
Prices 
Fertilizer and maize seed are already available on the formal market, well in advance of the 
planting season, for the first time in more than six years. The dollarization has resulted in the 
stabilization of prices, with fertilizer ranging from US$ 30.00 to 34.00/50kg. Maize seed was 
being priced at US$22.00/10kg and US$ 50.00/50kg at the Seed Co depot.  At Pioneer, the 
seed was priced at US$ 2,000/ton. 
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Gender Aspects in Seed:  Special Women’s Issues 
 
Is there anything called women’s crops?  Women in Murehwa confirmed that women are 
usually responsible for ensuring ‘food is there on the table’ and getting relish and nutritious 
foods. Crops usually associated with women include: groundnuts, Bambara nuts, sweet 
potatoes and cowpeas. Women manage these crops, including the phases of securing seed, 
field management,  post harvest handling and for modest marketing. However, when a crop 
within their domain becomes lucrative, men usually adopt it too, as is the case with sweet 
potatoes.  
 
For ‘women’s crops, women usually can  make independent decisions about their use and 
manage proceeds from their sale (sometimes used  to buy kitchen utensils). Seed for all the 
women crops is found in the informal seed sector and is not very difficult to access. Although 
the last  seasons  have not been especially productive ones, women  in Murehwa have 
generally managed to keep their seed for all the crops. Those who do not have seed can 
barter, work for seed (maricho), and receive gifts from friends and relatives or purchase. 
Women in Murehwa participate in most agricultural related issues, for example they 
constitute more than 80% of farmer field school membership in the district.  
  
General Summary 
 
The major limiting input in Murehwa is fertilizer, although the farmers recognized that the 
‘two twins’ seed and fertilizer always move together. They were quick to indicate that they 
hate ‘seed aid dependency’, and indicted that receiving free distributions is just not 
sustainable. The only seed they have had difficulties in accessing over past five to six years 
has been hybrid maize seed.   Seed of all the other crops, such as groundnuts, finger millet, 
sunflower, Bambara nuts, sweet potatoes, soybeans and even local maize ‘garabha’ has been 
available and accessible within the informal sector. The community would prefer: input loan 
schemes; the revival of input supplies through local agro-dealers; and would appreciate 
interventions which will improve their access to cash. One community member noted that, 
“Money that has value is not easy to access”, meaning the US dollar, SA rand, Botswana Pula 
and other currencies currently being used in the Zimbabwean economy. 
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Recommendations: Murehwa 
 
1. Focus assistance on fertilizer support 
The community in Murehwa was greatly affected by the continuous absence of fertilizer 
on the formal market in the past five to six years. This has been exacerbated by the 
controlled pricing of the commodity which led to its availability mostly on the ‘black 
market’. The dollarization of the economy has improved its availability. The Murehwa 
community would require fertilizer-oriented support, at least to boost their production 
since the product seems to be priced beyond their reach. Maybe a fertilizer voucher, 
redeemable at agro-dealers is an option.  
 
2. Support Agro-dealers to re-open their facilities in rural areas.  
 When designing interventions, intentional efforts should made to ensure that they do not 
compete with the local agro-dealers, but rather complement their efforts. There is need 
to consider a voucher-based subsidized input scheme whereby an NGO, such as CRS or 
CTDT, can facilitate a relationship between the local agro-dealers and  seed houses and 
fertilizer companies, so that these suppliers can provide inputs closer to rural 
populations, and in formats small farmers can access.  This is a critical time for the newly 
re-opened agricultural input dealers: it is vital that intervention support the agro-dealer, 
growth rather undermining their potential. 
 
3. Focus greater attention on non-maize innovation.  
A lot of research in the country has been on hybrid maize seed : relatively modest work 
has been effected on the other crops. There is need  for  conscious efforts to introduce 
new improved varieties of a range of crops, such as groundnuts, Bambara nuts, finger 
millet and sweet potatoes. Although some varieties were introduced by relief seed aid 
and at times developmental projects, this has been done without the necessary 
agronomic back-up and technical support. There is need to ensure that varieties are 
introduced through the existing extension mechanisms. The introduction of new varieties 
for these crops could be through organized farmer groups, such as farmer field schools. 
Such a means of introduction will ensure that the new introduced varieties are evaluated 
by the community and that they filter through the community with some rapidity.  
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Seed System Security, July 2009:  Bikita District 
Introduction 
A seed security assessment exercise was done in Bikita District by a multi-sector team in 
August 2009 as part of a larger seed security assessment covering four sites in Zimbabwe.  
 
Bikita district is located in agro-ecological region IV in Masvingo Province, but also has 
characteristics of region III along the main mountain range, Devule, that demarcates it from 
the Devule Wildlife Conservancy. The current estimated population is around 500,000, made 
up of approximately 100,000 farming households. The people have a distinct tradition of 
eating a particular type of stinkbug, known in local parlance as ‘harurwa’.  According to 
community discussions, the bug is roasted to an appetizing light brown color for the table or 
for sale at the nearby growth centers.  Most people in Bikita originated from Sedzi, Mutoko, 
Mt Darwin and Manyika in the north east, Chimanimani and Chipinge in the east, Hwedza and 
Buhera in the north, Matabeleland in the south and Guruswa in Mozambique.  
 
Agricultural Overview 
Major crops grown are maize, finger millet, groundnuts and Bambara nuts, cowpeas, sugar 
beans and sweet potatoes. Sorghum and pearl millet areas are increasing, probably for beer 
brewing and sale that are on the increase as a coping strategy. Maize, groundnuts and sugar 
beans rank high for both household food and income; finger millet is high for income, used 
mainly for beer brewing but medium as a food crop; Bambara nuts and cowpeas are medium 
for food and income purposes. Table 51 presents uses and importance of the various crops 
grown in Bikita. 
 
Table 51: Crop uses and relative importance, Bikita 
Crop Food  Income 
Maize - Staple (sadza) 
- Animal feed 
- Roasted (maputi) 
- Roasted and ground into 
powder (mbwirembwire) 
- Boiled (mangai) 
H 
- Sold as grain 
- Used for beer brewing 
which is sold 
 
 
 
H 
Finger millet - Millet Meal (sadza) 
- Fermented drink (maheu) 
M 
- Beer  
 
H 
Groundnuts - Roasted 
- Peanut butter 
H 
- Roasted and sold 
- Peanut butter for sale 
H 
Bambara nuts - Boiled 
- Relish 
M 
- Sold unprocessed 
 
M 
Pearl millet M M  (grown by few people) 
Cowpea M M 
Sugar beans H H (indicated very high) 
Sweet potatoes H M 
Soybeans* H M 
H = high importance for indicated function;  M = medium importance for indicated function 
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Additional crops which are grown on a very small scale by farmers in Bikita include sunflower, 
peas, sorghum and wheat. A summary and trend of all the crops grown, areas allocated for 
each crop and the yields obtained in the past 5 years are given in Table 52. 
 
Table 52: Crop Production (2004/05 to 2008/09), Bikita 
 
Crop 
2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
Area 
Pltd 
(ha) 
Yld 
T/ha 
Area 
Pltd 
(ha) 
Yld 
T/ha 
Area 
Pltd 
(ha) 
Yld 
T/h
a 
Area 
Pltd 
(ha) 
Yld 
T/ha 
Area 
Pltd 
(ha) 
Yld 
T/ha 
Maize 35791 0.25 37673 0.8 36182 0.5 36023 0.25 33113 0.5 
Finger millet 11200 0.25 13863 0.5 13069 0.4 11578 0.3 15874 0.4 
Groundnuts 13770 0.25 13056 0.5 8263 0.4 12520 0.25 11540 0.5 
Pearl millet 4397 0.2 3126 0.6 2686 0.3 2495 0.25 5431 0.3 
Sorghum 850 0.1 3202 0.6 2176 0.5 3412 0.3 7348 0.3 
Sunflower 200 0.3 164 0.5 92 0.1 185 0.1 754 0.3 
Cowpeas 0 0 96 0.25 0 0 78 0.1 965 0.2 
Soybeans 39 0.2 49 0.5 123 0.1 0 0 32 0.3 
Cotton 3359 0.5 3318 0.6 1676 0.5 5567 0.55 3147 0.5 
Source: AGRITEX Bikita. Yld = Yield; Pltd = Planted; ha = hectare 
 
According to AGRITEX and community discussions, areas planted to maize is decreasing, while 
areas planted to finger millet, pearl millet and sorghum have significantly increased – 
suggesting that these small grains are replacing maize areas.  Area planted to groundnuts 
decreased from 2004/05 to an all time low in 2006/07, increased in the following year but 
dropped again. It has not reached previous high levels.  
 
Maize area decreased somewhat from 2005/6 to present but it still clearly dominates and as 
the staple crop. Yield levels are erratic and reflect quality of season – low in 2004/05, 
2007/08, modest in 2005/06, 2008/09, and relatively high in 2005/06. 
 
Sorghum area significantly increased in 2005/06, trebling the 2004/05 areas. Further 
dramatic significant area planted increased in 2008/09, more than trebling area planted in 
the previous year. Cowpeas, a new crop, significantly increased in area. Reduction in yield is 
probably due to aphid attacks which communities mentioned during group discussions. 
Cotton, another new crop, had comparable areas planted in 2004/05, 2005/06 and 2008/09, 
and probably responded to low prices on the market. 
Livestock trends are given in Table 53. 
 
Table 53: Livestock trends in Bikita 
Livestock Year 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Cattle 87,922 89,443 88,006 87,570 86,000 
Goats 76,800 77,113 76,707 76,001 77,111 
Sheep 5,997 6,000 6,552 6,809 6,100 
Pigs 2,248 2,200 2,315 2,251 2,221 
Donkeys 2,500 2,400 2,437 2,802 2,650 
Source: AGRITEX  Bikita 
 
Though currently at the lowest, the number of cattle has remained somewhat steady over 
the past 5 years, only varying by not more than 2000 from year to year. The droughts, floods, 
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outbreaks of diseases or other stress factors have not significantly changed the numbers, as 
probably overall mortality has been compensated by births. The goat numbers situation is the 
same, with a range of 1,112. Sheep also follow the same trend with a range of 812. The same 
trend is true for pigs. During stress periods when households face food insecurity, it is 
common to sell off small stock to raise money for food and other needs – a standard coping 
mechanism. When large numbers of households face crisis, small-stock numbers tend to 
decrease, but this is not the case in Bikita.  Note that  these aggregate numbers do not show 
changes in ownership within – - that is, poorer households selling to better-off households 
who may keep rather than kill the animals. 
 
Community Perspective on Key Agricultural Trends 
Community perceptions about positive trends and a good season in Bikita include a 
combination of: adequate well-distributed rainfall ; availability and affordability of seeds, 
fertilizers and other materials like agro-chemicals; and availability of these inputs in sufficient 
quantities at the right time,  before the start of the season. Perceptions about a poor season 
and negative trends are the opposite: poor rainfall and significant shortages of seed, 
fertilizers and chemicals, inadequate draft power and political instability. 
Season Quality 
Based on these perceptions communities ranked the past 2008/09 season as ‘medium’, 
2007/08 as  ‘poor’ and 2006/7 as ‘average’ in terms of season quality and crop production.  
 
Good rains were received in 2008/09 but maize seed was not widely available, appearing 
mostly on the informal market at exorbitant prices around US$40 for a 10kg pack. The season 
was a mixture of misfortunes: seed aid started late in December/January, some seed aid 
OPVs did not perform well, fake seed was sold clandestinely, pesticides for stalk borer control 
were not on the market, and flash floods reduced crop performance in certain localities. At 
the start of the season in October, most traders preferred and traded in the US dollar 
because the local currency was losing value too quickly. Many farmers did not have the US 
dollar as previous crop products had been sold in local currency – hence they effectively 
could not purchase inputs on the market. 
 
The 2007/08 season was poor in most respects: the little rainfall received was poorly 
distributed and ended too early, negatively affecting critical crop growth stages. The high rate 
of loss of value of the local currency and unprecedented inflation was catastrophic for 
farming operations. Many could not withdraw their payments for crops sent to GMB because 
of very low bank cash withdrawal limits – in some instances several times lower than bus fare 
to rural areas. It was difficult to find the local currency and most outlets did not accept 
checks.  The situation was particularly hard for rural farmers who had no alternative sources 
of income except the money ‘trapped’ in the banks. 
 
The 2006/07 season was average, substantially more productive than the 2007/08 season but 
worse than the 2008/09 season. Rainfall was erratic in places but fairly good in other 
locations, and crop production was average. Seed and fertilizer were available at local agro-
dealer and general dealer shops but deliveries were late and many farmers could not secure 
these on time. The high inflation rate and general economic decline exacerbated the 
situation, preventing substantial purchases of inputs. A good portion of the seed aid received, 
particularly from CARE, was re-distributed by recipients to other farmers in the area. 
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Trends in Bikita Agriculture as described by Community 
 The positive trends experienced are the introduction of conservation farming into the faming 
system, especially for households which do not have draft power, food aid from NGOs 
especially during times of hunger, and satisfactory extension work by AGRITEX officers. The 
negative trends include the general hunger, erratic rainfall, and shortage of agricultural 
inputs, poor soils getting poorer and political instability that disturbed agriculture. 
Crops gaining / decreasing in area 
Crops gaining in area are finger millet, sorghum, cow pea, sunflower, Bambara nuts, sweet 
potatoes and soybeans. Finger millet seed is easy to obtain within the community hence it 
easily replaced maize areas. Cowpea and sorghum were given as seed aid and naturally grew 
in area, replacing maize in the process. Seed of sunflower, Bambara nuts, sweet potatoes and 
soybeans was easy to find within the community and these crops are normally cultivated 
without fertilizers, making the switch from maize also fairly easy. Such diversification might 
be seen as a positive trend – potentially bringing greater production stability and more 
nutritional balance. Though maize is a staple crop and is cultivated on up to 50 percent of the 
fields, areas allocated to maize have been reduced due to difficulties in securing hybrid maize 
seed and fertilizer on the market. Groundnut areas have also been reduced due to difficulties 
associated with securing groundnut seed. 
Varieties gaining / decreasing in area according to the community 
New maize varieties have been introduced in Bikita: ZM521 - an open pollinated variety that 
performed well in Chivaka and Chinyamagona villages and  SC 513 , a new maize variety from 
SeedCo, which is in demand : agro-dealers are currently selling this popular variety. Pioneer 
varieties 30G19 and 32G30 are also gaining ground and in demand. A formerly popular 
SeedCo maize variety, introduced more than 15 years ago, R201 was phased out and replaced 
by SC501, which in turn was also replaced by the current popular SC 513. There has been no 
major change to varieties for groundnuts, pearl millet and finger millet. One groundnut 
variety, Falcon was introduced some time ago and quickly disappeared.  
 
Results of the individual household qualitative questions on the type crop and variety 
cultivated are given in Table 54. 
 
Table 54: Type of the varieties planted by crop among the sampled households in Bikita 
Crop  Type of varieties grown 
 Frequency Local Modern OPV Hybrids 
Maize 62 12.9  12.9 74.19 
Groundnuts 18 77.8 22.2   
Finger millet 19 100    
 
The majority of farmers planted hybrids, but much of this was actually recycled hybrid seed, 
second or third generation. Very few people grew local and OPV. The majority of people grew 
local groundnuts and finger millet varieties.  
 
Farmers’ assessment of performance of varieties planted in 2008/09 cropping season is given 
in Table 55. 
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Table 55: Farmers’ assessment of performance of varieties planted in 2008/09 cropping 
 season , Bikita sample 
Crop  
Total number 
of 
respondents 
Percentage of farmers evaluating 
the variety performance  
% of farmers that 
would re sow the crop 
variety planted in 
2008/09 
   Poor Average Good  
Maize 74 13.5 33.8 52.7 62.2 
Groundnuts 21 33.3 47.6 19.0 95.2 
Finger 
millet 
19 15.8 47.4 36.8 100.0 
Bambara 10 30.0 40.0 30.0 100.0 
Sorghum  18.2 18.2 63.6 81.8 
 
 
The majority of farmers rated the performance of the maize variety planted in 2008/09 as 
average to good, while a very small proportion thought it was poor. Many would replant the 
same maize variety. Two thirds of respondents rated the groundnut variety planted as 
average to good while a third thought it was poor, and almost all would replant the same 
seed. The majority of respondents rated finger millet, Bambara nut and sorghum seed 
planted in 2008/09 as average to good, and many would replant the same seed next season. 
 
Sources of Seed in 2008/2009 season, and for the past 5 years 
According to community discussions  , the primary sources of maize seed during the 2009/09 
season were GMB seed and the Maguta program (GOZ)  and retained seed from recycled 
hybrids SC513, open pollinated varieties ZM521, Red Cork and Hickory King.   Retained maize 
seed is selected for desirable traits in the field during harvesting / dehusking, kept separate 
from ordinary grain and later planted at the onset of the rainy season.  Other  primary 
sources include the RBZ program sourcing from Pioneer Seeds, the informal market, mainly 
sourced from South Africa, and the SADC seed, sourced from donors. Very small amount 
came from maize selected from food aid (Figure 8a). 
 
The customary sources in the past five years include CARE, GMB, and Masvingo Farm Supplies 
direct sales to farmers .  Other sources include local shops and agro-dealers, and retained 
seed of hybrids and open pollinated varieties. Seed sources for maize have changed from the 
usual agro-dealers, NGOs, GMB and local retained seed to include very diverse options – 
SADC, RBZ, Food Aid and the Maguta Program. 
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Figure 13a: Sources of maize seed during 2008/09 season, Bikita 
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Figure 13b: Maize : sources of seed last five years, Bikita 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The proportions of seed planted in 2008/09 cropping season and the various sources of that 
seed is given in Table 56. 
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Table 56: Percentage of seed planted in 2008/09 cropping season that came from each 
 source,  Bikita sample  
Source  
 
Maize Ground nut Finger millet 
Own stock/social networks 27.85 72.7 99.72 
Retained 15.71 57.87 72.61 
Carry over 0.7   
Gifts from relatives/friends 11.44 14.83 27.11 
Seed market 15.15 18.08 0.28 
Agro-dealers 11.98 0 0 
Contract growers 0 0 0 
Irrigation scheme 0 0 0 
Barter 3.17 18.08 0.28 
Casual labor 0 0 0 
Development interventions 23.25 0 0 
COMMUTECH* 0.28 0 0 
Extension 22.97 0 0 
Seed/food aid 17.33 9.04 0 
Seed aid 15.36 9.04 0 
Seed vouchers 0 0 0 
Food aid 1.97 0 0 
* Local Non Government Organization 
 
Farmers principally source maize, groundnuts and finger millet seed from own seed and social 
networks. Maize seed has diverse sources, own stock being predominant, followed by 
development projects, seed aid and the seed market. Such comparable diverse sources 
mentioned in the individual interviews, and corroborated in community discussions, imply 
the existence of a robust maize seed sourcing system. Many respondents sourced the 
majority of groundnuts from own stocks and social networks, followed by purchases from the 
seed market, and seed aid. Finger millet sources are largely own stocks and social networks. 
 
Table 57: Average and Poor Farmer Groundnut Harvest and Proportion of Seed 
 Requirements, Bikita 
Groundnuts Average Farmer Poor Farmer 
Surface area planted in 
hectares 
0.9 0.1 
Seed need for area 90kg 
(Seed rate is 100kg/ha) 
0.01kg 
Harvest 720kg 
(Might use 800kg/ha lime or 
less quantity gypsum) 
40kg 
Less capacity to weed 
(Might use 400kg/ha lime or 
less quantity gypsum) 
% Harvest needed for seed 12.5% 25% 
 
Comparisons of the average and poor farmer illustrate how poor farmers may have 
inadequate groundnut seed for planting. The average farmer needs just 12.5% of harvest 
whereas the poor farmer needs to retain 25% of harvest as seed. 
 
From the community discussions, seed sources for most crops in the last season and the past 
five years are largely locally- retained seed, seed swaps / exchanges, seed payments for 
 101 
 
casual labor and NGO supplied seed for last season and the past five years. Finger millet was 
largely obtained from retained seed, that is, selected while in the field for desirable traits like 
disease tolerance and / or high yield, separated from the rest of grain and safely stored for 
planting. Many households grow finger millet, and seed is available and accessible to all 
households – hence most are seed secure. 
 
Approximately 80 percent of households grow sorghum for food and beer brewing and most 
households are seed secure, the main source being retained seed. Selection for sorghum seed 
also starts in the field for desirable traits and the same process is used as for finger millet 
seed selection. Less than 5 percent of households grow pearl millet and all are seed secure. 
The main seed source for pearl millet is retained seed; the same seed selection process is 
used for pearl millet as for finger millet and sorghum - choosing from the field for desirable 
traits. 
 
All households grow groundnuts but seed may not always be available at time of planting. 
Approximately 25 percent of households are seed insecure at time of planting but will 
eventually plant the crop after swapping with some of their grain, or  doing casual work and 
being paid in groundnut seed (at the rate of half the quantity planted if the casual work 
entailed planting groundnuts). During the past season, the primary groundnut source was 
retained seed, identified during harvest for desirable traits like large size and kept separately 
from the rest of the crop. The secondary sources of groundnuts were seed exchanges, casual 
labor and local shops, all transacting retained seed. In addition to these primary and 
secondary sources, groundnut seed in the past 5 years was obtained from primary sources, 
GMB supported by the secondary source GOZ, and CARE supported by secondary source of 
donors.  
 
Table 58: Adaptations in seed source, varieties and quantities planted, Bikita 
Crop N 
% of farmers who 
used the sources they 
wanted to use 
% of farmers 
who planted the 
varieties they 
wanted to grow 
% of farmers who 
used evaluated the 
seed condition as 
‘good’ 
Maize 40 42.50 55.00 92.50 
Ground nut 19 68.42 94.74 100.00 
Sorghum 11 45.45 90.91 100.00 
Bambara nut 9 66.67 77.78 100.00 
N = Respondents 
 
Most farmers planted the maize seed varieties they wanted to grow, but less than half used 
the sources they wanted to use: this reflects on limited sources – and  the absence of agro-
dealers last season.  Few farmers used the quantities they wanted to use. However, almost all 
farmers regarded seed condition as good. 
 
Most farmers planted groundnut, sorghum and Bambara nut seed varieties they wanted to 
grow and regarded the seed condition as good. Sources for groundnut and Bambara nut were 
the ones farmers wanted to use. Less than half wanted to use the sorghum seed sources 
actually used.  
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Table 59: Amount of seed farmers usually use and the required amount for the 2009/2010 
 cropping season, Bikita 
Crop Obs 
Average 
amount 
of seed 
(kg) 
usually 
used Std. Dev. 
 Average 
amount of seed 
required for 
2009/10 
cropping 
season 
 Std. Dev. 
Maize 40 22.5 13.3 22.8 14.5 
Cow pea 40 0.5 2.4 0.5 1.8 
Gnut 40 9.8 9.4 9.2 9.8 
Finger millet 40 3.4 5.7 3.5 6.2 
Bambara nut 40 3.35 6.6 3.35 6.7 
Sorghum 40 1.25 3.3 1.25 3.3 
 
Quantities of seed usually used for all crops are more or less the same as the seed quantities 
planned for use in 2009/10 season. Seed rate is directly related to areas planted; hence a 
higher seed rate would require a larger area. The little variation in seed rate is probably due 
to the fact that it is difficult to increase areas cultivated. The source of variation could be in 
area reduction.  
Table 60. Farmers’ planned seed sources for 2009/2010 cropping seasons, Bikita sample 
Source 
Percent of seed expected from the source by farmers 
Maize Groundnut Finger millet 
Retained 19.23 49.18 73.40 
Local shop/vendor 29.67 9.56 0.00 
Agro dealer 18.13 0.00 0.00 
Contract growers 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Irrigation scheme 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Community based seed group 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Gifts from relatives/friends 2.75 9.02 0.00 
Barter/purchase from 
neighbors 12.64 28.69 26.60 
Extension 2.75 0.00 0.00 
Seed aid direct distribution 12.64 4.10 0.00 
Seed voucher/fairs 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Food aid 3.30 0.00 0.00 
Urban markets 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 101.10 100.55 100.00 
 
Farmers plan to source maize, groundnut and finger millet seed mainly from traditional 
sources for the 2009/10 season and this is consistent with sources used for the same crops 
planted in 2008/09 season (Table 60). The high expectation to source maize seed from local 
shops / vendors implies a new anticipation that these sources will open and that the farmers 
will have cash to purchase the maize seed. 
 
Community Overall Assessment of their Seed Security 
The community’s  overall  assessment of their seed security situation is given in Table 61. 
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Table 61: Community assessment of seed security and insecurity 
 
 
Crop 
Approximate 
number of 
households that 
grow the crop 
Proportion of 
households who 
are seed secure 
next season (after 
harvest) 
 
 
Comments 
Finger millet 100% 100% Seed is available in the area 
Sorghum 80% 100% Seed is available in the area 
Groundnuts 100% 75% Most farmers have groundnut seed. Those 
without perform casual work for others and are 
paid in seed (seed-for-work). Aphids decimated 
groundnut crop last season. 
Pearl millet 3 farmers out of 
40 grow the crop 
100%  
Maize 100% 85% Most without seed will do casual work for others 
or get from relatives.  
 
 
Finger millet, groundnuts, maize and, to a large extent sorghum,  are grown by most farmers 
in Bikita. Farmers are seed secure in the small grains – finger millet, sorghum and pearl millet. 
Up to one quarter of the farmers are not seed secure in groundnuts and maize, but they 
indicated that they will secure seeds for planting through purchase, seed swaps, casual work 
and gifts. 
 
 
Key informant insights 
The key informants interviewed were the AGRITEX  District Agricultural Extension Officer, the 
Crops Specialist and the Livestock Specialist of Bikita District. Information of Bikita in general, 
the past three seasons, crop performance, inputs availability, accessibility and preparations 
ante-season were corroborated during community discussions. 
 
Imposed blanket price controls by the GOZ without due consideration for production costs 
negatively affected agriculture – most inputs were in short supply and / or expensive on the 
parallel market and some outlets closed shop. The combined effect of price controls, low 
seed production by seed houses and a poorly performing economy culminated in poor 
agricultural production. A parallel market emerged where maize seed was sold for up to 
double the retail price and payment had to be in US$ – around US$40 - 50 for a 10 kg hybrid 
maize seed pack – which was beyond the reach of most farming households. The 2007/08 
season had poor rainfall and agricultural production was very low – and the food gap was 
filled by food aid. The 2006/07 season was medium; rainfall was higher than normal in the 
first few months but was followed by a prolonged mid summer drought; agricultural 
production was modest. AGRITEX was minimally involved in the planning and management of 
Operation Maguta Program, which was implemented by the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). 
 
 
Market Overview 
The study team interviewed key informants in the formal business sector, agro-dealers in 
Masvingo, agro-dealers and agents who used to participate in seed distributions under the 
CARE program at Nyika Growth Point, and informal market traders at the Mucheke market in 
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Masvingo. The general feeling across all these sectors is that business in seed, fertilizer and 
other agricultural commodities is improving though purchasing power is very low because 
‘the US dollar is difficult to get’ according to some farmers. Maize seed and fertilizers 
(compound D and ammonium nitrate) are available or in the process of being procured. The 
situation is highly dynamic and returning to normal with sales likely to increase, projected to 
reach a spike as the agricultural season (October / November) draws near. Finger millet, 
cowpeas and sugar beans are also available at the Mucheke market, and within communities 
in Bikita, and accessible according to informal traders and community discussions. 
 
Agro-dealers 
The formal market is apparently reviving and business at outlets visited--, Red Star, Farm and 
City, N. Richards, and Masvingo Farm Supplies-- seems to be growing after closure last year 
following price control raids. All key informants interviewed are in agreement that business 
had come to a halt last year, and business may fully recover if current trends continue. 
 
All the outlets were beginning to stock maize seed and fertilizers. Red Star, who does central 
procurement in Harare, did not have maize seed and fertilizer but had made an order that 
could be arriving anytime. The impression given by Red Star was that there were no problems 
procuring seed and fertilizer as long as local management was convinced that the products 
could be sold. 
 
Farm and City had maize seed in 10-kilogram packs and fertilizer available, both compound D 
and ammonium nitrate in 50-kilogram bags. Most buyers are purchasing one item at a time 
because of cash constraints. The outlet felt that most people could not afford the prices, 
hence sales were still low but would improve as the season drew near. N. Richards had 5-
kilogram packs maize seed, from last year’s stocks, available during the previous week and 
which had now been sold out. They were expecting another consignment of seed and felt 
that this too would be quickly sold out. 
 
Masvingo Farm Supplies (MFS) had a compelling story of how agro-dealers were affected by 
the general economic environment, the price controls, bulk purchases of seed aid from seed 
houses for direct distribution and the plight of affected employees. 
 
MFS used to have approximately 150 employees in 14 branches and principally dealt in maize 
seed sale:, at peak annual sales reaching 200 metric tons – which generated adequate 
revenue to see them through to the next season maize sales. As seed aid programs started 
taking root in Zimbabwe, maize sales significantly fell to such an extent that they had to 
diversify and increase other product areas – chemicals, fertilizers, hardware, and plumbing – 
in order to remain afloat and viable. Attempts to purchase seed last year from SeedCo,  their 
main supplier, failed as apparently most seed had been bought out into one of the massive 
direct seed distribution programs. MFS’s lifeline – maize seed sales – had effectively been 
taken away from them, and started a chain of events that led to closure of the business. The 
price control patrols that forced most outlets to trade at below economic levels finally forced 
MFS to retrench all the 150 employees and close down. As the key informant, the Accountant 
of MFS put it ‘it was heartbreaking to see the end of livelihoods for all the 150 employees, 
their families and extended families. Their future was uncertain in an environment where 
most employers were closing their businesses’. MFS has reopened with renewed optimism 
for business in the new environment, but were apprehensive at the probability of another 
massive direct seed distribution (see Box 7).  
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Nyika Growth Point Agro-dealers 
Business is slowly coming back to Nyika as most outlets are opening shop for the coming 
agricultural season. There was high optimism that if conditions remain the same, without 
price controls and patrols, then business would come back to normal again. The more than 5 
general traders and agro-dealers visited at Nyika Growth Point had stocks of 10 kg packs of 
maize seed priced at US$25 – 30 each. They had purchased varying amounts of 10 to 20 such 
packs on a trial basis to see whether the product could sell fast – and farmers were buying 
maize seed at the rate of one bag each. The Masvingo Farmers Supplies outlet had just 
delivered 5 tons of Pioneer 32G53 10 kg packs, and 10 farmers had already bought part of the 
seed. More farmers were expected to buy seeds and fertilizer at the end of the month. Out of 
the 23 - 50kg bags of ammonium nitrate priced at US$38 per bag, only one bag had been 
bought; The 25 - 50kg bags of compound D fertilizer had still not been bought yet. 
 
Two input dealers who participated in the CARE agro-dealer program in the past four  years 
were visited (see also Box 8).  CARE delivered maize seed and list of beneficiaries to the 
dealers, beneficiaries would approach the dealers and claim seed based on their vouchers 
and pay a handling and storage fee to the dealer. Another dealer visited used to procure seed 
and fertilizers from large dealers in Masvingo on credit, which was guaranteed by CARE in 
case of defaults. The Nyika dealer would then pay back for all items procured on terms until 
all the money owed was paid up. This CARE guarantee facility expanded trade activities of 
rural traders while service to farming families was assured. When the project ran out of funds 
in February this year, these graduated small agro-dealers who had been with CARE for more 
than 3 years are now approaching banks for loans. One agro-dealer visited had secured a 
personal business loan of US$1000 from Kingdom Bank, payable at 10 percent interest within 
3 months. She is currently buying maize grain from farmers and cattle for her butchery 
business while operating the general dealer shop. She has managed to open another shop 
outlet for her son to operate at a nearby shopping center. 
Prices  
The price for maize seed ranges from US$22 – 30 for a 10kg pack, fertilizer prices range from 
US$ 32 – 39 for ammonium nitrate and compound D. The prices for seed and fertilizer appear 
on the high side when compared to prices 10 to 20 years back.  There is an imbalance 
between the price of inputs and the price of maize grain (outputs). 
 
 
Special Women’s Issues  
Women are predominantly the farmers in most households in Bikita and make significant 
contributions to household seed and food security. In previous years when the economy 
could employ men in urban centers, women played a crucial role in maintaining production – 
a role that continues to this day. The challenges have slightly shifted in the current dollar 
operated economy. The distinction of women’s crops are somewhat blurred as crop 
profitability changes. Groundnuts are traditionally regarded as a woman’s crop and proceeds 
from sales are for the purchase of kitchen items – which later revert to the woman’s family in 
case and when she dies. 
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General Commentary 
Generally areas planted to maize are decreasing but may have or will reach a threshold, as 
maize is the staple food crop in Zimbabwe. The small grains, finger millet, sorghum and pearl 
millet have taken up significant portions of the areas previously planted to maize (See Table 
62), but a threshold in expansion of these crops will or might have been reached as well. 
Areas allocated to groundnuts appear to have fallen, probably due to the problems 
associated with storage of groundnut seed, but this may need further examination, especially 
as groundnuts are regarded as a woman’s crop. Extension officers may have to look more 
closely at these trends over a longer period, discuss further with farmers and seek ways to 
enhance groundnut production. 
 
Business for agro-dealers is returning to normal, farmers are purchasing maize seed and 
fertilizer and new stocks are expected in  at the end of July-early August, when demand is 
expected to be at peak. Introducing direct seed aid at this point would certainly put a lot of 
the agro-dealers back out of business, as has  happened in the last few years. Sustainable 
options for seed aid -- that may include, but not be limited to vouchers, seed fairs, direct cash 
disbursements – need to be implemented to maintain rural businesses and access to their 
service by farming families. 
 
The current terms of trade for farming households are not within their manageable control – 
they tend to be ‘price takers’ for agricultural inputs and for sales of crop commodities. The 
economics of smallholder production, stress situations that farmers experienced, and coping 
strategies they employed for survival need to be closely studied.  
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Recommendations for Bikita Area 
 
1. Re-stimulate trader agent network in Bikita area 
The trader agent network in Bikita and Masvingo in general is extensive, and benefited 
from training and capacity-building sessions that CARE implemented in the past. These 
networks need to be stimulated by channeling all trader products including seed and 
fertilizers through the agents. In the past, large commodity producers, including seed 
houses, were only allowed to sell their products through wholesalers who would only sell 
to retailers. NGOs could be supported to continue training and capacity building of trader 
agents – but with an added agenda to get a fair price for farmer’s produce, as some 
agents are also buying farm produce, following inability of GMB to buy. 
 
2. Encourage current agro-dealers, based in Masvingo, to re-open branches in rural areas, 
bringing inputs closer to farmers 
Some branches have already opened in out-reach areas like Bikita, but this is at a slow 
pace as agro-dealers are testing the market. Besides being encouraged to re-open 
branches, agro-dealers could also be encouraged to explore ways of becoming buyers of 
grain and other produce from farmers to stimulate competition for such products - which 
may lead to farmers getting a fair price for their produce. Farmers will not get a fair price 
until they are well organized; have basic business skills and access to market information 
so they can negotiate effectively. 
 
3. Provide assistance for farmer inputs through tried and tested and other viable 
alternative means that do not sideline agro-dealers but enhance their service to 
farmers. 
Provide seed and other assistance through alternative means - e.g. seed fairs and voucher 
system, ‘near money’ and other forms of cash transfers – through established and new 
agro-dealers to stimulate trade and services to farmers. The voucher systems have to be 
tailored to suit local conditions. CARE and other NGOs working in Bikita and Masvingo 
have institutional knowledge of communities and conditions for best case systems for 
seed and other assistance. 
 
4. Promote local production and improvement of seed; Promote introduction of new 
varieties, including OPV maize. 
The current local seed production system has proved its resilience during the aggravated 
stress seasons, and all farmers have planted a crop every year, despite alarmist calls that 
there is seed shortage. However, there is need to improve and enhance these seed 
production systems to levels where farmers could produce seed for sale. The Tsholotsho 
farmer field school model, started by AGRITEX, could be followed, especially for crops 
that are ignored by the seed houses. OPVs had a mixed start when introduced through 
the GMB seed aid schemes, but these should be introduced prudently. 
 
5. Introduce more pulses and improve the current production of pulses 
Groundnut seed is difficult to secure for some families, though all families eventually 
plant the groundnuts. Introducing new groundnut varieties will improve options for 
farmers and may increase production.  Special seed production training, related to 
groundnut, might also be of use.  Cultivating cowpeas is on the increase, and new 
varieties could be introduced, evaluated by farmers and cultivated to improve the protein 
food sources. Perennial pulses like pigeon peas could be tried out on an experimental 
basis.   
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Seed System Security, July 2009:  Tsholotsho District 
 
Introduction 
Tsholotsho district is located in western Zimbabwe. The district borders Botswana and lies in 
Agro-ecological region IV- a semi arid region that receives between 400 to 500 mm annual 
rainfall. The rainfall is characterized by mid season droughts that affect crop performance. 
The growing season in Tsholotsho is relatively short, averaging 90 days. Thirty year rainfall 
data shows that the district experiences severe crop failure once every 5-7 years 
 
Predominant soils are the deep structure-less Kalahari sands with intrusions of black vertisols 
in some low lying areas. The sands are inherently poor with low organic matter and thus a 
low water holding capacity.   
 
Like most districts in southern Zimbabwe, Tsholotsho is heavily affected by migration of the 
young (both male and female) to South Africa and Botswana to seek employment. Over 95% 
of households reported having one or more of their children working in South Africa. This has 
negative implications on labor needs for cropping, as only the elderly remain in many 
households.  
 
The migration also means that remittances are very important to the communities in the 
district. According to the farmers who took part in SSSA group discussions, the children remit 
mostly groceries and cash. None in the sample remit agricultural inputs.  
 
Agricultural Overview 
Crops grown 
 Based on data provided by the AGRITEX district office, crops grown include sorghum, pearl 
millet, maize, groundnuts, cowpeas, Bambara nuts, sweet potato and finger millet. Pumpkins 
and melons also play an important role in the diet of the population. Pearl millet, sorghum 
and maize are the most important food crops while groundnuts and cowpeas are the most 
important legumes grown by the farmers in the district. The average land holding in the 
district is 5 hectares.  
Types of varieties grown 
Sampled households grow mostly modern varieties of sorghum, pearl millet and groundnuts. 
Table 63 below shows that, farmers grow more of OPVs in maize than hybrids though the 
difference is not great—and the sample size is modest. 
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 Table 63: Type of the varieties planted by crop among the sampled households, 2008/09, 
 Tsholotsho  
  
Crop  Frequency 
Types of varieties grown 
Local Modern OPV Hybrid 
Maize 18 16.7 0.0 66.7 61.1 
Cowpea 12 75.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 
Groundnut 16 31.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 
Bambara nut 3 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pearl millet 30 43.3 76.7 0.0 0.0 
Sorghum 31 51.6 90.3 0.0 0.0 
 
Farmer assessment of performance of varieties, 2008/09 
Table 64 shows what farmers felt about the varieties that they are growing. Generally, all 
varieties grown by farmers were assessed as having been average to good, except for 
cowpeas, which farmers claimed was a wrongly labeled variety. However, in the 2009/10 
season, the majority of farmers are generally going to re-plant all varieties of crops they have 
been growing. 
 
Table 64. Farmers’ assessment of performance of varieties planted in 2008/09 cropping 
 season , Tsholotsho 
crop 
  
Number of 
responses 
Percentage of farmers evaluating the 
variety performance 
% of farmers  that 
would re sow the 
crop variety 
planted in 
2008/09 Poor Average Good 
Maize 28 21 54 25 81 
Cow peas* 13 46 31 23 77 
Ground nut 29 14 34 52 97 
Bambara nut 4  50 50 100 
Pearl millet 36 19 42 39 86 
Sorghum 44 27 27 45 86 
 
 
Uses of crops grown  
Table 65 below shows that, pearl millet and maize were rated high as food crops, while 
sorghum was rated low by the mixed (men and women) group. Sorghum and maize were 
ranked high as income crops. Groundnuts and cowpeas were ranked high both as food and 
income crops.  However the women group ranked pearl millet as the most important food 
crop, followed by sorghum, maize, groundnuts, cowpeas and Bambara nuts in that order.  
Pearl millet, sorghum, Bambara nuts groundnuts, water melons and sunflower were ranked 
high as income crops.    
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Table 65: Uses of crop grown as rated by community group, Tsholotsho 
Crop Use for food 
(High, Medium, 
Low) 
Use for cash 
(High, Medium, Low) 
Comments 
Pearl millet H M  
Sorghum L H Used for income only 
when sold as brewed 
beer.  
Maize H L Rarely sold 
Groundnuts H H Sold as butter. Also sold 
roasted and salted 
Cowpeas H H Partially cooked and dried 
leaves and grain are sold  
Source: Farmers ward 12: 7/07/09 
 
Farming system trends  
The area under crops will fluctuate in different seasons for various reasons some of which are 
outlined below. 
 
• Magnitude and quantities of aid in the district especially the GOZ’s Inala/Maguta 
program. 
• Quantities of fuel allocated to each district for tillage programs. In Tsholotsho for 
example 40 % of the households do not have cattle. 
• The start of the season, rainfall distribution at the start of the season and the total 
rainfall received. An early start to the season usually results in increased area under 
crops. A dry season will see an increase in the area under small grains the following 
season at the expense of maize. 
• Of late, labor shortage has tended to influence the area households can crop. They 
will plant what they can adequately manage especially weeding. 
  
According to farmers in ward 12, the area under maize, sorghum and groundnuts has been 
steadily increasing. The introduction of seed aid by Government through Inala/Maguta except 
for the past two seasons and the SADC input program were cited as having been the main 
contributing factors to the increase in the area under maize, while the introduction of two 
early maturing varieties of sorghum (Macia, SV IV) and one new variety of groundnuts 
(Nyanda) have been responsible for the increase in the area under these crops. The ward 
enjoys good access to most inputs from government programs as it is near the district centre 
from where such inputs are distributed. 
 
An increase in yields of most crops was also reported by the farmers to have been a result of 
training in crop production mainly in FFS programs that started in the district in the 2003/04 
season. 
  
A shortage of seed was also cited by farmers as having been responsible for the decrease in 
the area under Bambara nuts.  
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In terms of recent negative trends, the community cited a range of issues: he general loss of 
value of the Zimbabwe dollar due to inflation; political instability;, livestock death due to 
drought; increased HIV and AIDS infection; and , seed and fertilizer shortages. Positive trends 
included seed, goats, and food aid from various NGOS. 
 
Varieties gaining and decreasing in area 
New sorghum varieties that have been introduced in the community are Macia, SV II and SV 
IV. New pearl millet varieties are Okashana and PMV 3. These have gained much popularity 
within communities in and outside the district.  IT 18 and CBC1 are the new varieties of that 
have gained entry into the community, while in maize, it has been PAN 413. 
 
Late maturing and low yielding local pearl millet varieties such as Halale and isifumbata are 
gradually loosing popularity with the farmers. For sorghum the variety Tsheta is losing 
popularity with the farmers.  
 
Access to new varieties by the community has been mainly through seed aid rather than  
through extension and research programs (55.3% and 34.8% of farmers receiving new 
varieties, respectively,  through the two channels).  This points to the fact that NGOs are 
better resourced than public development agents like Research and Extension. This is not a 
sustainable option; the reverse would be more preferable. The community revealed that they 
have been receiving seed aid every year in the past five years 
 
Seed sources 
Figure 14a and 4b trace the seed sources for pearl millet. Figure 14a shows current sources. 
Basically, the bulk of pearl millet comes from the local system –retained, accessed through 
gifts or purchased on the local market. Small quantities have come through the GMB. Most 
significant in Tsholotsho has been the importance of FFSs as a source of seed, as they supply 
farmers directly and also sell much of their pearl millet, sorghum, groundnuts and cowpeas 
through aid related seed fairs.  
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Figure 14a Seed sources- Pearl millet 2008/09, Tsholotsho  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
 
                                                               
                                                                            
 
 
 
                                                                               
                                                                                                                     
 
 
                                                                  
Figure 14b traces community assessment of pearl millet sources five years ago. The sources 
are basically the same, with the bulk of the seed coming from local production and small 
amounts coming from NGOs and government. This shows that the pearl millet seed system 
has been a stable one.  
 
Figure 14b Seed sources- Pearl millet in the past five years, Tsholotsho 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
 
                                                               
                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
It is important to note that since the 2002/03 season, seed fairs organized by Plan 
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main channel of seed supplies for farmers in Tsholotsho district. Crops sold at the seed fairs 
have included pearl millet, sorghum, groundnuts, open pollinated maize, cowpeas and 
Bambara nuts. Sixty percent of the pearl millet and sorghum seed that exchanged hands at 
the seed fairs was produced by farmers in the FFSs.  Sources for sorghum seed are virtually 
the same as those of pearl millet. 
 
Figure 15a shows current sources of maize seed as described by the community.  
 
Figure 15a Current sources of seed maize, Tsholotsho 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
Figure 15b shows community assessment of maize seed sources five years ago. In both cases 
the bulk of maize seed came from external sources. 
 
Figure 15b Sources of seed maize five years ago, Tsholotsho 
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time. On some occasions seed houses were invited to bring their seed at the seed fairs. These 
have been the source of hybrid maize sold at the seed fairs. Occasionally some farm 
implements have also been sold at these seed fairs. In the last ten years, agro dealers were 
also a source of hybrid maize. 
 
Seed Sources 2008/09 Season 
Table 66 below, shows that for all the crops grown in the community, own stock and social 
networks contributed most as seed sources during the 2008/09  season. This shows that 
farmers in this community are more self-reliant and rely less on seed aid. For maize, sorghum 
and pearl millet, seed/food aid  a second source, though contributing 15% or less of the total 
seed planted. For groundnuts, seed markets were the second most important source, and a 
significant one. Development interventions also contributed seed, especially for groundnut 
and sorghum.   
 
Table 66:  Sources of seed and their contribution (in percentage) of seed planted in 2008/09 
cropping season, Tsholotsho district  
Sources 
  
Percentage seed from the source 
Maize 
Ground 
nut Cow peas 
Pearl 
millet Sorghum 
Own stocks and social 
networks 83.28 61.36 97.68 91.75 69.24 
Retained 46.71 41.67 39.81 55.93 37.05 
Carry over 7.37 0.00 0.00 5.15 1.30 
Gifts from social networks 29.20 19.69 57.87 30.67 30.89 
Seed markets 1.72 27.66 2.31 3.09 2.27 
Local shops/vendors 0.00 13.28 2.31 0.00 0.00 
Agro-dealers 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Barter trade  1.72 13.28 0.00 1.03 0.00 
Casual labor 0.00 1.10 0.00 2.06 2.27 
Contract growers 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Irrigation scheme 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Development interventions 0.98 10.99 0.00 0.00 12.96 
Community tech 0.00 10.99 0.00 0.00 3.24 
Extension/research  0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.72 
Seed/food aid 14.02 0.00 0.00 5.15 15.54 
Seed aid direct distribution 9.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.54 
Seed vouchers 2.46 0.00 0.00 5.15 0.00 
Food aid 1.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Planned Seed Sources 2009/10 
For the 2009/10 cropping season, the most important sources for groundnuts, sorghum, and 
pearl millet seed will be retained stocks. For sorghum and pearl millet, this source will 
constitute over 50% of their seed requirement.  For maize,  farmers are counting mainly of 
their own stocks and buying from seed markets.  They expect the 2009/10 contribution of aid 
to be about 12% for maize seed, so on expecting only modest help .  They anticipate aid will 
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be insignificant for groundnuts, sorghum and pearl millet seed. For groundnuts, seed markets 
will be the second most important seed source (Table 67). 
 
Table 67. Farmers’ planned seed sources for 2009/2010 cropping season, Tsholotsho district 
  Percent of seed expected from the source by farmers  
Source Maize Groundnuts Sorghum Pearl millet 
Own stocks/social networks 33.37 42.72 61.74 59.88 
Retained 25.14 42.72 53.04 53.1 
Gifts from social networks 8.23 0.00 8.70 6.78 
Seed markets 39.87 32.4 30.23 16.44 
 local shops 15.17 12.02 6.09 0.00 
agro dealers 18.42 3.76 1.96 0.00 
contract growers 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
irrigation scheme 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
barter/purchase with friends 3.14 13.24 20.22 13.22 
Casual labor 3.14 3.38 1.96 3.22 
Development interventions 18.42 5.45 0.00 17.97 
community groups 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.78 
Extension 18.42 5.45 0.00 11.19 
Seed /food aid 12.46 7.89 2.17 3.39 
seed aid direct distribution 7.58 3.76 0.00 0.00 
seed vouchers 0.98 4.13 2.17 3.39 
food aid 3.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Community Overall Assessment of Their Seed Security 
According to farmers in ward 12, all farmers are seed secure in pearl millet and sorghum.  
Table 68 below also shows that 100% of the farmers feel that they can be seed secure in 
maize. Access is the major issue with farmers growing hybrids. 
 
Table 68: Community overall seed security assessment, Tsholotsho 
Crop Proportion of farmers who 
are seed secure next season 
Remarks 
Pearl millet 100 %  
Sorghum 100 %  
Groundnuts 75 % Community indicates that they have enough seed 
to satisfy demand. Those who have do not want to 
sell yet – waiting for prices to firm. Lack of cash 
remains a problem for farmers willing to buy 
Maize 100 %  For hybrids, community indicates willingness to 
buy. 
 
Farmer Field Schools   
In Tsholotsho, Farmer Field Schools (FFS) have a special importance in stabilizing seed 
systems. FFSs started in the 2003/04 season, with farmers learning about integrated soil 
nutrient and water management technologies. On realization that seed security was a 
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problem for most farmers in the district, the FFS program then included seed multiplication in 
the FFS curriculum.  
 
Starting in 2003, seed production has been substantial in each of the six years (Table 69). 
Even in 2005/06, a drought year, the FFSs performed remarkably, producing enough pearl 
millet seed to plant 3500 ha.  
 
Table 69: Seed production by FFS 
Year Number 
of FFS 
Crop  Variety Seed 
produced by 
FFSs 
(t) 
Seed 
produced by 
FFS members 
(t) 
Total 
(t) 
2003/04 6 Pearl millet PMV 3 4.5 10 14.5 
  Ground nut Nyanda 3.2 7 10.9 
  Sorghum Macia 6.8 10.8 17.6 
  Cowpeas IT 18 0.9 3 3.9 
 
2004/05 6 Pearl millet PMV 3 6.1 17 23.1 
  Ground nut Nyanda 2.8 6.9 7.7 
  Sorghum Macia 8 11 19 
  Cowpeas IT 18 1.1 2.1 3.2 
 
2005/06 6 Pearl millet PMV 3 3.6 14 17.6 
  Ground nut Nyanda 2.8 4.8 7.6 
  Sorghum Macia 4 16 20 
  Cowpeas IT 18 1.1 1.9 3 
 
2006/07 13 Pearl millet Okashana 7.1 19 26.1 
  Ground nut Nyanda 6.5 3.9 10.4 
  Sorghum Macia 10.5 18.8 29.3 
  Cowpeas IT 18 2 1 3 
 
2007/08 26 Pearl millet Okashana 5.2 17 22.2 
  Ground nut Nyanda 1.5 8.5 10 
  Sorghum Macia 4 20 24 
  Cowpeas IT 18 0.8 2 2.8 
 
2008/09 46 Pearl millet Okashana 14 70 84 
  Ground nut Nyanda 7 21 28 
  Sorghum Macia 18 17 35 
  Cowpeas IT 18 4 4 8 
Source: AGRITEX- Tsholotsho district office 
 
For the last season, 2008/09, the scale of FFS seed production has been  particularly 
remarkable. Forty- six FFSs and individual farmers in the FFSs produced 84 tons of Okashana 
(enough to plant 16 800 ha of pearl millet), 28 tons Nyanda/Akwa (groundnuts), 35 tons 
Macia (sorghum), 8 tons IT 18 (cowpeas). Another FFS, Khulumausenza produced 0.5 t of 
CBC1- a new cowpea variety that is currently being purchased by Agri-seed. 
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ICRISAT, particularly SMIP, worked hard with AGRITEX in the introduction and promotion of 
new varieties of pearl millet and sorghum, during on farm trials and later using FFSs. Other 
NGOS such as COMMUTECH, Plan International, ORAP and CRS continued this work in the 
community working mainly with FFSs. 
 
FFS members are now content with their production potential, but are rather concerned with 
finding marketing outlets for their produce. The entire groundnut crop is sold within the 
district.  Discussions with one FFS suggested that ¼ of their seed is sold within the community 
and ¾ goes outside, purchased, among others, by seed houses and at one time the Grain 
Marketing Board.  Agri-seeds, a seed house has already started buying pearl millet and 
cowpeas. 
 
Seed Management by Seed Producers  
Farmers in Farmer Field Schools have novel ways of managing their seed.  For sorghum and 
pearl millet the farmers use isolations in either distance or time of planting to ensure purity 
of their seed. In terms of distance, the sorghum or pearl millet crop meant for seed is planted 
at least 300 m away from any other crop of the same family. When time of planting, also 
called staggered planting, is used, the crop meant for seed is planted in such a way that it 
does not flower when any crop of the same family nearby is in flower. For groundnuts, FFS 
farmers use distance and a barrier crop. Use of a barrier crop is when another crop, for 
example sorghum, is planted between two varieties of groundnuts.  
 
For Pearl millet and sorghum, rouging of off- types is done up to harvesting. Some seed 
production groups select panicles meant for seed before harvesting: these are kept and 
threshed separately. Most farmers use very fine wood ash to deter insect pests from 
damaging the seed. Groundnuts are kept unshelled until needed either for sale or planting. 
 
 
Seed Market Overview 
 
Formal Markets 
 
Formal markets used to operate at the district center,  in the form of agro-dealers and shops 
that sold seed eight to ten years ago. The bulk of these sold hybrid maize. The price of the 
seed in these outlets was also very high. With the increased frequency of government input 
programs and seed aid, these were gradually pushed out of the seed business.  
 
Some farmers from the district also purchase their inputs from Bulawayo, some 112 km  
away.  In Bulawayo, three out of nine major agro-dealers visited (Bulawayo Seed Centre, 
Farm and City and Meikles Hard Ware) had hybrid maize seed already in stock, in July 2009.  
 
 ORAP.  This agro dealer is in the process of winding up operations and converting the agro-
dealer shop into a food shop. It cited viability problems as the reason for converting. The 
agro-dealer normal distributes 60-90 tons of hybrid seed maize.  They used to access seed 
from Pannar, Pioneer and Seedco, the largest seed houses. Last season (2008/9), it was 
difficult to access seed and they distributed only 30 tons. Most of the seed produced by seed 
houses was reportedly bought by the government. ORAP has worked with ENDA Zimbabwe 
and ICRISAT to multiply pearl millet seed (PMV1 – 3) and groundnuts (Natal Common) at their 
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farm in Figtree.  They also sell groundnuts and Bambara nuts on behalf of small holder 
farmers.  Currently, they have in stock 7 tons of groundnuts and 3 tons of Bambara nuts for 
farmers in Nkayi District.  They did not have any maize seed in stock at the time of the 
assessment. 
 
National Tested Seeds.  The seed house used to sell seed from Pannar, Seedco and Pioneer.  
The issue of cash upfront consignment is posing problems to the seed house. At present, NTS 
has in stock 2 tons of compound D and 3 tons of Ammonium Nitrate. A 10Kg bag of compound 
D and Ammonium Nitrate sells for US$8.50. The last five years have been the most difficult, 
mainly due to currency devaluations and price controls which saw the company operating at a 
loss. June 2009 has been their first month to break even.  Their major clients have been rural 
farmers, whom they feel have limited access to cash for input purchases at the moment. 
 
Mica Hardware.  They are general a departmental shop of the Thomas Meikles group of 
companies, focusing mainly on hardware, but who also sell hybrid maize seed from seed 
houses, vegetable seed and fertilizer. Last year, they said it was difficult to access both seed 
and fertilizer.  Actually they last sold fertilizer three years ago, yet they normally sold 30-60 
tons per season before that. Currently they have received 2 tons of seed maize (SC513) from 
Harare and are selling this at US$25/10Kg. 
 
Farm and City: The agro-dealer has the following in stock;  
• 10 x 20 000 kernel packs of hybrid maize  
• 40x50 000 kernel packs hybrid maize 
• 10 tons Pannar maize seed 
• 20 tons compound D 
• They also have sugar beans in 500g packs, which can be potential seed.  
 
They are currently trying to get more maize and sorghum seed from SeedCo. 
 
C. Gauche: A hardware shop that also sells grain, some of which can be potential seed. 
Currently, they have cowpeas, Bambara nuts, soybeans, sugar beans, shelled groundnuts, 
wheat, sorghum, sunflower and pearl millet. Customers buy the above products for food, 
chicken feed and seed. They indicated no shortage of product supply. Produce is brought by 
farmers from rural areas. Potential seed is not cleaned or graded and is sold from 50 liter open 
bins. 
 
Bulawayo Seed Centre: The owner is an agent of SeedCo, Pioneer, Pannar, Windmill and 
Zimbabwe Fertilizer Company. The first three sell seed, while the other two sell fertilizers. The 
agro-dealer currently received 30 tons of hybrid seed from each of the three seed houses, 
totaling 90 tons. Sales of both seed and fertilizer have been good, so far. The proprietor thinks 
giving out free seed is a challenge to the business and suggested that all farmers should be 
asked to pay at least part of the price of the seed they receive, so that they value it and 
become accustomed to buying. 
 
Other important agro-dealers include Red Star, Jaggers and Fortwell, strategically situated at 
the main bus terminus where rural buses drop and load farmers. They haven’t sold seed for 
the past 5-6 years due to government policy controlling sale of seed.  Fortwell is currently 
selling ox-drawn plows at a fast rate, evidence that farmers are investing in agriculture. The 
three agro-dealers did not even know that government input programs had since stopped. 
They were going to request their head offices in Harare to order seed for their shops. 
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Informal markets  
 
Local seed fairs are the main seed outlet for both FFS and individual farmers producing seed. 
Seed houses have also been a major seed outlet for pearl millet, sorghum and cow pea seed. 
In fact, Agri-seed had already bought twenty –two tons of pearl millet from the 2008/09 
harvest. Farmers were however not happy with the $0.40/kg being offered as they felt that 
was the price for grain and yet they were selling seed. 
 
The other important informal market for Tsholotsho farmers is in Bulawayo at the main rural 
bus terminus. The market sells both grain and potential seed of pearl millet, sorghum, 
groundnuts, Bambara nuts, sugar beans and cow peas. Some of the grain and potential seed 
sold in this market is from outside Matabeleland North province. Some sellers grade their 
grain when they see it as potential seed. 
 
Prices of most potential seed crops double in September to October mainly due to increased 
farmer demand and diminished volumes. Towards the planting season, farmers will be 
holding fewer stocks compared to immediately after harvesting--- and yet it is the time that 
farmers will be looking for seed to plant: thus, there is an increase in demand. 
 
Prices 
Informal markets 
 Prices in the community and seed fairs vary according to the time of the year, as determined 
by supply and demand. Soon after harvest prices are low and they then go up towards seed 
fairs and planting time. A few farmers had started selling seed to other farmers and to a seed 
company- Agri –seeds as of the July assessment period.  Sorghum and pearl millet are selling 
for $0.40/kg and cow pea is being traded at $1.09/kg. The price of groundnuts is yet to be 
decided as farmers are not sure about pricing using the new currencies –US$ and ZAR (Rand). 
Prices of most crops generally double towards the planting season. Farmers, for example 
estimate that cowpeas will likely sell for $0.80/kg towards planting time.  Table 70 shows 
prices that were obtained at the Bulawayo market at the time of assessment. 
 
Table 70: Commodity prices at the informal market, Bulaweyo,  July 2009 
Crop Pack size (1 kg) Price (US$) 
Pearl millet 1 $0.20 
Sorghum 1 $0.20 
Groundnuts 1 $0.80 
Cow peas 1 $0.40 
Bambara nuts 1 $0.40 
Sugar beans 1 $0.80 
Finger millet 1 $2.00 
 
 
Formal markets: Table 71 below shows prices of fertilizers and seed in the Bulawayo formal 
markets . 
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      Table 71:  Commodity prices on the formal market, Bulaweyo, July 2009  
Item Company Pack size Price (US$) 
Seed maize Pioneer 20 000 kernels 10 kg) 25 
 Seed Co 25 kg 50 
  10 kg 20 
  5 kg 10 
Compound D Windmill 50 kg 39 
 Windmill and ZFC 50 kg 35 
Ammonium Nitrate Windmill and ZFC 50 kg 35-38 
Sources: Bulawayo Seed centre and Farm and City 
 
Special women’s  issues 
The majority of farmers in the ward are women. This is mainly due to migration of the men to 
South Africa and Botswana in search of employment. Participants estimated that 50% of the 
households in the wards are female- headed, composed of mothers who never married, 
widowed, divorced, deserted or women whose husbands are working outside the country. 
Female farmers are not in their own right allocated land for farming by traditional leaders. 
Divorced or widowed women who return to their original homes are either allocated land by 
their families or work family fields. Unmarried mothers may use land allocated to their sons, 
but they are a source of discord in the community as they are often considered snatchers of 
married men. 
Women’s crops 
 Generally such crops as groundnuts, cowpeas, Bambara nuts, sweet potatoes, water melons, 
and pumpkins are considered women crops, although some couples do not distinguish crops 
by gender and have equal decision-making , access and control over all crops. Females 
generally have more decision making powers over ‘women’s crops’.  
 
Conflict over choice of crops and land allocation to different crops is  sometimes marked 
between couples where the wife only attends agricultural training sessions, including FFSs, 
and therefore  has more knowledge in crop production. Some families also have separate 
granaries, because wives fear that their husbands may use their hard earned grain to support 
‘small houses’ - illicit affairs. 
 
General Commentary 
General Seed security:    Seed security, overall, has been assessed as good – both 
qualitatively by the community- and through quantitative questionnaires. Sorghum and pearl 
millet seed are abundant in the system. A good number of farmers use OPVs and have even 
recycled hybrids. In community discussions, farmers using hybrids have indicated they will 
buy seed this season. 
 
Tsholotsho has been an unusual site for seed multiplication innovations. The scale and spread 
of seed multiplication is truly impressive.   Partly because of farmer field schools, new 
varieties of sorghum, pearl millet, groundnuts and cowpeas have moved fairly quickly within 
the community. The presence of ICRISAT, SMIP, Plan International, COMMUTECH and ORAP 
in the district has also helped with variety introduction and dissemination particularly of pearl 
millet and sorghum.  
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Immediate seed concerns: There is a general concern about groundnuts seed security as the 
crop is difficult to multiply in terms of labor and yield levels. Also, the greatest concern of 
farmer seed producers is in marketing of their seed and developing market outlets—a 
strategy which they prefer in preference to receiving seed aid from outside.  In fact, farmers 
prefer the reverse to outside aid--- they have asked that outsiders come to buy seed from the 
community in Tsholotsho. 
   
Recommendations: Tsholotsho 
 
1. Build capacity of farmer seed producers particularly to market seed 
Farmers have made seed security possible in the district by multiply seed of important 
crops (sorghum, pearl millet, groundnuts and cowpeas) and in impressive quantities. 
These farmers have limited experience interfacing with big seed companies and lack 
general marketing skills. There is need to capacitate the farmers in these areas. 
 
2. Limit direct seed aid 
  In order to protect, stabilize and enhance the seed multiplication efforts in the district 
there will be need to limit seed aid especially of those crops in which the district is seed 
secure.   
 
3. Support, do not undermine agro-dealers 
Agro-dealers  play a crucial and sustainable role in affording farmers access to preferred 
inputs, on time and in appropriate packages. They need to be encouraged to get back 
into the input business. Seed vouchers through agro-dealers or availing loan facilities to 
them should be considered. 
 
4. Expand Farmer Field Schools 
 Farmer field schools have played a crucial role in improving crop production, and 
particularly the introduction of new varieties of pearl millet, sorghum, groundnuts and 
cowpeas. The role of field schools in seed multiplication by farmers in Tsholotsho has no 
parallel anywhere in the country.  Farmer field schools need to be linked directly to new 
variety innovations. Channels accessing new varieties might be formalized. 
 
5. Scale up production of foundation seed 
  Production of foundation seed of non-maize crops needs to be scaled up, particularly for 
sorghum, pearl millet and groundnuts. 
 
6. Promote open pollinated varieties (OPVs) 
Open pollinated varieties should be promoted to ensure seed security. This is key, 
especially in very marginal areas, and when targeting vulnerable groups.  
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Seed System Security, July 2009:  Beitbridge District 
 
Introduction 
Beitbridge district lies in Agro-ecological region V- a semi arid region that receives between 
300 and 400 mm rainfall per annum. The rainfall is characterized by mid season dry spells and 
droughts that severely affect crop performance. Generally, the cropping season runs from 
October to April, but the growing season- period, when rainfall is enough for normal 
physiological functions of crops, is less than 90 days. 
Beitbridge is a border district. Both rural and urban livelihoods are to some extent influenced 
by its proximity to a vibrant South African economy. The district is thus heavily affected by 
migration of the younger generation in search of employment in South Africa. This has 
affected crop production as labor becomes scarce.  
 
Agricultural overview 
Crops grown 
Based on crop data provided by the AGRITEX district office for the past six seasons (2003/04 
to 20008/09), sorghum had the highest area dedicated to it followed by pearl millet.  From 
the 2005/06 season maize overtook pearl millet to become the second most important crop 
to sorghum. Ironically maize has been written off on four out of the six seasons  (with very 
low production results).  Government input programs could be responsible for the increase in 
the area under maize. 
 
Other crops grown include groundnuts, cowpeas cotton and, in the past two seasons, 
Bambara nuts. Yield data provided by AGRITEX shows that all crops grown in the district are 
very sensitive to low rainfall and mid season dry spells. This is more pronounced in maize and 
cowpeas which have failed in four and two seasons respectively, in the last six years. This 
might also mean that the varieties grown are not adapted to the prevailing conditions in the 
district. 
 
Types of varieties grown 
 Sampled households grow mostly maize hybrids. Local varieties are planted by 29.6% of 
households. For cowpeas, groundnuts, sorghum and pearl millet, local varieties top the list of 
the types of varieties grown (Table 72). 
Table 72 Type of the varieties planted by crop among the sampled households in Beitbridge 
  
Crop  Frequency 
type of varieties grown 
Local Modern OPV Hybrid 
Maize 27 29.6 3.7 14.8 51.9 
Cowpea 12 91.7 8.3 - - 
Groundnut 24 91.7 8.3 - - 
Pearl millet 25 84.0 16.0 - - 
sorghum 29 65.5 34.5 - - 
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Farmer assessment of performance of varieties, 2008/09 
Table 73 below shows that farmers are happy with most varieties that they are growing. 
Generally, all varieties grown were assessed by farmers as having been average to good, 
except for cowpeas, which farmers claimed was a wrongly labeled variety. In the 2009/10 
season, the majority of farmers are going to re-plant most of the varieties of crops they have 
been growing. 
 
Table 73.  Farmers’ assessment of performance of varieties planted in 2008/09 cropping 
 season, Beitbridge  
 Crop 
Percentage of farmers evaluating the 
variety performance 
% of farmers  that 
would re sow the crop 
variety planted in 
2008/09 Poor Average Good 
Maize 37.0 37.0 25.9 74.1 
cow pea 8.3 8.3 83.3 100.0 
Gnut 6.9 48.3 44.8 100.0 
pearl millet 4.0 48.0 48.0 84.0 
Sorghum 6.9 31.0 62.1 93.1 
 
Uses of crops grown 
 Sorghum, an important food crop, is also considered a cash crop when used to brew 
traditional beer. Table74 below shows major uses of the crops grown by farmers in ward 10. 
 
Table 74: Uses of crop grown, Beitbridge 
Crop Use for food 
(High, Medium, 
Low) 
Use for cash 
(High, Medium, Low)  
Comments 
Pearl millet H L Used for income only 
when sold as brewed 
beer.  
Sorghum H M Used for income only 
when sold as brewed 
beer.  
Maize H L Rarely sold 
Groundnuts H L Used as peanut butter 
and relish 
Source: Farmers ward 10: 13/07/09 
 
The women, unlike the mixed group, put maize in the medium category as a food crop and it 
is one crop that would not be planted under stress conditions.   
 
Farming system trends 
Crop trends 
The six year crop data provided by AGRITEX depicts a general decline in the area dedicated to 
maize and pearl millet, except for the 2008/9 season when all crops registered  phenomenal 
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area increases --due to an early start to the season, good rainfall distribution and a longer 
than normal rainy season.  In contrast, there is a definite increase in the area under 
groundnuts. The area under cowpeas also shows an upward trend (Table 75).  
  
Table 75: Cropping trends, Beitbridge district 
Crop Maize Sorghum Pearl millet Groundnuts Cowpeas 
Area 
(ha) 
Yields 
(t/ha) 
Area 
(ha) 
Yields 
(t/ha) 
Area 
(ha) 
Yields 
(t/ha) 
Area 
(ha) 
Yields 
(t/ha) 
Area 
(ha) 
Yield 
(t/ha) 
2003/04 4476 0.1 6787 0.8 6012 0.5 20 0.3 10 0.7 
2004/05 1300 0.0 7100 0.06 5212 0.001 0 0 100 0.0 
2005/06 2469 0.0 2350 0.1 1280 0.01 253 0.03 162 0.002 
2006/07 3753 0.0 3871 0.1 2448 0.0 423 0.0 75 0.0 
2007/08 1954 0.0 5446 0.03 1970 0.06 337 0.015 135 0.01 
2008/09 4995 0.4 10414 0.38 4855 0.28 907 0.22 580 0.2 
Source: AGRITEX Beitbridge district 
 
Farmers in ward 10 put pearl millet as the most important in terms of area dedicated to it, 
followed by sorghum, then maize and groundnuts.  Water melons, pumpkins and sweet 
potatoes were  also included by the women’s focus  group as being important: such crops are  
important as they mature first and are eaten during the growing season.  
 
There are several reasons advanced by AGRITEX for the fluctuation in the area planted to 
different crops in different years. In the 2003/04, season the increase in the area under maize 
was a result of a GOZ input assistance program following the 2003/04 drought. A total of 269 
tones of seed maize were distributed to farmers in the district. The sudden drop in the area 
under maize the following season was attributed to the late start of the season. In 2008/09, 
the area under all crops significantly increased, due to good rains and improved seed 
availability from a carry over from Inala/Maguta, the Champion farmer program and the 
SADC input program. When rains are good - a rare phenomenon in Beitbridge- farmers just go 
on planting, even using grain bought from GMB for food.   
 
According to farmers in ward 10, the area under pearl millet has increased while that of 
sorghum has decreased. They advance tolerance of pearl millet to striga, that has caused 
havoc to sorghum ,as the major reason. The area under maize which is used as a back up crop 
has remained unchanged. 
Livestock trends 
 Data provided by the Department of Veterinary Services shows an upward trend for all 
classes of livestock, although in some cases numbers fluctuate depending on the time the 
statistics were taken. Ownership patterns of cattle and goats, the most important livestock 
classes in this very arid environment ,show that 43.5% have no cattle but have goats (Table 
76).  Livestock is the major source of income for farmers in this district.  
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Table 76: Cattle and goat ownership, Beitbridge district 
Livestock holding category Ownership (% of farmers) 
0 cattle  less than 8 goats 24.3 
0 cattle more than 9 goats 19.2 
1-2 cattle 12.3 
3-7 cattle 24.2 
More than 8 cattle 20.0 
 Source: ICRISAT. (2007) Goat production and marketing: Baseline information for Semi arid Zimbabwe, 
Matopo Research Station Bulawayo Zimbabwe 
 
 Other trends 
 Farmers noted improved yields in the 2000/01 and 2005/06 season as some of the positive 
trends in the last 5-10 years (Table 77).  In terms of negative trends, there was a shortage of 
seed in the 2003/04 season when pearl millet and sorghum provided by World Vision in the 
2002/03 season did not head.  
 
Table 77.   Positive and negative trends in the past five to ten years, community 
 assessment,  Betbridge sample 
Positive Negative 
• High yields of all crops including maize in 
the 2000/01 and 2005/06 seasons owing 
to good rains. 
• Floods in the 2000/01 season 
•  Increased maize, sorghum and pearl 
millet seed aid in 2004/05 
• High cattle mortality due to drought in 
the 2002/03 season  
 • Shortage of sorghum and pearl millet 
seed in the 2003/04 season owing to 
fodder seed varieties provided by WV 
the previous season 
 • High incidences of crop damage by 
armored cricket 
 • High bird populations damaging crops in 
the 2008/09 season 
 • Increased infestations of striga affecting 
sorghum and pearl millet 
 
Varieties gaining and decreasing in area 
A new open pollinated maize variety called ‘Mozambique’ is gaining popularity in the 
community. A Pioneer maize variety whose name the farmers couldn’t remember and Super 
dwarf, are varieties that are also gaining popularity in the community.  Macia and SV II are 
sorghum varieties that have also made inroads into the community’s seed system. 
  
A late maturing and low yielding local sorghum variety, known as ‘Ndende’, is almost 
disappearing from the community’s seed system.  
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Seed sources 
   
The district as a whole received huge quantities of seed and fertilizer through the SADC Input 
Program that were distributed through the GMB network in the 2008/09 season. 
Unfortunately the seed came late in January and some of it could not be planted as 
distribution continued even well after the planting period. The district received the following 
inputs through this facility: 
 
Maize    37.05 t 
Sorghum   33.75 t 
Groundnuts   33.38 t 
Sugar beans   7.725 t 
Cowpeas   1 t 
Compound D   30.95 t 
Omnia (top dressing)  10 t 
 
Source: AGRITEX. June 2009. SADC inputs distribution status report   
 
 
In ward 10, local seed systems were the most important sources from which farmers 
obtained their seed especially for pearl millet  (figure 16a) and groundnuts seed in the 
2008/09 season (Figure 16a). However in the last five seasons, World Vision provided seed of 
pearl millet (Figure 16b). Some farmers also bought their seed from a neighboring district.  
 
The women’s  group remembered community seed multiplication efforts sponsored by World 
Vision in the 2006/ 07 season, which involved multiplication of sorghum (variety, Macia), 
maize  (variety, Kalahari Early Pearl,  KEP) and groundnuts (variety, Nyanda). 
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Figure 16a. Sources of pearl millet seed during the 2008/09 season, Beitbridge 
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Figure 16b: Sources of pearl millet seed 5 years ago, Beitbridge       
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Besides using their own retained sorghum seed, farmers also used seed aid from the 
Lutheran Development Services (LDS) and government programs in the 2008/09 season. 
.  
Figure 17a: Sorghum seed sources in the 2008/09 season 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         
 
 
 
In the past 5 years, World Vision also provided sorghum seed aid. The local sorghum seed 
system was then, and remains,  still the most important source for sorghum seed (Figure 
17b). 
 
Figure 17b: Sorghum seed sources in the past five years 
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Groundnuts seed is the only commodity farmers do not give as gifts,  but rather  sell to each 
other. Farmers buy groundnuts at monthly cattle sales, at the Beitbridge informal markets 
and markets outside the district. Own retained seed and barter trade are the two other 
sources of groundnut seed. Groundnuts will also exchange with other commodities in the 
following ratios: 
 
Groundnuts/Bambara    1:1  
Groundnut/Cereals    1: 2  
Groundnut/chicken    5 liters: 1 chicken 
Groundnut to goat    50 kg: 1 goat 
 
 Groundnuts will be unshelled if exchanged with livestock. 
 
For maize, seed houses, GOZ input programs and World Vision have been the main sources of 
seed in the past five seasons. 
Seed sources 2008/09 
Table 79, below, shows that in the 2008/09 season, own stocks and social networks were the 
most important seed sources for pearl millet and sorghum. This shows that farmers in this 
community are more self-reliant and rely less on seed aid for these two most important 
crops. 
 
For maize and groundnuts, seed markets were the most important seed sources.   
Development interventions did not make any contributions as seed sources 
Table 79:  Sources of seed and their contribution (in percentage) of seed planted in 2008/09 
 cropping season, Beitbridge 
Source 
  
percentage seed from the source 
  
Maize Ground nut pearl millet Sorghum 
Own stocks and social 
networks 26.26 32.73 81.90 89.02 
Retained 16.39 21.47 51.64 74.73 
Carry over 2.41 0.00 11.23 0.00 
Gift from social networks 7.47 11.26 19.03 14.29 
Seed markets 67.7 67.27 10.30 0.00 
Local shops/vendors 19.76 64.94 7.18 0.00 
Agro-dealers 27.71 0.00 3.12 0.00 
Barter trade  6.02 2.32 0.00 0.00 
Casual labor 8.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Contract growers 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Irrigation scheme 5.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Development interventions 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Community tech 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Extension/research  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Seed/food aid 6.02 0.00 7.80 10.99 
Seed aid direct distribution 0.00 0.00 7.80 10.99 
Seed vouchers 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Food aid 6.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Planned Seed Sources 2009/10 
 For the 2009/10 cropping season, the most important sources for groundnuts, sorghum, and 
pearl millet seed will be retained stocks and gifts from social networks, although seed 
markets are an equally important source for groundnuts (Table 80). For sorghum and pearl 
millet, this source will constitute over 75% of their seed requirements.  For maize, the most 
important source will be seed markets.  Farmers project that  seed aid/food aid’s contribution 
will be insignificant.  
 
Table 80. Farmers’ planned seed sources for 2009/2010 cropping season, Beitbridge  
 
Source 
Percent of seed expected from the source by farmers  
Maize Groundnut Pearl millet Sorghum 
Retained and gifts from 
social networks 24.96 47.96 78.49 85.36 
Retained 19.72 44.74 73.15 81.82 
Gifts from social networks 5.24 3.22 6.34 3.54 
Seed markets 65.86 42.84 18.79 13.39 
 local shops 26.58 23.83 14.09 10.86 
agro dealers 22.03 7.31 0.00 2.53 
contract growers 4.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 
irrigation scheme 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
barter/purchase with 
friends 12.63 11.70 0.00 0.00 
Urban markets 0.00 0.00 4.70 0.00 
Development 
interventions 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
community groups 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Extension 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Seed/food aid 11.56 2.92 0.00 1.26 
seed aid direct distribution 11.56 2.92 0.00 1.26 
seed vouchers 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
food aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 
Community Overall Assessment of their Seed Security 
 
Table 81 below, shows that the sampled  community  in Beitbridge assessed itself as seed 
secure in all the major crops grown (pearl millet, sorghum, maize and groundnuts).   
However, farmers indicated that they need access new varieties, especially for the crops for 
which they retain seed--- and made a plea for research Institutions such as Matopo Research 
Institute to give provide them directly, or give them  access to the varieties they require.  
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Table 81: Community overall seed security assessment, Beitbridge 
 
Crop Proportion of farmers who 
indicated that they will be 
seed secure next season 
Remarks 
Pearl millet 99-100 % Normally keep own home 
saved seed 
Sorghum 100 % Home saved seed and from 
NGOs and government 
programs 
Groundnuts 90 % Own saved seed 
Maize 100 % Normally use external seed 
sources 
 
 
 
Seed management by farmers  
 
For all crops, farmers manage grain meant for seed (potential seed) differently from grain. 
Larger and un-diseased (smut free) heads of pearl millet and sorghum are selected soon after 
harvesting. They are then threshed and ashes of goat manure are mixed with the seed. The 
container in which the seed is stored is covered with thick mud and stored in most cases 
under the bed or in the granary.  For maize, the two ends of the cobs are shelled off and the 
mid section separately shelled and stored in the same way for seed. Groundnuts are kept in 
shells until when needed for planting.  Just before planting farmers select large unbroken 
seed that is free from diseases. 
  
Seed Market Overview 
Formal Markets 
 
Red Star, Bambazonke and M and R wholesalers are the main agro-dealers that used to sell 
seed in the district.  
 
Bambazonke: This wholesale shop buys its stock from South Africa and as far afield as 
Johannesburg.  Besides their own retail shops, the wholesaler also supplies other retail shops. 
In the 2008/09 season they sold 5 tons of PAN 413, an early-to-medium hybrid maize variety. 
The agro-dealer bought seed at between R35.00 and R40.00/10 kg and sold it at R100 to start 
with and reduced the price to R50.00 towards the planting period as seed supplies improved 
in the district. Due to cash constraints, the wholesaler starts stocking seed in October to 
avoid tying cash to a commodity that might not sell quick enough-- if ordered too early. The 
wholesaler plans to order 30 tons of seed maize in the 2009/10 season.  
 
Red Star: The wholesaler last stocked seed in the 2006/07 season. In that year it sold 2 tons 
of seed maize.  A seed house, Pannar has made enquiries already and the wholesale will be 
making a decision as soon as Pannar gives them the prices. 
 
M & R: In the 2008/09 season, the wholesaler sold 7tons of hybrid maize. They brought most 
of their seed from South Africa. They have never sold fertilizer. In the 2009/10 season, the 
wholesaler hopes to sell 7 tons of hybrid seed maize. 
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Informal markets  
The major informal market is situated at Dulibadzimu rural bus terminus. Bambara nuts, 
cowpeas, pearl millet and groundnuts are the main crops sold on the market. The first three 
can be termed potential seed material while the groundnut is of very poor quality and  not 
suitable for planting. The bulk of the grain comes from outside Beitbridge. Most of the 
Bambara nut crop is sold across the border in South Africa.  
 
Prices  
Informal markets 
 
Prices at the Dulibadzimu market fluctuate according to supply and demand. Towards the 
planting season, when supply is low and demand is high,  prices almost double or treble.   
 
Table 82: Commodity prices at Dulibadzimu informal market 
Crop Price (US$/kg) 
Pearl millet 0.33 
Bambara nuts 0.55    
Groundnuts 0.42 
Cowpeas 0.35 
 
Special women’s issues 
 
Women’s crops are food security-linked and also empower them to access the petty cash 
they may require for household needs. Generally, such crops as groundnuts, cowpeas, 
Bambara nuts, water melons, pumpkins and sweet potatoes are classified women crops 
because: they are normally managed by women; they are used to address the girl child 
needs; they are considered minor crops and used for immediate food security and relish. 
  
 
Other Key Informant Insights  
 
AGRITEX: According to the DAEO, seed aid encourages a dependency syndrome in farmers. 
Wheat, for example, dropped from 300-400 ha per year to only 165 ha in the 2008/09 season 
because government did not provide free inputs. His office feels the best and most 
sustainable seed system is to revive the seed markets and to also hold seed fairs where even 
seed houses can bring their seed and sell to farmers. AGRITEX is in fact trying to organize the 
first seed fair in the district for the 2008/09 season.   
 
Farmers in the border town also bought seed maize from South Africa, despite the fact that 
seed maize varieties sold in the nearest towns are long season and are grown under 
irrigation. 
 
The office feels that the district is seed secure in pearl millet, sorghum and OPV maize seed.  
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Red Star: This  agro-dealer  felt that the advent of seed aid from Government and donors was 
responsible for the collapse of their seed business.   
 
Other comments 
 
‘Beggers are not choosers’ quipped one farmer during a discussion with the women’s group 
in Beitbridge apparently referring to the quantity of seed a farmer receives from seed aid.  
 
‘Bring Matopo research station here in Beitbridge so that we farmers can have new drought 
tolerant varieties,’  farmers remarked a group discussion meeting. 
 
 
 
Recommendations: Beitbridge 
 
1. Promote an integrated crop production approach 
Beitbridge is a very marginal district and crop production requires that modern crop 
production technologies be seriously considered. This calls for an integrated crop 
production strategy. Integrated soil nutrient and water management technologies should 
be promoted alongside a rigorous promotion of new modern varieties.  
 
2. Support  community seed multiplication programs 
 Community seed multiplication of modern and new varieties of Pearl millet, sorghum, 
 open pollinated maize and groundnuts should be promoted in the district. Irrigation 
 schemes scattered across the district could be used, provided the farmers are prepared 
 to pay a premium price for seed grown under irrigation. 
 
3. Revive Agro-dealers 
In order to avoid a situation where farmers plant inappropriate varieties even in irrigation 
schemes, there is need to support local agro-dealers and shops to re-engage in the input 
business.  Seed vouchers through agro-dealers or availing loan facilities to them should 
be considered. 
 
4. Limit direct seed aid distributions 
 In order to protect, stabilize and enhance efforts by agro-dealers to re-engage in the 
agricultural input business, there is need to limit direct seed aid and improve access to 
inputs by spreading agro-dealer shops far and wide.  
 
5. Capacitate extension staff 
The apprenticeship training program of extension staff is abridged and produces semi 
qualified extension workers. The surveys which were conducted by AGRITEX field staff as 
enumerators confirmed this. There is therefore a need to put in place a program to 
resuscitate the once popular and efficient in-service training of extension workers in 
AGRITEX.  
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VIII: OVERALL RECOMMENDATIONS: ACROSS SITES  
The opportunity for the SSSA team to conduct assessments across diverse and fairly 
representative regions has provided the field teams a useful perspective on seed security in 
Zimbabwe, more generally.   While site-specific recommendations have been included in each 
site report (chapter VII), below, we put forward a set of recommendations which are 
applicable across all sites.  These include recommendations related to seed security and 
emergency response, as well as recommendations specific to formal and informal seed sector 
strengthening and to the process of seed security assessment per se. 
 
 
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON SEED SECURITY AND 
 EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
 
1. The seed security problems encountered in all assessment sites were not short-term  
ones.   
 
Recommendation:  Any response in the short term should be linked to longer-term 
recovery and development, including exploring potential for agro-business support.  
 
 In terms of strengthening seed systems, immediate emergency responses might be 
 usefully designed to address any or all of the following: 
• Re-stimulate the agro-dealer sector, and encourage it to become  
  more small farmer-oriented 
• Help farmer seed production groups market surplus seed stocks 
• Link farmers to already ‘proven’ variety innovations 
• Put special emphasis on ‘problem crops’- maize and groundnuts 
 
(see specific recommendations below in sections on Formal Sector Seed and 
Informal Sector Seed, respectively) 
 
2. Availability of seed per se, was not identified as the major problem in any of the 
assessed sites, including availability of maize seed. Agro-dealers and farmers were 
optimistic about the supplies currently available, as well as supplies potentially 
available through re-ordering stocks.   Rather access to seed, in particular maize, was 
a compelling issue in all zones, due to : a) high prices of maize seed ; b) decreasing 
farmer purchasing power , partly associated with low compensation  for produce 
sold; and c) scarcity of  South Africa  Rand (ZAR) or US$ currency notes  in circulation. 
Recommendation:  In this context, emergency ‘seed-related’ interventions might 
best  be designed to   inject  money, including currency notes, into the local 
economies.  
 
3. Repeated maize seed distributions (whether by government or NGO) are having 
negative effects.   Among farmers, repeated distributions are altering their strategies 
for accessing seed.  Farmers wait for free seed aid (as soon as upcoming distributions 
are announced via press or radio), instead of trying to access it themselves. Repeated 
deliveries are also undermining the sustainability of agro-dealer business.  Hence, 
direct seed distribution (DSD) of maize is not a ‘do-no-harm’ response.  
Recommendation:  The DSD practice might best be significantly curtailed in both the 
short-term and  the longer-term. 
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4. The multiple, intensive SSSAs have shown that ‘one size does not fit all’.   The four 
sites assessed had different problems and challenges.  A blanket response, such as  
giving  free seed, with or without fertilizer,  may  not solve the problems immediately 
at hand and may not strengthen systems toward recovery and development.  
Recommendation:  Interventions need to be tailored to specific seed security 
constraints.  
 
5. The SSSA found little evidence for farmers’ eating of seed in stress periods.  Accounts 
suggest that farmers eat their seed only; a) If they can easily access desired seed 
again, as is the case for buying pulses on the open markets; or  b) if they  are alerted 
that government or NGO-provided seed is a guaranteed bet.  Recommendation: The 
need for a “Seed Protection Ration” (SPR) might be critically reviewed.   
 
 
Below, we make recommendations for the very short-term (now) and for the short to 
medium term (i.e. the next few seasons). 
 
 
FORMAL SEED SECTOR STRENGTHENING DURING 
EMERGENCY AND EARLY RECOVERY 
 
Agro-dealers are critical conducts through which farmers obtain maize seed, fertilizer and 
other specialized agricultural inputs.  They can only serve small farmers if: a) they continue to 
exist, b) have supplies,  c) are situated in some proximity to farming communities, and d) 
offer products at prices which farmers can afford.   The Relief Seed Business is threatening to 
compromise attributes a  and b, and incentives or subsidies have to be put in place to address 
issues c and d.  
 
Very short term 
 
6. Recommendation:  In the immediate months, all efforts must be made to sustain,  
 not undermine, agro-dealer business during this tenuous financial period.  A good 
 number are just starting to re-open their doors, and it is a ‘make or break’ period for 
 them. 
   
Specific recommendations linked to 6 
  
 6.1  If emergency maize and/or fertilizer are to be given as part of relief programs 
  such distributions should be done via a  voucher system linking farmers to 
  agro-dealers stores or to agro-dealers selling at seed fairs.    
  
  Such a move will help support business recovery, get farmers access to  
  preferred varieties and inputs, and help to inject cash into the local economy. 
  
 6.2 Agro-dealers need to be encouraged to sell closer to farming communities, 
  and growth center areas.  Transport costs mean that rural farmers may pay 
  30-50% more for the same bag of seed sold in the bigger towns.  In the short-
  term, aid organizations might consider adding a transport cost into any  
  voucher program. 
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 6.3 Agro-dealers linked to seed aid programs should be encouraged to package 
  seed and fertilizer products in sizes farmers have potential to access.  While 
  the assessment team saw 1 kg packages of both (re-packed) we suggest 
  seed sizes of  5 and 10 kg (with 2 kg on offer in small quantity) and fertilizer 
  in 5 and 10 kg packs and upwards. 
 
 6.4  Efforts should be made (by donors? government? UN agencies?) to ensure 
  that regional and local agro-dealers can receive adequate stocks to sell.  This 
  might be an issue of reorienting the overall supply away from bulk relief  
  aid purchase.  Mechanisms should also be explored for helping local dealers 
  to receive stocks on consignment or through some credit guarantee  
  arrangement. 
 
Short to medium term 
 
13. Recommendation: The ‘normal’ network of those selling certified maize seed, 
fertilizer, and other specified inputs needs to be expanded and brought closer to 
farming communities on a continued basis.  Formal agro-dealers may not find it 
lucrative to set up shop in less populated and removed areas. Programs such as 
CARE’s ‘trader agents’ in Masvingo have served in the past to broaden agro-supplier 
coverage. (Note: similar programs have unfolded in neighboring Zambia, The Profit 
Program)   Recommendation: The traders agent networks, such as those supported 
by CARE,  should re-vitalized and replicated so as to serve even those in more remote 
areas.  
 
14. As a general recommendation, across the board:, Incentives need to be put in place 
to encourage agro dealers and trader agent suppliers to become more  small farmer 
client oriented.  Client-oriented means putting seed on offer early (July/August rather 
than October/November), offering farmers preferred crops varieties and fertilizers, 
packing in affordable sizes, and selling at points accessible to local farming 
populations.  
  
INFORMAL SEED SECTOR STRENGTHENING DURING 
EMERGENCY AND EARLY RECOVERY 
 The informal seed sector provides the majority of Zimbabwe farmers’ seed:  small 
grains, pulses and tubers. (Important exceptions are seed of maize, wheat and 
horticultural crops).  The informal sector needs to be strengthened so as to provide 
farmers easy access to improved varieties, deliver a good quality seed, and to 
professionalize the processes of seed production, marketing and rural agro-
enterprise more generally.   A healthier informal seed sector will translate into a 
much healthier rural economy. 
 
 
Very short term 
 
15. Recommendation: emergency support programs linking with the informal as well as 
formal sector should concentrate on alleviating seed access problems. Seed fairs with 
vouchers, vouchers linking farmers to agro-dealers  (cited in point 7) and direct cash 
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transfers are all examples of possible aid options which might give farmers increased 
access to crops and varieties of their choice. 
 
Specific recommendations linked to 9 
 
9.1 In terms of seed-related issues, seed voucher and fair operations might best  
 be designed to respond to specific needs of farmers at this moment in time.   
 Access to groundnut seed, and seed of new, especially early maturing 
 varieties, have been cited at various sites as key farmer-sought inputs.   Seed 
 fairs might make extra efforts to engage local and regional agro-dealer 
 suppliers to put on offer modern varieties.  Formal sector suppliers might 
 require a transport premium to take part in these rural  events. 
 
9.2.  Non-seed agricultural inputs also were cited at the forefront of farmer needs 
 in the assessment:  fertilizer, labor, draught power.   Seed fairs might insure 
 that both basal and top dressing fertilizer bags appear on offer in any fair 
 event, and in farmer-friendly sizes.  Use of vouchers to gain access to labor 
 and draught power might also be explored. 
 
9.3   Graduated vouchers might be usefully employed in the upcoming emergency 
 programs.  Basically, graduated vouchers give varied levels of aid and help to 
 distinguish between the very poor, and  those who need a bit of extra help in 
 this time of financial and currency fluctuation. Graduated vouchers can  help 
 lessen  dependencies, as only  those near the bottom of the spectrum 
 should  receive substantial free  support. Average income farmers  (again, 
 somewhat cash insecure) might receive vouchers to cover but parts of their 
 agricultural needs. 
 
9.4.   Giving cash aid as direct assistance might seem unwise at this point in 
 Zimbabwe, where the whole economy is severely cash-strapped.  However, 
 small cash trials could help farmers access their own priority needs, which 
 may include agricultural inputs. 
  
Short to medium term 
 
There is a strong need and opportunity to professionalize and strengthen informal sector 
seed production. 
 
16. Farmer groups (and individual entrepreneurs)  require support to ensure good quality 
seed supplies of what are referred to as the non-commercial or orphan crops  
(basically everything but maize, wheat and horticultural crops). This support implies 
efforts on multiple thrusts, and  needs to be done professionally,  Seed production 
will not succeed unless it is tied to real demand and sustainable market development.  
Recommendation:  Significant effort and funds should be allotted to increase  
informal seed  production capacity and marketing channels.    
   
 Specific recommendations linked to 10 
 
10.2 Local community groups need enhanced capacity in the techniques of seed 
 production.  Farmer Field School experience shows that better isolation 
 distances, variety sorting, improved agronomic practices,  improved storing 
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and storage techniques can lead  to greater availability of good quality seed at 
the local level. Groundnut  seed, in particular, requires enhanced local level 
capacities. 
 
10.2 Farmer groups, whether for seed or food sale, should only be encouraged to 
 produce crops if  clear markets have been identified, and general agro-
 enterprise/ marketing skills enhanced.  Market skill enhancement and 
 market identification has to be the driving force shaping local production 
 initiatives.   
 
10.3 New, modern, farmer-acceptable, and market preferred crops and varieties 
 have to feed on a continuing basis into local production systems, both to 
 boost yields and enhance marketing possibilities.  Across sites, only new 
 maize  varieties enter  farming system with regularity—except when special 
 aid of development programs bring  in new cowpea or sweet potato or pearl 
 millet types.   Recommendation: Links have to be professionalized and 
 sustained to promote variety innovation at the local level.   Farmer Field 
 Schools (FFS),  Participatory Variety selection, new variety small packet sales 
 might all help to raise awareness of and access to new needed varietal 
 materials.  
 
 10.4 Production of foundation seed has to be intensified across of range of non-
  commercial crops, to form the base of an extensive, decentralized, seed  
  production system.  The production of such foundation seed should squarely 
  rest with the national research institution `DR&SS.  (This is not an appropriate 
  or sustainable international agricultural center function).   
 
In brief, we are recommending the development of a market driven local seed 
production model, which scales up foundation seed and then decentralizes seed 
production in scores of zones country- wide.  Supply has to respond to demand, 
meaning that hard to produce crops (e.g. groundnut) and new desired varieties have 
to drive the production process. 
 
11. Local markets are important for farmers’ seed supply, particularly for the pulses. 
More attention should be given to encouraging that these open seed/grain markets 
supply the kinds of potential seed farmers need.  As a point of departure, seed/grain 
traders could be powerful partners in helping to move new modern varieties widely, 
within and among farming communities.  Recommendation:  Strategies should be 
tested for directly linking formal sector seed supply with informal trader seed/grain 
sellers.  Among the approaches that might be tested and evaluated are a) the 
distribution of variety samples (to stimulate demand); and b)  the sale of small 
packets of modern varieties and improved seed at open market venues. 
 
PROMOTING ACCURATE SEED SYSTEM SECURITY 
ASSESSMENTS 
  
 Classic seed need assessments inevitably conclude that ‘seed is needed’ and that the 
response should take the form of direct seed distribution. While innovative at their inception 
(as they distinguished seed aid need from food aid need), such assessments are now 
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outdated, inadequate and should be significantly modified, and urgently. Understanding of 
what happens to seed systems during disaster has become markedly more refined in the last 
five years and   we have learned that distinguishing among seed security constraints is key for 
recovery.  Further, analyses have shown that systems need to be analyzed to gear 
appropriate seed-related responses: seed systems, farming systems, markets and livelihood 
systems more generally. 
 
Short to medium term 
 
12. Recommendation :  Seed security assessment methods have to be significantly 
revamped. 
 
Specific recommendations linked to 12. 
 
 12.1  ` National and regional formats for assessing seed security status should shift  
 from those which calculate simplistic ‘seed needs’ to frameworks which 
 recognize different types of seed security problems, and which tailor 
 responses accordingly.  These problems might include diverse constraints of 
 seed availability, seed access and seed quality, which are distinguished by 
 their presence in the short and in the long term.   The Crop and Food 
 Assessments missions might be among the priority tools to be revised to 
 contain a specific seed security component. 
 
 12.2 Seed security assessment capacity needs to be built at regional and local 
 levels.   Technical tools already exist to help NGO and government 
 agricultural officials move forward on seed security assessments.   An explicit 
 technical process needs to be put in place to: 
• raise awareness of seed security versus food security issues 
• set up local level seed security indicators 
• train local level staff (NGO and government)  in seed security field 
assessments  
 
 12.3  Given the complexity of the stresses in Zimbabwe, “emergency’ seed aid 
  related work has to think strategically and longer-term. Assessments  
  related to seed security, can and should incorporate more developmental 
   elements, including  Issues related  to system stability, opening and   
  strengthening of markets, and  equity concerns. 
   
 This expanded focus suggests that the ‘skill set of those assessing seed 
 security’ has  to be considerably broadened.  Minimally SSSA requires 
 inputs from formal and  informal seed sector specialists, farming system 
 specialists, marketing professionals, and gender/ livelihood analysts.  
 Nutritional expertise might be considered as an  added bonus.   
  
  Specific recommendation: Multidisciplinary teams should be mobilized for 
  seed system security assessments.    
 
 12.4 More generally, a political environment for ‘real seed security assessment’ 
 has to be established.  This is no easy task.  Technical advances in methods 
 alone will not lead to more accurate assessments. 
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Strong seed security frameworks at a national level and strong leadership, ensuring that seed 
security assessment is given focus (as distinct from food security and other non-food item 
assessment),  can enable seed aid assistance in Zimbabwe to become more demand and 
problem driven.  More accurate assessments will bolster the ability of seed- related 
assistance to  address farmers’ compelling seed security problems and to seize on important, 
emerging opportunities. 
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X. ANNEXES 
 
 
• Agro-dealers visited 
 
 
• Persons consulted 
 
 
• Participants at SSSA feedback meeting, July 23, 2009 
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SSSA Zimbabwe:  VISITS TO AGRO-DEALERS   (N=35)  and OPEN MARKETS ( sites= 5) 
 
 
Murehwa 
A1 Seeds 
Seed Co 
 
Bulaweyo 
Bulaweyo Seed Centre 
C. Gauche 
Farm and City Center 
Fort Well 
Jaggers 
MICA Hardware 
ORAP  (ACRONYM?....) 
National Tested Seeds (NTS) 
Red Star 
 
Masvingo 
Advance 
Farm and City Center 
Masvingo Farm Supplies 
N. Richards Hardware 
Red Star 
 
Bikita 
Orellana trading 
Farmer and Builder Merchants 
(+8 small, non-specialty stores—shoes, food 
etc) 
 
 
Beitbridge 
Bambazonke Wholesalers 
N& R Wholesale 
Tagira Supermarket 
Red Star 
 
 
 
 
 
Gweru 
Meikles 
 
Kwekwe 
Farmers Paradise 
 
 
Kadoma 
Farm and City 
 
Chegutu 
Farm and City Center 
 
 
 
 
 
OPEN MARKETS 
 
Harare- Mbare 
Murehwa 
Bulaweyo 
Beitbridge 
Masvingo 
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 Key persons contacted during seed system security assessment 
 
Name Organization 
 
 
HARARE 
 
 
Karel Selenka Catholic Relief Services 
Danisile Hikwa MoA –Division of Crops Research 
John MacRobert CIMMYT 
 Peter Setimela CIMMYT 
Walter  Sanchez CARE 
Garikai Magaya CARE 
Paul Mapfumo SOFECSA 
Chrispen Suvume Univ. of Zimbabwe 
Andrew Mugobo World Vision Zimbabwe 
Rhodes Ndlovu World Vision Zimbabwe 
Farmer Mulagis World Vision Zimbabwe 
Pauline Alexandretta Hobane Consultant 
Michael Jenrich FAO Emergency Unit 
Jacopo D’Amelio FAO 
Kudzayi Karin FAO 
Douglas Magunda FAO 
Ethel Sibanda FAO 
Wellington Mudzamiri FAO 
Felix Dzvurumi FAO 
Jan Wessel USAID/OFDA 
Mark Adams USAID/OFDA 
Scott McNiven USAID 
 M. Jonga Seed Co 
Walter Chigodora Agri Seeds and Services 
Rob Kelly Agri Seeds and Services 
 
MUREHWA 
 
 
Mr. Matiburo District Administration 
Douglas Makuvire Ministry of Agriculture 
T. Chigarira CRS- Murehwa 
Mr. Zanza Grain Marketing Board 
Mr.  Fumhanda Grain Marketing Board 
Cornelius Chirape Pioneer Seed Co. 
Amon COMMUTECH 
 
TSOLOTSHO 
 
 
Davison Masendeke AGRITEX 
Geoff Heinrich CRS 
Willie Makumbe CRS 
Mandlenkosi Mhlanga Red Star Agro-dealer 
Levi Tshuma Fortwell Wholesalers, Limited Agro-dealer 
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Henry Makozhora Jaggers 
Martha Andersen Bulaweyo Seed Center 
Noble Tamanikwa Pannar Seed Company 
Mduduzi Sibanda 
 
COMMUTECH 
 
BEITBRIDGE 
 
 
R.Matanda Bambazonke Enterprises 
Taruona Pembere Red Star 
Sam Goto Tagira Supermarket 
Darlington Chakanya N+R Wholesale 
 
MASVINGO/BIKITA 
 
 
Earnest Musinamwana CARE 
Saison Ncube CARE 
Exile Mhango N. Richards Hardware 
Fameeda Paulser Denbury  Trading t/a Masvingo Farm Supplies  
Shadreck Mahove Nyika Growth Point 
Mrs Anna Zvoushe Zvoushe Store, Bikita 
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Seed Systems Security Report Back Meeting: 23 July 2009 Bronte Hotel, Harare Zimbabwe 
 
 Name Organization Position  
1 Mari Morimoto International Federation of the 
Red Cross 
Monitoring 
2 Stanley Ndlovu International Federation of the 
Red Cross 
Relief delegate 
3 Misheck Charasika World Vision Relief Team Leader 
4 Petros M DAPP Project Manager 
5 Brighton Mvumi Management Technical Learning 
and Coordination Unit 
Agriculture & Food Security 
Coordinator 
6 Takella Shoko AGRITEX - NEWU National Coordinator 
7 Tamuka J Mukura Ministry of Agric  Economist 
8 GM Heinrich  Catholic Relief Services Senior Tech Advisor – Agric 
& Environ 
9 J d’Amelio FAO Coordinator – Information 
Office 
10 G W Chidawanyika World Bank  
11 Tambu Pasipangodya AGRITEX - NEWU Agronomist 
12 Rupangwana Chrispen  AGRITEX Coordinator Planner 
13 Regina Gapa ECHO Program Officer 
14 Allan Majuru ICRISAT Scientific Officer 
15 Locadia Marongwe Seed Co Account Relations Manager 
16 Marshal Mukuvare Zim Red Cross Program Officer 
17 Tafadzwa Makata  Zim Red Cross Food Security Officer 
18 Kudzai Akino WFP Programme Officer 
19 John MacRobert CIMMYT Seed Systems 
20 Ben C Mbaura Practical Action Districts Facilitator  
21 Veronica Mutiro IFAD Consultant 
22 Obert Randi ARC Seed Technologist 
23 Dowsen Sango TDH/Italia M&E Officer 
24 Edson Mugore AusAid Program Advisor 
25 Memory Muchenga Environment Africa Field Officer 
26 Farai Ncube Environment Africa Monitoring and Evaluation 
27 Themos Ntasis IRD Country Director 
28 Jan Robertson Agri - Biotech CEO 
29 Thomas Rogers USAID/OFDA Program Officer 
30 Jan Wessel USAID/OFDA Regional Advisor 
31 Lovemore Musa Lewis Oxfam GB Economic Justice 
Coordinator 
32 Walter Sanchez CARE ANR Sector Coordinator 
33 Erica Keogh MTLC M&E 
34 Mac De Santis SDC Coordinator 
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35 Klaus Leushener GTZ Consultant 
36 Mugove Chakurira CAFOD Program Manager 
37 Pierre Luc 
Vanhaevirbeke 
EC  
38 Glenn Campbell Charter Seeds Director 
39 Tichaona Mashado CAFOD Program Support Officer – 
Agric 
40 Wilfred Munguri CRS Sector Coordinator 
41 Amos Chinyama CRS M&E Officer 
42 Patience Nyakanda APLUS  
43 Sue Kageler UNICEF Consultant M&E 
44 Katrina Wallace 
Karenga 
Development Consultant  
45 Rod Charters GRM MTLC Manager 
46 Davison Masendeke AGRITEX Provincial Agronomist 
47 David Chikodzore Consultant  
48 Bart Mupeta Plan International Food Security & Poverty 
Advisor  
49 Enid Katungi CIAT Agric Economist 
50 Rhodes Ndlovu World Vision Food Security Officer 
51 Douglas Magunda FAO M&E Officer 
52 Pauline Hobane Consultant  
53 Zulu Dube River of Life Procurement 
54 Urayayi Mutsindikwa CRS Agric & Food Security 
Advisor 
55 Annely Koudstaar Netherlands Embassy Program Officer 
56 Elizabeth Ngadze UZ Crop Science Lecturer 
57 Doreen Chimwara IOM AP 
58 Martin Mubvindi CSO PS Officer 
59 Louise Sperling  CIAT Scientist 
60 Dennis Zaranyka Seed Co Managing Director 
61 Walter Chigodora Agriseeds Managing Director 
 
